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1Introduction
Harold Crouch and Hal Hill
Political discussion in Indonesia during the past few years has been
dominated by the question of presidential succession. In March 1993
the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) will meet and,
according to most expectations, re-elect President Soeharto for his
fifth term in office. The re-election of Soeharto, however, will not
resolve the succession issue but merely postpone it. With Soeharto's
re-election virtually a foregone conclusion, the main focus of
attention will be on the vice-presidency. Will the armed forces
stand united behind its own candidate and will President Soeharto
accept that candidate? How would the armed forces react if the
President follows past precedent and nominates his own man? In the
past, the vice-presidency was not a post of vital importance because
it was generally assumed that its incumbent would not succeed to the
presidency. But, bearing in mind that President Soeharto is now
more than 70 years old, it cannot be assumed that fate — in the form
of illness or worse — will not intervene and that he will be able to
serve the full term.
Indonesia has experienced only one presidential succession. That
succession, in the tumultuous circumstances of 1965-68, was
accompanied by civil conflict on an enormous scale in which up to
half-a-million people lost their lives, hundreds of thousands more
were imprisoned and rival units of the armed forces confronted each
other in angry stand-offs.
The past, however, is not necessarily a guide to the future. The
New Order regime's program of depoliticization narrowed the
permissible boundaries of ideological conflict while political
parties and mass organizations were in effect deprived of their mass
bases. At the same time, the economic decline of the later years of
Sukarno's rule was reversed by the rapid growth and
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industrialization achieved under Soeharto. Although the majority
of Indonesians are still very poor, significant improvements were
experienced by most sections of the population, while a new
educated middle class appeared in the cities and towns. Consisting
of businessmen (and women), managers, professionals and other
white-collar workers, the new middle class has a strong stake in the
evolution of a stable and orderly political system.
As the Soeharto era draws to its inevitable close, Indonesia
seems to be approaching a kind of political crossroads. The last few
years have witnessed important trends which may or may not
continue in the post-Soeharto era. The role of the military in
government has declined gradually but steadily while there has
been some progress toward political keterbukaan (openness). A
widening range of political issues has been debated in the press and
specific proposals have been put forward, for example, to limit the
terms of office of future presidents and to reduce armed forces
representation in the legislatures. These trends have been
accompanied by much speculation about the values and aspirations
of the new middle class and their impact on political development.
Will the trend to democratization continue in the post-Soeharto era
or will the military reassert its domination over the government?
In the 1992 Indonesia Update conference held at the Australian
National University on 28 August 1992 the focus was on 'Political
Perspectives on the 1990s'. The papers presented at that conference
(plus one paper not presented) constitute the chapters in this book.
Part One consists of surveys of recent economic and political
developments written respectively by the editors and an analysis by
Herb Feith of the East Timor issue. In Part Two, six prominent
Indonesians put forward their own perspectives on how Indonesian
politics might develop in the 1990s. The conference was opened by
Senator Chris Schacht, the Chairman of the Australian
Parliament's Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.
The six Indonesians have different backgrounds and offered a
range of different political perspectives. Lieutenant-General
Hasnan Habib is a retired general and former ambassador; Jusuf
Wanandi heads the influential Jakarta think-tank, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies; Marzuki Darusman was, until
the recent election, a 'vocal' member of the Golkar faction in
parliament; Abdurrachman Wahid is the leader of Indonesia's
largest Muslim organization, the Nahdatul Ulama; Mulya Lubis is
a prominent lawyer and human rights advocate; and Arief Budiman
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is a well-known academic and social critic. The six Indonesians were
in agreement that significant political changes had taken place
during the 1980s. In particular it was agreed that some sort of
democratization process had begun although it was not clear how
far it would go. According to Marzuki Darusman, the original New
Order system was based on what he called 'technocratic
developmentalism' which 'forecloses real public participation and
thereby manifests inherent authoritarian principles'. But in recent
years, there has been 'a consistent but extremely graduated process
of democratization'. For example, the parliament has been more
assertive and it is expected that the special security powers
exercised by the President since 1966 will be withdrawn in 1993.
Marzuki envisages that eventually the parliament would enjoy 'a
more balanced and supervisory relationship with the executive as
provided in the constitution'.
Jusuf Wanandi regards the democratization process as a response
to the emergence of the new middle class which has expanded as a
result of economic development during the New Order era. Although
many members of this new class are more interested in economic
advancement than in politics, they also want more opportunities for
political participation. The new middle class, says Mulya Lubis,
has an interest in 'the guarantee of the rule of law as opposed to the
rule of the ruler, favoritism, or primordialism', while Arief
Budiman notes that they were alienated by 'nepotistic monopolism1,
over-regulation of the economy, limits on freedom of expression and
disregard of the rule of law. One sign of increased middle-class
political participation is what Marzuki calls the 'phenomenal
growth in the last five years of a significant number of non
governmental organizations' although he feels that democratic
pressures are still quite 'feeble' at this stage.
Marzuki also raises the question of the possible link between
democratization and economic deregulation. While he concedes that
'it would be difficult to specifically correlate economic
deregulation with political democratization at this point', he
believes that in the long run 'it is inevitable that further
deregulation will eventually require democratization'. In similar
vein, Mulya Lubis sees a link between economic development and
respect for human rights. According to him, 'maintaining the pace of
economic development will require, among other things, certainty of
law and human rights guarantees'.
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While agreeing that economic development has brought about
substantial structural change in society, Arief is of the opinion that
the process is still far from sufficiently advanced to provide a social
basis for an enduring democracy in which the power of the state is
balanced by forces rooted in society. The new middle class is still
divided along racial and religious lines and it feels threatened by
the possibility of 'unexpected eruptions from below'. While the
middle class wants increased participation, Arief believes that, for
them, change 'has to be done in an orderly way, through the existing
political institutions' and without social upheaval. The
democratization of the last few years, therefore, is less a result of
middle class pressure than a by-product of rivalries within the
military elite. As long as the elite is divided, 'People can criticize
one faction of the "powers that be" because they are protected by
other factions. But if elite rivalry were to subside, Arief fears that
the democratic space would become narrower.
General Hasnan Habib portrays the armed forces (ABRI) as
committed to a mission to defend, protect and uphold the unitary
republic, the 1945 constitution and Pancasila. It was only when these
principles were endangered by the ineffectiveness and
mismanagement of civilan governments, he asserts, that ABRI felt
compelled to intervene in the political process. But with the defeat
of communism and the entrenchment of Pancasila, there is now less
need for the military to play the dominant role. According to
General Hasnan, the concept of Dwifungsi does not imply permanent
military domination of the government and he notes a gradual
retrenchment of the military's political role during the last five
years. He concludes that, while ABRI will continue to participate in
politics, it should 'not dictate'. Jusuf Wanandi, however, put his
finger on the dilemma faced by military officers in the process of
democratization. Jusuf characterized the old generation of military
officers as 'very concerned and even rather obsessed with political
stability and national unity' and therefore reluctant to relinquish
power to civilians. Increasing openness and civilian participation,
on the other hand, will require a 'readiness on their part to
implement decisions and ideas that will reduce their political
power in relative terms'.
The success of civilianization, said General Hasnan, will
depend on the performance of the civilians themselves. According to
Jusuf Wanandi, The problem for the future is how to promote
political participation in accordance with people's expectations
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without endangering the unity of the nation and the stability of the
country'. Thus, in pushing for a larger civilian role, Jusuf advises
civilians to be patient and to exercise self-restraint. He warns that
from time to time the government would be bound to implement
unpopular measures that could lead to popular opposition. In
addition, there would always be some civilians who would be
impatient with gradual change. The leaders of Golkar and other
parties and organizations would have to control their supporters in
order to avoid pushing ABRI into a corner from which it might
respond in ways that could upset the whole process. In particular it
will not be easy to extend the scope for civilian participation in a
way that does not undermine political stability and national unity
in a country that is still vulnerable to conflict based on 'ethnic,
religious and even regional animosities'. While the new middle
class wants to extend opportunities for political participation, Arief
points out that it also fears social conflict and upheaval and
therefore wants to preserve the strong state that, it seems to many of
them, only the military can provide.
Abdurrachman Wahid is particularly concerned that Indonesia
might be returning to what he calls 'the old politics' when Islamic
groups were in constant conflict with the abangan (nominal Muslim)
and Christian communities. Recent developments, such as the
persistence of old loyalties in the recent election and President
Soeharto's wooing of Islamic groups, leads Wahid to ask whether
'the political strategy of de-ideologising Indonesian politics is still
feasible'. He fears that the present trend might culminate in the re-
emergence of Muslim 'firebrands' with 'anti-this-and-anti-that'
attitudes. As a consequence 'the effort to de-ideologize politics in
Indonesia will be difficult to sustain any longer without resorting to
undemocratic ways'. The 'grave challenge' facing Indonesia,
therefore, is how to de-confessionalize politics 'without resorting to
unconstitutional instruments'.
During the 1990s, the political process in Indonesia will also be
subject to international pressures, especially on human rights and
democratization issues. Both Arief and Mulya expect international
pressures to have a positive impact but both, at least in the long run,
regard pressures arising from domestic developments as decisive. In
his opening remarks, Senator Schacht firmly rejected the idea that
basic human rights varied from culture to culture. As he put it, 'I
have yet to come across anyone who likes to be summarily executed,
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or taken off and tortured, or have their kids conscripted into the
army, or be beaten up without recourse to the law'.
In regard to East Timor, Herb Feith believes that the
international reaction to the shooting of 'mourner-demonstrators' in
Dili on 12 November 1991 has led to increased public awareness of
the situation in Dili. He portrays Indonesia's East Timor policy in
1992 as 'an uncertain and occasionally contradictory combination of
repression and sealing off on the one hand and sensitivity to
international opinon on the other'. Feith believes that in these
circumstances international pressures are still vital and that
Australia and Indonesia have a common interest in the adoption of
new guidelines for resolving claims for self-determination which
break 'the nexus between self-determination and secession'.
The contributors to this book do not anticipate drastic changes in
the Indonesian political order during the 1990s, although
Abdurrahman Wahid warned of the possible revival of conflict over
the place of Islam in Indonesia's political life. Despite detecting 'a
whisper for change' in the 1992 election result, Arief Budiman
remained pessimistic and predicted that 'Politics in the 1990s will
still be pretty much the same as in the 1980s'. The other Indonesian
contributors, however, expect change in the direction of
democratization but they all think that the process will be gradual
and could be reversed if accompanied by signs of social conflict and
political upheaval.
2Opening Address: Indonesia Update 1992
Senator Chris Schacht
Chairman, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
Australian Parliament
The 1992 Indonesia Update is of particular significance for a number
of reasons. Firstly, this is the tenth Indonesia Update conference. It
has been described by Hal Hill and Terry Hull as 'an important
element in developing a more sophisticated understanding of
Indonesia among Australian policy makers, academics and business
people'. That alone makes it an important contributor to Australian-
Indonesian relations. Secondly, the theme of this Conference is
Political Perspectives on the 1990s. In this year, an election for the
People's Consultative Assembly has been held. The selection of the
President will be undertaken by that body in 1993. This is certainly
a most relevant time to examine likely political developments in
Indonesia. We are therefore indeed fortunate to have attracted such
an eminent panel of speakers to discuss the subject today. Finally,
this conference is being held at a time when the Committee of which
I am chair, the Parliament's Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade, is holding an inquiry into Australia's relations
with Indonesia.
If I may, I would like to mention a few things about this inquiry.
To date, it has held ten public hearings: in Melbourne, Canberra,
Sydney, Darwin and Broome. Two further days of hearings are
scheduled for Perth next week, with another four days of hearings in
Canberra and Melbourne likely. Seven volumes of submissions, about
150 in all, have been published. While we would like to table our
report in 1992, this may not be possible.
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This inquiry by the Joint Committee is the thud in a series about
our region. This series began with an inquiry into Australia's foreign
relations with the island states of the South Pacific. A report on
this subject was tabled in April 1989. The Committee then examined
our relations with Papua New Guinea and a report on relations with
our closest northern neighbour was tabled in the Parliament in
December 1991.
Our inquiry has uncovered a great deal of information about
Australian-Indonesian relations. You will all have to wait until it
is tabled to find out our conclusions and recommendations.
Some of the issues which have come up in submissions and at
public hearings include legal and illegal fishing off the north and
north-western coast, exchanges of teachers between our countries,
sister city and state/province relationships, the sale of educational
services to Indonesia, defence aspects of the relationship and the
work of the Australia-Indonesia Institute. These areas and others
will be dealt with in our report.
It has been pointed out by a number of people that our two
countries are about as unlike as neighbours can be. They sometimes
refer to 'periods of difficulty' in the relationship. Those who have
made this sort of statement often follow it up by adding that it does
seem to have acquired a depth and maturity over the past few
years. This is probably true, as can perhaps be demonstrated by
thinking back to the reaction to an article in The Sydney Morning
Herald by David Jenkins in 1986. This article dealt with the
business dealings of the Soeharto family. Similar, perhaps more
pointed, stories have been published in 1992, with few if any of the
problems to the overall relationship which were seen in 1986.
However, it is also true that a number of witnesses have drawn
attention to the small amount of knowledge each country has of the
other. One of the minor but interesting things to have come out of the
Joint Committee's inquiry has been some information on the teaching
of Indonesian language and culture in Australia. The decline in the
study of this language was mentioned in a number of submissions and
at several public hearings. The Committee has also been told that
education is central to the relationship between Indonesia and
Australia. The same witness went on to say that there is a need to
spend more money on the education of Australians in the Indonesian
language and culture. Another witness told us that language is
fundamental to understanding another society, another culture. A
representative of one of the Commonwealth Departments observed
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that Australia's overall educational relationship with Indonesia is
somewhat fragmented. That statement clearly supports other
evidence we have received.
I should also mention that not all the submissions, nor the
evidence at public hearings, have concentrated on East Timor or
human rights issues. We have in fact received a wide range of quite
mixed comments on many aspects of the Indonesian-Australian
relationship. The range of this material has been one of the most
heartening aspects of the inquiry.
It would be pointless to deny that one of the difficulties in the
Indonesian-Australian relationship is that of human rights.
Notwithstanding the difficulties which will occur from time to
time, the relationship will develop further. As our Indonesian
neighbours expect us to adjust to the things that are different in
their culture, so they too must understand that a concern about
human rights is part of Australia's values. This concern is, of course,
not solely focussed on Indonesia. Some would say that 'cultural
relativism' demands we ignore abuses of human rights in Indonesia.
Despite these claims from the users of such wonderful phrases, the
Australian cultural and political system means we must raise our
concerns about human rights with other nations. It follows,
incidentally, that we too must accept criticism of abuses of human
rights in our own country.
As human rights issues have been raised, there are a couple of
comments I would like to make, not only as Chair of the Joint
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, but also as Chair
of the Human Rights Sub-Committee. I do not accept the argument of
cultural relativism. I have had an opportunity in the last five years
to visit countries like South Africa, Burma, China, Indonesia,
Ethiopia, the Sudan and I have yet to come across anyone who likes
to be summarily executed, or taken off and tortured, or have their
kids conscripted into the army, or be beaten up without recourse to
the law. No matter which culture you come from, I have yet to
discover anyone who thinks cultural relativism is a good idea if it
allows you to do that to your own people. I take a very strong view
that you don't have to be well-educated or conversant with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to understand
what human rights are about.
Human rights are about the right to live without being abused,
killed, tortured, or locked up. It is a very simple human right and I
think even the most ill-educated peasant understands the difference
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between happiness and pain. I don't think there is any doubt that
we should not be backward as a country in arguing that cultural
relativism is an excuse to abuse human rights, and it should not be
used as a defence, because the ordinary people of the third world, or
the developing world, appreciate human rights as much as we in the
western world.
On the question of individualism versus collectivism, it is often
implied that individualism is a western concept while other
cultures have a collective view. However, I do not think you can get
decent collective human rights unless you guarantee individual
human rights. I do not think you can achieve collective human
rights if at the same time, you are abusing your own people. When it
gets to the bottom line in any country, I would have thought the
right of an individual to stand against the majority view without
being abused or locked up is very, very important. Once that is
established, you then can have an argument about what are the
collective human rights such as delivering social, economic and
other services to make sure that people get a decent standard of
living.
I would also like to comment on the observation that people in
Jakarta, who may be reformers or progressives or democrats often do
not have a particular view about East Timor. This is not unusual. For
example, when I was in China last year leading the Australian
parliamentary human rights delegation, I spoke privately to many
of the reformers who want change in China, yet when I raised Tibet
with them, there was silence. Even though they are reformers and
want democracy in China, the idea that Tibet could be independent
and sovereign was not in their thinking at all. Tibet for them was
part of China and all their comments were very similar to those of
the Government — that a lot of money was spent in Tibet raising the
standard of living and they should be grateful that so much money
had been spent. It reminded me of some of the remarks made by
rednecks in Australia about all the money spent on Aborigines and
that they should be more grateful. I suspect that perception is not
unusual in many countries.
With respect to negotiations about East Timor, we have had a
lot of submissions to the inquiry into Australia's relations with
Indonesia. Many of them just give factual details of eye-witness
accounts of what happened, but no one has really tried to address in
a realistic way how to conduct a dialogue with Indonesia to improve
the human rights situation in East Timor. I think in the long run the
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differences and the difficulties in East Timor will be resolved as
Indonesia becomes more democratic. If the civilization continues
apace with the economic development, many members of the
Indonesian elite in Jakarta, both in and outside the military, will
want Indonesia to have a role in the world commensurate with its
size and its population, and its role in ASEAN. It is very difficult to
play that role when every few years there may be a massacre in
East Timor that gets headlines all round the world and results in a
whole range of countries carrying resolutions condemning you for
human rights abuse. If a country like Indonesia is going to play an
important role, which it surely will do, I think many more people in
Indonesia will realise that you can't go on having this sore
irregularly erupting in East Timor. I suspect that in the longer run,
other developing countries will come to a similar conclusion. Maybe
even China in dealing with Tibet will realise that it cannot develop
a major role in the world when every few years there's a major
scandal or problem in Tibet.
I think that if you are concerned about East Timor in human
rights terms, the main point is to talk to Indonesia generally about
political developments and hope that the economic developments
which are taking place will go hand in hand with those political
developments. One thing is quite clear in Southeast Asia. As people
become more prosperous and start to get a decent standard of living
and the so-called middle class develops, they then start asking the
obvious question, why can't we have more of a say about the way we
run our country? Why can't we have a say in getting rid of
governments we dislike? Why can't we have a say in getting rid of
corruption, which affects our lifestyles and the running of our lives?
When I was in Thailand in July, one of the Thai ministers told
me that a survey of the people who demonstrated against the
Suchinda Government in May showed that, of those hundreds of
thousands of people on the street, only 15 per cent were university
students while 20 per cent were small business people and 45 per cent
were middle-class income-earners. The majority of the people lying
in the streets were fed up with corruption and the dominance of the
military because they had access to income and a good standard of
living. When I asked him how the organization took place, he said
it was through the technological revolution. He said many people
had mobile telephones — when they were on the streets lying down
in front of the tanks, they could ring friends at the back of the
demonstrations and tell them the tanks were coming. I even heard
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from our Australian Embassy officials that people on the streets
being shot at were using mobile telephones to ring the Australian
Embassy to tell them what was going on. It is clear that the
technological revolution is breaking down the ability of
governments to control access to information and may well destroy
the ability of countries — all countries — to control programming. If
it means that more people get access to information and put pressure
on, or even overthrow one-party governments, I think that the
technological revolution ought to be supported.
I think that in the context of a forum such as this, which has
such a range of people with expertise on relationships between
Australia and Indonesia, the East Timor debate is about general
human rights. It should be a debate put in that broader context,
because that is part of our culture, and we cannot ignore it. I think
the way East Timor will be resolved will be through wider economic
and then political development in the broader Indonesian
community.
It is an incorrect notion to suggest we would break off relations
with another country simply because of human rights abuses,
however important the concept may be to us. For the future,
therefore, the only thing we can predict with certainty about our
relations with Indonesia is that we will continue to raise human
rights issues, whether specifically or in general terms.
On a positive note, I would like to remind you of a statement
made by our Prime Minister in Jakarta, during his visit to Indonesia
in April of this year:
In establishing political stability and economic progress in
Indonesia, your Government has contributed to stability and
prosperity in the wider Southeast Asian region. Australia is among
the beneficiaries. We gain commercially, of course, but just as
importantly, our national security benefits from a benign
environment where not so many years ago there was great
uncertainty and volatility.
It is clear that, in spite of occasional differences on human
rights, the level of cooperation between our two countries is
significant in many areas. For example, at the regional level, we
reached agreement on the Timor Gap Treaty. At the international
level, the Indonesian role in the complex and sophisticated
Cambodian peace settlement was significant. Cooperation in these
areas may well be the start of a constructive relationship in a range
of other regional matters. The Indonesian role in the Non-Aligned
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Movement gives it considerable influence with many nations around
the world. Its leadership in that organization is quite significant
and must be recognized. Indonesia is a major supporter of the Cairns
Group; it is engaging in constructive dialogue in matters relating to
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (or APEC). It is also clear that it
has welcomed Australia's increased emphasis on becoming part of
Asia.
These are not the actions of a jealous, inward-looking neighbour.
They should give us all heart for the future of the relationship. I
have already referred to concerns about the lack of knowledge each
country has of the other and that may well be one of the greatest
problems facing both countries.
It would be remiss of me, given our venue today, not to mention
the significant contribution made to Indonesian studies by this
university. While this knowledge is recognized in the academic
community and by those with particular, specialized needs or
interests, it is not generally widely known or available to the
general community. Without the scholarship of individuals at the
ANU, and the work of the Indonesia Project, it is possible that our
relationship with Indonesia would have been more difficult than it
has sometimes been. As was said to the Committee at a public
hearing in April, the institutional memory here at ANU goes back
to the 1950s. There are a number and quality of experts gathered
here in a range of disciplines. This means that a perspective is
available which is quite different from the '30 second grab' and can
place current events in the invaluable context of what has happened
in the past.
If such knowledge is used at all, it is usually used badly. The
Australian-Indonesian relationship is important and the better for
the holding of conferences such as this. That it is an annual review,
albeit with a different theme each year, makes it the more
valuable and relevant. That does not mean everyone will be
comfortable with everything which will be said here today, as
Australia is also being examined in many ways.
I would like to thank Hal Hill and his team for doing me the
honour of inviting me here today to speak to you. You have a
fascinating program in front of you and I am glad I will be able to
listen to some of the speakers with you. In opening this important
conference, I wish all participants well and look forward to seeing
the results in published form in due course.

Part I:
Recent Economic
and Political Developments

3The Economy, 1991/921
Hal Hill
Introduction
The years 1991/92 have posed major challenges for Indonesia's
economic managers and the economy in mid-1992 presents a very
mixed picture. On the positive side of the ledger, activity remains
buoyant, much more so than most observers had expected. In 1991
real GDP grew at 6.6 per cent. This is a creditable performance in
view of the sluggish global economy, a serious drought which
resulted in a poor rice harvest for the second successive year, and the
government's tight money policy as reflected in continuing high
interest rates. The government appears to have been able to control
the potentially serious inflationary problem of 1990-91 while avoiding
a Tiard landing'. The 1991 figure is explained in part by a one-off
expansion in the mining sector. But, in addition, industrial export
growth has been most impressive. Manufactured exports increased by
almost 25 per cent in 1991, boosted especially by the performance in a
range of labour-intensive industries, and reversing decisively the poor
growth record of 1990. That Indonesia registers such expansion in a
year of low global economic and trade growth is testimony to its
growing, broad-based industrial competence, and its capacity to
achieve export growth through increased market share. This export
performance also contributed to a much smaller current account
deficit for 1991/92 than many forecasters had projected and the
government had feared.
This chapter draws particularly on my August 1992 'Survey of Recent
Developments' in the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies (Hill, 1992),
together with the two preceding Surveys (Manning, 1992; Muir, 1991)
and a preliminary version of the December 1992 Survey (Tomich, 1992).
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Nevertheless, the government is still grappling with a range of
daunting short and long-run economic policy challenges. Inflationary
pressures are waning, but they have not disappeared altogether. To
slow down an over-heated economy the government has arguably
relied too heavily on monetary policy and not enough on fiscal policy.
Lending rates in the formal banking sector have been stubbornly high,
in the range 25-30 per cent, prompting many observers to wonder
why there have been so few reported corporate collapses, especially
among firms oriented primarily towards the domestic market. The
country's external indebtedness, of some $75 billion, is cause for
concern, especially as a number of international banks and
development agencies appear to be reluctant to increase their
exposure in Indonesia. Cronyism, politically-sanctioned business
monopolies, and the business affairs of several powerful individuals
have all become the subject of increasingly vociferous private — and,
at a more restrained pitch, public — comment and debate. Perhaps
inevitably, supply-side constraints to growth in the area of physical
and social infrastructure are not being removed quickly enough. It is
partly for this reason that Indonesia has registered growth rates of
'only' around 7 per cent in the recent past, in contrast to the double-
digit performances of some of its neighbours.
The following section examines major macroeconomic
developments, including economic growth, the balance of payments,
fiscal performance, and inflation. In Section 3, the policy environment
is assessed, including a number of recent government initiatives, and
the debate over business monopolies. The final section investigates a
number of broader issues, among them Indonesia's role in ASEAN
and East Asia, socio-economic development in the lagging regions of
Eastern Indonesia, and the new institutional arrangements for
international aid to Indonesia.
Macroeconomic Survey
Economic Growth and Structural Change. The 1991 national accounts
indicate that the economy grew much faster than most observers
expected. The officially estimated growth rate, 6.6 per cent, was not
significantly below the strong expansion recorded in the two previous
years (Table 1). Three features of the accounts are particularly notable.
First, for the first time since 1985, the oil sector (oil, LNG and refining)
grew faster than the non-oil economy. The oil growth reflects
volume effects — high prices and a relaxation of OPEC quotas
induced a temporary, one-off production increase. Secondly, the
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effects of the 1991 drought are clearly evident: food crop production,
dominated by rice, declined, and this followed only a marginal
increase in 1990.
Table 1: Economic Growth, 1989 -91a
( per cent)
1989 1990 1991
Agriculture 3.32 2.00 1.34
Food crops 3.97 0.52 -0.58
small-holders 1.16 3.93 4.92
plantations 9.34 9.07 5.73
livestock 1.45 3.74 4.85
forestry -3.87 2.97 -1.02
fishery 6.78 4.95 5.01
Mining 4.85 4.95 9.26
Industry 9.20 12.19 9.81
non-oil 11.57 12.97 10.56
oil refining 0.90 10.07 3.13
natural gas 2.52 9.56 8.39
Utilities 12.15 17.89 16.14
Construction 11.77 13.52 10.95
Trade, Hotels & Restaurant 10.74 7.07 5.35
Transport & Communications 11.51 9.57 7.04
Financial Services 14.35 14.06 12.74
Accommodation 4.18 4.21 4.03
Government and Defence 5.86 4.60 2.81
Other Services 6.19 5.01 5.30
GDP 7.46 7.14 6.60
excluding oil & gas 8.25 7.53 6.24
agrowth rates based on constant 1983 prices
Source: BPS
A third important feature of the 1991 national accounts is that for the
first time in the nation's history manufacturing output exceeded that
of agriculture. This is an historic turning point in Indonesian
20 Hal HOI
economic development. Although the event was hastened by the poor
rice harvests, its fundamental origins lie in the impressive, export-
oriented industrial growth which has occurred since 1986. The speed
of the structural change in the last quarter century is revealed in the
fact that over the period 1966-91 the share of manufacturing in GDP
has risen from 8 per cent to 22 per cent, while that of agriculture has
declined from 51 per cent to 19 per cent.
Structural change has of course been a good deal slower as
measured by shifts in employment shares.2 The 1990 Population
Census revealed that, for the first time, agriculture's share of
employment dipped (very marginally) below 50 per cent, declining
from 56.3 per cent recorded in the 1980 Census. The manufacturing
share rose (9.1 per cent to 11.6 per cent), but there are still more than
four times as many people who derive their primary livelihood from
agriculture as compared to manufacturing. Indeed, a surprising
feature of the 1990 Census results is the fact that agricultural growth
accelerated in the 1980s, increasing at an annual rate of 2.5 per cent
compared to 1.2 per cent in the 1970s. At a national level, agriculture
provided one-third of the new jobs in the 1980s, much higher than the
incremented share of manufacturing (of 18 per cent). Nevertheless,
the rapid pace of industrialization in Java is clearly evident:
manufacturing provided the largest net addition to employment (24.9
per cent), marginally ahead of trade, restaurants, and hotels (24.1 per
cent) and agriculture (19.2 per cent).
The fortunes of the key economic sectors varied considerably. In
food crops, as noted, the performance was very poor. It was
somewhat better for the other agricultural sub-sectors, except forestry
where export bans and the exhaustion of easily accessible stands of
timber explain the stagnant picture. Among cash crops, both small
holders and plantations, the record has been better, in spite of
generally low international commodity prices. Palm oil and cocoa, in
particular, continue to register impressive output growth.
The mining sector grew strongly in 1991, by almost 9 per cent in
the case of oil and gas and 10 per cent for non-oil mining. Supported
by strong prices in the first half of the year, the relaxation of OPEC
quotas, and a generally conducive (though fiscally tough) commercial
environment, oil and gas activities were at record levels. The total
number of active contracts let by Pertamina is the highest in
Indonesia's history, and exploration and development expenditures
This paragraph draws on Manning (1992, pp 28-30).
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rose threefold between 1987 and 1991. Following the relaxation of
quotas, crude oil export volumes rose by some 20 per cent above the
annual average output of recent years, while LNG volumes continued
to grow strongly. This growth has also been facilitated by the
extension of a number of long-term agreements between Pertamina
and the oil companies. The most recent of these was the
announcement in March that Pertamina and Caltex had agreed in
principle to a 20-year extension using a 90:10 profit division in favour
of Pertamina. In September the government introduced an additional
package of fiscal incentives which allows contractors to retain a larger
share of production in any new gas fields they develop, and to keep a
bigger share of oil produced in remote and difficult locations.
Accelerated depreciation allowances were also provided for, and the
pricing formula for compulsory local sales made more favourable.
In spite of these positive developments, there is still some concern
that Indonesia's oil investment climate is insufficiently attractive,
especially compared to terms on offer by other oil producers.
Moreover, the contribution of the oil sector to the economy will fall
sharply in 1992. In January the government announced it will be
cutting oil production in accord with the OPEC response to a
softening international oil market; the decline is likely to be from 1.45
to 1.425 million barrels per day. Indonesia's minas crude sold for an
average price of $17.75 during the first four months of 1992, about half
the peak price of October 1990, but marginally above the 1992/93
budget estimate. There is some prospect of price recovery, but the rise
is likely to be modest in view of increased production in the Middle
East and sluggish demand growth in the OECD.
The major development in non-oil mining is the rapid expansion
of the coal sector. Over the period 1988-91, the volume of coal
production and exports has risen by about 300 per cent and 500 per
cent respectively. Coal has emerged as another of Indonesia's
significant non-oil exports, and the prospects for further expansion
are considered excellent, especially as the coal is generally low in
sulphur content. The Minister of Mining and Energy has recently
forecast that coal production by the end of the century would be
about 80 million metric tons (mt), of which at least 20 million mt
would be for export. These figures represent a six- and threefold
increase respectively on the 1991 levels, and would make Indonesia a
very significant player in the regional coal trade. The spectacular
increase in output is explained by the decisions through the 1980s to
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open the industry to the private sector, and by big investments in
associated infrastructure development, especially port facilities.
Manufacturing output continues to expand quickly, the non-oil
sector at double-digit rates. Export growth rebounded strongly and
output increased rapidly in 1991. Particularly impressive gains were
recorded in the area of labour-intensive export growth, which are
likely to spearhead Indonesia's export expansion in the 1990s.
However, industries oriented towards the domestic market and
dependent on high levels of protection have experienced slow growth
or even dedine, and a number of firms are in financial difficulty.
The most spectacular export growth continues to be recorded in
textiles, clothing and footwear. Textile and clothing exports doubled
between 1989 and 1991 (Table 2), an astonishing performance in view
of declining OECD growth rates and tightening MFA quotas. They
have now become Indonesia's major manufactured export, accounting
for about one-third of the total, and easily surpassing plywood, the
dominant export item of the 1980s. The growth of footwear exports
has been faster still, rising from $1 million to almost $1 billion in a
little over a decade, and quadrupling between 1989 and 1991.
The immediate prospects for continued strong growth, albeit at a
slower pace, are encouraging for at least three reasons. First, textile
and footwear machinery imports rose by one-third in 1991, after more
than doubling the previous year. Secondly, footwear exports have
never been quota-restrained while, paradoxically, after encountering
serious quota restrictions in the late 1980s, textile and garment
exporters are likely to face few quota problems in the large US market
in the next few years. Finally, the export quota allocation system is
now functioning more smoothly — though the problems are by no
means resolved — and the debilitating dispute among rival producer
associations within the industry has subsided, at least in its most
public manifestations.
Other labour-intensive export industries are also performing well.
For much of the 1980s Indonesia missed out on the massive
globalization of the electronics industry. The multinational
corporations which dominate the industry were deterred by the
country's still restrictive foreign investment climate, and by physical
and regulatory obstacles to international trade. However, the reforms
of the late 1980s are making Indonesia a more attractive location for
these export-oriented, assembly-type operations. Thus in each of the
past two years electronic exports have doubled (Table 2), and among
manufactures they now rank behind only textiles and garments,
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Table 2. Major Manufactured Exports, 1980-91*
($ million)
1980 1985 1989 1990 1991
Labour-intensive 297 807 3,073 4,634 6,814
( per cent of total) (59) (39) (44) (51) (58)
Clothing (84) 98 339 1,170 1,646 2,265
Fabrics (652-9) 43 227 727 1,132 1,552
Yam (651) 3 13 112 109 204
Footwear (85) 1 8 220 570 994
Electronics (76-77) 97 81 123 204 403
Furniture (82) 3 7 167 286 385
Toys & sporting goods (894) n n 21 57 142
Glass & products (664-5) 3 8 77 80 91
Oils & perfumes (551) 21 23 32 60 94
Resource-Intensive 119 992 2,838 3,324 3«488
( per cent of total) (24) (49) (40) (37) (30)
Plywood (634) 68 941 2,414 2,791 3,034
Cement & products (661) 26 22 133 100 48
Leather (611) 6 8 69 64 46
Capital-intensive 85 245 1,107 1,083 1,514
( per cent of total) (17) (12) (16) (12) (13)
Fertiliser (562) 35 80 164 193 297
Paper & products (64) S 21 166 154 266
Steel products (672-9) 8 28 343 188 249
Rubber tyres (625) n 7 65 66 58
Total 501 2,044 7,018 9,041 11,816
aThe 'narrow' definition of manufactures is employed here. Numbers in parentheses
refer to STPC codes. The following definitions (in terms of SiIV codes) are used for
the major groups:
Labour-intensive: S1TC 54, 55, 65, 664-666, 695-697, 76-77, 793, 8 (excl. 86-88).
Resource-intensive: SITC 61, 63, 66 (excl. 664-666), 671.
Capital-intensive: SITC 5 (excl. 54-5), 62, 64, 672-9, 69 (excl. 695-7), 7 (excl. 76-
77), 86-88.
Source: BPS, Ekspor, various
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plywood and footwear in value. Exports of a range of miscellanous
light manufactures are also growing rapidly, spurred on by the same
factors behind the garments success story. Notable in this new group
is toys, exports of which rose from $2.3 million to $62 million 1988-91.
Prospects for rapid expansion are considered excellent, partly as the
regional industry diversifies its production base away from China.
By contrast, the automotive industry is facing difficulties at least as
serious as those during the recession years of 1985-86 and 1982-83.
Production rose sharply in 1988-90, from 156,000 to 272,000 units, but
fell in 1991 to 255,000 and is likely to slump further this year to as low
as 200,000. Output of light commercial vehicles such as colts and the
kijang continued to increase through to 1991; by contrast, sharp cuts
have been experienced in sedans, and buses and trucks. All major
automotive producers are reported to be in some financial difficulty,
and unsold stocks are estimated to exceed 40,000 units. The main
cause of the problem is high interest rates and tight consumer finance
(14 per cent of consumer bad debts are said to involve automobiles).
The introduction of a luxury tax in January 1991 may have also
deterred some consumers. More generally, the industry is facing the
limits of import substitution. Exports are small, about $50 million.
Being almost wholly domestic-market oriented, it is inevitable that the
industry experiences such sharply fluctuating fortunes. There is now
a greater appreciation within the industry that government
intervention is a two-edged sword: generous import protection
balanced by ever-increasing local content requirements and high
input prices, notably for steel.
What of the prospects for 1992? It is premature to make firm
predictions, but the general consensus is that growth will be
somewhat lower, perhaps around 5.5-6 per cent. Oil sector growth is
expected to decline sharply; domestic-market oriented manufacturing
and service activities will also be affected by the government's tight
fiscal and monetary policies. On the other hand, owing to a good
rainy season, food crop production has rebounded strongly, and rice
production will most likely increase by over 3 per cent in 1992. A
good deal will depend on whether non-oil exports can sustain the
growth momentum.
Inflation and interest rates. It is now clear that the government has
successfully curbed the serious inflationary pressures which emerged
in 1990 and 1991. In both these years, Indonesia missed out narrowly
on the double-digit 'threshold', although alternative estimates based
on a basket of goods consumed by higher income groups would
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almost certainly show a higher rate of increase. For the first eight
months of 1992 the increase was 3.42 per cent, less than half that over
the corresponding period of 1991, and suggesting that the figure for
the whole year may even by less than 6 per cent (Table 3). The figures
for the first two quarters include the traditional jump in prices which
occurs during and immediately after the fasting month. It is testimony
to the government's political resolve to bear down on inflation that
the tight monetary and fiscal policy stance was maintained despite
sometimes vociferous business protests, especially in the context of an
election year.
Table 3: Inflation, 1990-92
( per cent increase each quarter, 27-city index)
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 January-
August
1990 151 3.29 3.31 1.42
1991 1.09 2.51 3.91 2.01 7.39
1992 1.35 1.68 0.39a 3.42
a July and August only
Source: Bank Indonesia and press reports.
The cost of this monetary tightness has of course been very high
interest rates. This is hardly a new phenomenon in Indonesia, nor
necessarily a damaging one in a high return economy whose actors
have a very short time horizon. Official data on deposit and lending
rates suggest the peak has passed, a point emphasised on several
occasions over recent months by the Central Bank Governor.
However, many in the business community believe that the Bank
Indonesia data understate the seriousness of the position — that
lending rates are stuck at around 27 per cent and that very little new
credit is available in any case. The monetary authorities are clearly in
a very difficult position: on the one hand they are under considerable
business and political pressure to loosen monetary policy — which
perhaps explains the Governor's attempt to 'jaw-bone' interest rates
down in an April meeting with bankers — while also facing up to the
economic imperative of controlling inflation. In addition, interest rates
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are being held up by the new prudential requirements imposed on the
banks.
A puzzling feature of the economy is why these high interest rates
and the economic slow-down have not resulted in a spate of corporate
crashes and a hard economic landing. The most important corporate
news over this period was the major restructuring which occurred in
the country's second largest conglomerate, Astra, precipated by the
huge losses incurred by Bank Summa. In mounting a rescue operation
for the Bank, which was controlled by one of the sons of Astra's
founder, William Soeryadjaya, the Astra group has undergone
significant changes in corporate structure and personnel.
An assessment of the impact of the tight money policy and high
interest rates is hindered by the fact that there are no reliable and
timely statistics on corporate profitability. The stock market is not yet
an accurate indicator of business profitability, partly because it is still
adjusting to the spectacular boom of 1989-90, and the equally
spectacular crash of 1991. In addition, high interest rates have
rendered the stock market a much less attractive vehicle for short and
medium term investments. Another indicator, investment approvals
by the government's Capital Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM),
has shown a sharp decline. Domestic investments in 1991/92 were
half those of 1990/91, although the figures for the first four months of
1992/93 suggest the decline may have been arrested (Table 4). By
contrast, foreign investment approvals held up well in 1991/92, but
appear to have fallen away sharply in 1992/93. It needs to be
emphasised, however, that these figures are most imperfect indicators
of business conditions. The investments tend to be lumpy' in nature
and they refer only to approved projects, not realised figures.
Moreover, the figures in 1990 were at record levels in historical
perspective, and some decline was inevitable. It is therefore not clear
whether Indonesia is out of the woods yet. Part of the explanation for
the absence of widespread corporate crashes is that the export sector,
particularly manufactures, has performed well.
Another explanation has to do with the fact that Indonesian firms
have long been accustomed to periods of high interest rates. Of more
concern, however, are widespread reports within the business
community that many firms are simply rolling over loans, paying
neither interest nor principal commitments. According to this
argument, if several serious crashes occur then the whole 'pack of
cards' may collapse, particularly given the interconnected nature of
many financial and business empires. As inflation and interest rates
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decline, the prospects of such a scenario occurring recede. But it will
not be until well into 1993 that we can be confident that the business
sector has survived this difficult period without a major shake-out.
Meanwhile, the lesson from this episode is clear : the costs of
monetary laxness in 1989-90 have been very severe, and similar
experiences need to be avoided at all costs.
Table 4: Investment Approvals, 1990-92
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93a
Domestic
projects 1,711 884 215
$billion 64.1 32.4 10.8
Foreign
projects 608 476 117
$billion 9.7 8.6 1.8
arefers to period April 1 - August 15, 1992
Source : Jakarta Post, September 8, 1992
Fiscal Policy and the Budget : There have been a number of
important developments in the area of fiscal and budgetary policy.
First, fiscal policy has generally been tight. In both 1991/92 and
1992/93 the government has in effect departed from its balanced
budget rule by putting aside 'surpluses' totalling Rp 35 trillion. This
decision was stimulated in part by the sudden, and very short-lived,
windfall gains in the wake of the Middle East dispute in 1990-91. The
generally uncertain international economic outlook and the possibility
of donor 'aid fatigue' was another factor. A second development is
that the general budgetary situation has become rather more
comfortable in the last few years (Table 5). In 1991/92 domestic
revenues actually rose by Rp 2 trillion, despite a Rp 2.7 trillion decline
in oil revenue, owing to strong growth in non-oil domestic revenue
(NODR). Foreign aid also held up well. On the expenditure side, the
government has had a good deal more room to maneouvre as debt
service payments have levelled off and subsidies (the main reason for
the decline in the 'other' category) have been trimmed. Most of the
expansion on the expenditure side has gone into domestic funding of
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the development budget, which fell away sharply during the difficult
period after 1985.
Table 5 : The Budget 1990/91 - 1991/92
(Rp billion)
1990/91 1991/92
Revenue 49,451 51,994
Domestic 39,546 41,585
oil & gas 17,712 15,039
non-oil 21,834 26,546
Foreign 9,905 10,409
program 1,397 1,563
project 8,508 8^46
Expenditure 49,451 51,994
Routine 29,998 30,228
personnel 7,054 8,103
material 1,830 2,373
regional subsidies 4237 4,834
debt service 13,394 13,434
other 3,483 1,484
Development 19,453 21,764
rupiah 10,944 12,918
project 8,508 8346
Source: Department of Finance
Thirdly, to focus on the NODR component, the performance here
has been particularly commendable. Neglected during the oil boom
period, these revenues have risen sharply following the tax reforms of
1984 and thereafter, and as enforcement has been tightened. NODR as
a percentage of non-oil GDP more than doubled from 1984/85 (6.8 per
cent) to 1991/92 (14.3 per cent)3; speaking in September at the 1992
NODR as a percentage of non-oil GDP has risen as follows :
Year 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 92/93
% 6.8 8.3 8.7 8.4 9.8 10.8 12.0 14.3
Source : Kompas, September 11, 1992. The figure for 1992/93 is a forecast.
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Conference of the Indonesian Economics Association, the Director-
General of Taxation stated that the target percentage by the end of the
decade was 20 per cent. The economic and political implications of
this expansion are profoundly important : the former owing to the
projected stagnation or even decline in oil revenues, and uncertainty
about foreign aid; the latter because higher government exactions will
almost certainly lead to demands for more accountability and
transparency in the government's expenditure program.
The Balance of Payments. There is an evident sense of relief and
satisfaction in official circles at the 1991/92 balance of payments, and
in particular the current account deficit of $4.4 billion (Table 6).
During 1991 there were various worst-case scenarios pointing to the
possibility of a deficit as large as $7-8 billion, a prospect which
motivated the government to regulate state borrowings abroad (Muir
1991). Although net oil exports fell, by some 18 per cent, non-oil
exports rebounded strongly, rising by 21 per cent and outpacing non-
oil imports (up by 11 per cent). Official capital inflows remained
strong, as did foreign investments.
In the short run, Indonesia's external position is relatively
comfortable. By mid year, foreign reserves were equivalent to about
five months of imports. There is some prospect of international oil
prices picking up. The exchange rate is still being managed very
effectively. Machinery imports have continued to rise strongly,
providing the base for sustained expansion in the 1990s. The prospect
of a number of very large and uneconomic projects precipitating a
sharp deterioration in the current account deficit has been removed, at
least temporarily. Finally, the measures introduced by Bank Indonesia
during 1991 to tighten the use of foreign exchange 'swap' facilities
appear to be working well, and have removed one source of monetary
instability (on which see Nasution 1991). Particularly important was
the decision in November to limit the swaps to investment credits
(defined as a minimum maturity of two years), or otherwise at the
authority of the Bank.
Nevertheless, the deficit, and Indonesia's total external
indebtedness, provide no grounds for complacency. On the current
account, and barring unforeseen circumstances, there is little prospect
of a boost through improved terms of trade. Despite the excellent
performance of non-oil exports in 1991, there is concern that low
economic growth rates in the OECD bloc will depress export growth
and raise trade barriers.
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Table 6: The Balance of Payments, 1990/91 and 1991/92*
($ billion)
1990/91 1991/92
Exports 28.1 29.3
Oil 12.8 10.6
Non-oil 15.4 18.7
imports -23.0 -24.7
Oil -3.6 -3.1
Non-oil -19.4 -21.6
Services (net) -8.9 -0.0
Current account -3.7 -4.4
Official capital (net) 0.9 0.9
Disbursement 5.0 53
Amortization -4.1 -4.4
Other capital (net)b 6.1 4.4
Use of reserves -3.3 -1.0
aMinor discrepancies within categories are due to rounding errors.
^Includes errors and omissions.
Source: Department of Finance.
On the capital account, while the termination of Dutch aid will
have little short-run effect, it is apparent that both international banks
and development organizations do not wish to increase their
Indonesia exposure significantly. One indication of this phenomenon
is that in recent loans to Indonesia the margin above Libor has
extended to 2-2.5 per cent, about double that of a year ago. This
reflects in part a world-wide increase (though the rise for Indonesia
has been greater), and in turn fears of a growing capital 'shortage' on
a global scale. It was partly with these considerations in mind that in
September 1992 the former Coordinating Economics Minister,
Professor Ali Wardhana, publicly suggested that the Foreign
Commercial Loans Team (Tim PKLN) be established on a permanent
basis. Set up in late 1991, the Team was originally seen as a short-
term, ad hoc solution to the rapidly rising overseas borrowings at that
time.
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Recent Policy Initiatives
Public debate of economic policy issues, and the political economy of
policy reform more generally, has been lively and uninhibited.
Important new legislation has been passed on banking (on which see
McLeod, forthcoming), social security, and transport. For over a year,
the possibility of trade reform affecting the automotive and steel
industries has been aired. Initiatives are also underway covering
small industry and regional finance. In April 1992 the government
again permitted full foreign ownership in a number of sectors, while
some relatively minor deregulatory reforms were introduced over
May-July.
200 Per cent Foreign Ownership : The April announcement
concerning foreign ownership was a historic one. Discussion of this
issue within the government had been under way since at least mid-
1991. Local partners have been required for all investment projects
since early 1974.4 But there has been mounting concern that, as more
and more countries offer liberal investment codes, Indonesia would
miss out on some foreign investments, especially in internationally
oligopolistic industries such as electronics, where investors appear to
favour such arrangements. On several occasions during the 1980s, as
the investment code was liberalised, Indonesia came close to adopting
this decision, but each time local business pressure and fear of a
nationalist backlash proved to be decisive stumbling blocks. Under
the decision (PP [Government Decree] 17), projects of at least $50
million and those located in less developed (but unspecified)
regionsmay be 100 per cent foreign owned. In addition, foreign firms
with as little capital as $250,000 may be established with up to 95 per
cent foreign ownership if they are labour intensive' (employ at least
50 staff) and are export oriented (export at least 50 per cent of their
output). In other circumstances, the current limitations apply, namely
a minimum investment of $1 million and at least 20 per cent
Indonesian shareholding; the current localization requirement — 51
per cent local shareholding within 20 years — also continues to apply.
As before, foreign investments in the oil and finance sectors will be
administered separately. The government has also foreshadowed
further simplifications in the licensing regime, including a shorter
Daftar Negatif (Negative List, of sectors closed to foreign investment).
* The exception in recent years has been the Batam Island group, whose
investment regime is administered separately from the BKPM.
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At the same time, the government announced that the
controversial Chandra Asri Olefin project planned for Cilegon, West
Java could proceed. In an extraordinary sequence of events, the $1.6
billion petrochemicals project is to proceed as a fully foreign
enterprise. It was deferred in October 1991 when the government
announced its restrictions on foreign borrowings for state-related
projects. It has now been resurrected, with a budget mysteriously
reduced from the original $2.5 billion figure, as a joint venture
between the original Japanese partners and three powerful
Indonesian entrepreneurs (Prayogo Pangestu, Henry Pribadi and
Bambang Tri Hatmodjo) in the form of a foreign holding company.
The nature of the new financial and managerial arrangements, the
extent of likely government support for the project, and the reasons
behind the decision to allow Chandra Asri to proceed, are still
unclear. However, it is thought that in addition to the political clout of
the three key individuals and pressure from certain Japanese
commercial interests, a key factor in the decision was the revelation
that the state-owned Bank Bumi Daya had issued an irrevocable letter
of credit for the project to the value of $550 million. In the
circumstances, the investment was unstoppable, on both commercial
and political grounds.
Minor Polio/ Packages : In late May and early June the government
announced a relaxation of its prohibition on timber exports. The first
set of decrees imposed extremely high taxes on the export of timber,
rattan and leather, ranging from $500 to $4,800 per cubic metre for
timber and $10-15 per kg for rattan. These decrees were followed by a
formal lifting of the export bans. The decision is intended to maintain
the incentive for downstream processing while raising government
revenue. It is thought the decision was also taken to strengthen
Indonesia's position in the GATT, where the bans had undermined
the country's bargaining power in international trade negotiations.
Welcome as the new policy is, it still leaves untouched the massive
rent dissipation which is known to occur in the timber industry. If the
government's hands were not tied by politically powerful timber
interests, the first-best solution would have been to introduce a fiscal
regime which appropriates timber rents directly for the government.
On 6 July, shortly before the CGI meeting, the government
announced another set of reform measures. These comprised five
main elements: foreign joint ventures in plantations may now lease
land for up to 30 years, with the possibility of renewals; some steel
and engine products can now be imported directly, rather than solely
The Economy, 1991/92 33
through Krakatau Steel as has been the case; the daftar negatif (list of
industries closed to foreign investment) was reduced slightly; more
items were transferred from non-tariff to tariff protection; and the
procedures for expatriates to obtain work permits have been
simplified. However, the reforms were much less comprehensive than
economists had hoped, and did not include agriculture, the
automotive industry and (apart from marginal changes) steel. Indeed,
they were seen by many prominent commentators as an exercise in
'window-dressing', designed more to convince the CGI consortium
that the reform momentum was being maintained than to achieve
fundamental policy change.
Privilege and Monopoly. The period since 1987 has witnessed the
emergence of a large and diversified (domestic) private business
sector. Yet none seems to have prospered more than a number of
well-connected individuals, whose reach seemingly extends into all
major sectors of the economy (Schwarz 1992). Close government-
business ties have been a feature of most East Asian economies, and
the extraordinarily rapid growth of these pribumi (indigenous)
businesses in Indonesia might be expected to be politically popular.
However, there is concern, discreetly though quite directly expressed
in the press, that the manner of this business expansion clouds the
commercial environment and is now discouraging new investment.
The most infamous example of business intervention continues to
be the clove marketing monopoly (BPPC) directed by the President's
youngest son Hutomo Mandala Putra (Borsuk 1992; Sjahrir 1992).
Established in December 1990, the Board announced it would increase
the incomes of clove farmers, which it argued had been suppressed by
the kretek cigarette companies and clove traders. It immediately
offered farmers about double their current price. However, through
1991, as the demand from kretek companies waned and clove
production responded, the Board's clove stocks rose dramatically, to
about 170,000 metric tons by March 1992, equivalent to two year's
supply. These purchases were funded by state bank credit estimated
to total approximately Rp 800 billion, more than half of Bank
Indonesia's Rp 1.5 trillion of liquidity (priority) credits extended over
this period; it is believed that BPPC is not paying interest on these
loans. The issue came to a head in February 1992 when Mr Hutomo
declared that clove production would have to be cut, and publicly
suggested that farmers burn 40-50 per cent of their crop and cut down
30 per cent of their trees. The ensuing public outcry, including
criticism by the House Speaker and also the Secretary-General of
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Golkar, resulted in Presidential intervention. In April, following a
meeting between the President and eight Ministers, it was announced
that BPPC's buying price would be cut from over Rp 7,000 per
kilogram to Rp 4,000, and that agricultural cooperatives would be
employed to assist the Board in its activities. These measures can
hardly be expected to resolve the problem. Meanwhile BPPC is
reported to be selling cloves to the kretek companies at about Rp
12,700 per kilogram, and paying farmers in the range Rp 3,000-5,000.
There have been other allegations of nepotism in 1992. In addition
to the olefin plant already referred to, much press attention has
focused on an exclusive arrangement for the marketing of West
Kalimantan oranges (jeruk Kalimantan), for the import of 1,000 luxury
cars for the September non-aligned summit to be chaired by Indonesia
Oooth awarded to the Bimantara group, controlled by the President's
second son), and for the collection of television licence fees.
It is important to keep these developments in perspective.
Suggestions that this cronyism rivals that of the late Marcos era, for
example, are far-fetched. Indonesia's non-oil export growth continues
to be impressive, its macroeconomic management tight, and the press
discussion of these issues reassuringly vigorous. Nevertheless, it
would be foolish to dismiss the phenomenon as unimportant. There is
considerable disaffection among 'non-favoured' groups, some
businesses have deferred expansion plans for fear that size and
prominence runs the risk of a takeover, and the publicity has
impaired Indonesia's reputation among foreign investors. It would be
tragic if all the hard-won and impressive achievements of the post-
1986 reform era were to be dissipated by this brazen rent-seeking
behaviour.
Other Major Development
IGGI becomes CGI. One of the most durable and best-known building
blocks of the New Order regime, IGGI (the Inter-Governmental
Group on Indonesia), disappeared with the stroke of a pen on 25
March. That evening, at a press conference attended by the five key
Ministers, it was announced that Indonesia would, with immediate
effect, suspend its aid relationship with the Netherlands. All existing
Dutch aid was to be terminated, no new aid would be received, and
Indonesia announced that it wished to establish a new donor
consortium which excluded the Netherlands. Exactly one month later,
the Home Affairs Minister extended the ban, announcing that non
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governmental organizations (NGOs) would no longer be permitted to
receive Dutch aid.
Although there was very little public forewarning of the decision,
it was undoubtedly popular in many Indonesian circles. There was a
widespread view in the country that the Dutch Minister of
Development Assistance, J.P. Pronk, had stepped over diplomatic
boundaries in his sometimes blunt and intrusive comments on
Indonesian affairs. Long known for his strongly-held views on human
rights, the Minister angered many people during 1991 with his
statement that economic deregulation had gone too far.
The immediate ramifications of the decision have been very
limited. Dutch aid has been about $100 million in recent years, less
than 2 per cent of the annual IGGI total. The aid relationship with
other donors has been preserved; indeed a few small donors have
been added to the new consortium, the Consultative Group on
Indonesia (CGI). Chaired by the World Bank, at its inaugural meeting
in Paris in mid-July the group pledged some $4.95 billion, $200
million more than the 1991 pledges and actually $150 million more
than the Bank had recommended. The Indonesian government has
moved quickly to preserve a number of Dutch aid projects which
were considered particularly important, either through its own
funding or by transferring them to other donors. The commercial
relationship between the two countries has also been kept intact. The
respective trade Ministers met shortly after the decision and were
quick to emphasise that there would be no disruption to trade and
investment ties.
Nevertheless, the decision to cancel Dutch aid was not a costless
one for Indonesia. The aid was almost entirely in the form of grants,
so in aid-equivalent terms the program was far more important than
the aggregate total suggests, perhaps equivalent to that of the large
World Bank activities, which now contain only a small concessional
finance element. The Dutch program also had a strong social
orientation, in contrast to the more commercially-oriented approach
of some other donors. About 15 per cent of the total is estimated to
have gone to NGOs, some of whom were very hard-hit by the
decision. In some quarters, also, there has been muted concern over
the enhanced role of the World Bank as Chair of the new CGI.
According to this view, Indonesia is now more vulnerable to the US
Congress's intrusion in its domestic affairs. (This concern was
heightened by a Congressional vote in late June to abolish a $2 million
military training aid program for Indonesia in protest over human
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rights issues.) Whatever the case, most observers expect there to be
some form of reconciliation between the two countries in the next few
years, motivated by a desire on the Dutch side to maintain its
presence in Southeast Asia, and on the Indonesian side to tap all
available aid resources in the face of an increasingly tight capital
account.
East Asia and AFTA : Indonesia continues to enjoy intense trade
relations with the East Asia region, which in the 'post-oil' era has
absorbed about 65 per cent of the country's merchandise exports
(Table 7). The Northeast Asian developing countries have been by far
the fastest growing export market for Indonesia; their share has more
than doubled in just five years, and now exceeds that of the US, EC
and ASEAN (still mainly Singapore) by a large margin. Strong growth
in these economies, the normalization of relations between China and
Indonesia, an underlying complementarity in natural resource
endowments, and burgeoning investment and technology links all
explain this rapid expansion. The share of the slower growth US
economy has declined sharply over this period. Perhaps surprisingly
in view of discussion over the impact of European union, the EC
share has continued to expand and has now overtaken that of the US.
Japan remains as Indonesia's dominant export market, with oil and
gas comprising at least two-thirds of the sales. The decline in
Indonesian exports to Japan in 1991 has been the subject of some
discussion in the Indonesian press, but it needs to be emphasised that
it occurred wholly on the oil and gas account; non-oil exports
expanded quite strongly (by 19 per cent), albeit more slowly that the
total for all countries (of 25 per cent).
Indonesia's response to the fourth ASEAN Summit in January has
surprised many observers. Prior to the Summit, Indonesia was known
to have some reservations about regional trade liberalization, and in
negotiations throughout 1991 officials had been proposing that capital
goods and small-scale industry be added to agriculture and services
among the excluded sectors. These exemptions would have
dampened the impact of the Summit's agreement, and in any case the
request relating to small-scale industry would have been unworkable
administratively. In the event, Indonesia dropped its requests and
signed the AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) agreement, which
envisages an ASEAN common market by January 2008.
It is known that Indonesia still has reservations in the above areas,
and progress will depend on the detailed negotiations now getting
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Table 7 : Regional Composition of Indonesia's Exports, 1986-91
($million or percent)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Japan 6,644 7,393 8,018 9321 10,923 10,767
percent 45 43 42 48 43 37
N.E.Asiaa 1,156 1,910 2365 2,615 3365 4398
percent 8 11 12 14 14 17
ASEAN 1,515 1,703 2^79 2,429 2315 3,197
percent 10 10 11 13 10 11
of which:
Singapore 1,239 1,449 1353 1,818 1,902 2,410
percent 8 8 9 9 7 8
USA 2,902 3^49 3,074 3,497 3365 3309
percent 20 20 16 18 13 12
EC 1,340 1,541 2,152 2,338 3,029 3,748
percent 9 9 11 12 12 13
Other 1,248 1,240 1331 1,959 2,178 3,023
percent 8 7 8 10 8 10
Total 14305 17,136 19,219 22,159 25,675 29,142
Source: BPS, Ekspor, various issues
a (South) Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China
under way. But the response to AFTA from various business and
official quarters has been quite positive, and reflects Indonesia's
growing confidence about its role in the regional and global economy.
Especially in labour-intensive industries, business groups have been
quick to point out that they have nothing to fear from open
competition within ASEAN. The evident success of the Batam-
Singapore-Johore commercial nexus (on which see Lee [ed] 1992), and
the popularization of the concept of growth 'triangles' and 'poles', has
strengthened domestic support for the ASEAN initiative.
Nevertheless, many issues have to be resolved if the AFTA is to
proceed effectively. An important motive is the political desire to
demonstrate to the rest of the world that ASEAN is a strong and
durable economic association which takes itself seriously. To be
balanced against the trade creation gains of AFTA are the costs of
trade diversification. In Indonesia's case, given that ASEAN currently
absorbs just 11 per cent of its exports (Table 7), these costs cannot be
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dismissed lightly, and a complex set of economic and political issues
needs to be balanced as negotiations continue.
Eastern Indonesia : The lagging provinces of Eastern Indonesia
{Indonesia Bagian Timur, IBT), generally defined as Sulawesi, the Nusa
Tenggara provinces (including East Timor), Maluku and Irian Jaya,
continue to be a major topic of public discussion and government
concern. They have always been among the poorest of Indonesia's
regions, but two developments since the mid 1980s have accentuated
this concern. First, the government, through its spending and
infrastructure programs, has been a major engine of growth in these
economies. However, since the decline in oil prices in the mid 1980s,
Jakarta's constrained fiscal circumstances have resulted in significant
budget cuts in regions where alternative sources of growth are very
limited. Secondly, the major and successful policy reforms since 1985
have stimulated economic growth primarily in Western Indonesia,
particularly Java. Most of the new footloose, labour-intensive
industries are located on the island, and the impact of financial
reforms has had its most visible impact there. Unlike the Eastern
region, these provinces are less dependent on public sector
expenditure, and they have been able to grow quickly in spite of the
sharp budgetary pruning.
Table 8 identifies some of the key socio-economic features of the
Eastern provinces, in comparision with national figures and those of
two large and diversified economies, East Java and North Sumatra
(both of which, it needs to be emphasised, are outside the 'favoured'
Greater Jakarta region). The regional economies are very small
(column 1) : in sum they are less than half that of East Java, and
excluding South Sulawesi they are a good deal smaller than North
Sumatra. Their per capita incomes are also well below those of the
national average and the two larger provinces (column 2), with the
exception of Irian Jaya where enclave mining boosts the figure.
Moreover, the gap appears to be widening, as evidenced by the
generally slower growth in gross regional product (GRP) per capita
column 3). These economies remain predominantly agrarian in
character, as indicated by the fact that the share of manufacturing in
GRP is in a majority of cases less than one-fifth of the national average
(column 4). In the principal exception, Maluku, manufacturing is
virtually 'mono-industry' in structure, being dominated by plywood.
Investor interest in the provinces is also less than other regions
(columns 5-6), although the disparities are not as evident apart from
the three very poor Nusa Tenggara provinces. Here also, large mining
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investments explain the high figures for Irian Jaya. The low level of
commercialization in most provinces is illustrated by the proportion
of credit outstanding to GRP (column 11), while physical
infrastructure limitations are underlined by the limited size of the
transport fleet (columns 12-13). These provinces are generally not
strongly oriented towards the international economy (column 7) with
the exception of Irian Jaya (mining) and Maluku (plywood), although
poor port facilities and government export regulations limit direct
exports in some instances. The latter two provinces generate very
sizeable export surpluses (column 8), a source of much dissatisfaction
in Irian Jaya. By contrast, the three Nusa Tenggara provinces,
especially East Nusa Tenggara and East Timor, receive very large
subsidies from the rest of the country. A large government economic
role is a feature of most of these provinces, where in a number of
instances it is more than double the national share (column 9). Large
central government subsidies are necessitated in part by the fact that
the local revenue base is weak in some cases (column 10).
Finally, these economic indicators are matched by equally poor
social indicators, as demonstrated by above average poverty
incidence and infant mortality (columns 14-15). A major exception to
this generalization is the socially advanced and generally prosperous
province of North Sulawesi.
The region has received national attention especially since the
1990 budget speech of the President, who stressed the importance of
fostering balanced regional development (Soesastro, 1990). It was also
in the limelight in November 1991, when the Indonesian Economics
Association (ISEI) held its annual conference in Ujung Pandang —
which aspires to be the 'capital' of the region — with its theme the
development of the eastern provinces. Four Ministers spoke at the
Seminar; the Minister for Research and Technology, Professor
Habibie, attracted the most attention with his bold call for
infrastructure investment to promote the region. Since the President's
speech there are reported to have been some 80 major seminars
devoted to this topic. Perhaps it was this fact which prompted one
provincial governor from the region to state that it was now time for
'action not seminars'.
The policy challenge is how a fiscally constrained government can
promote development in an isolated and dispersed region lacking
basic physical, social and commercial infrastructure and (with a few
exceptions) natural resources. There are clearly no simple solutions,
but the broad approach will presumably need to encompass at least
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the following features. First, as regional autonomy proceeds — an
inevitable and desirable development — it will be important to devise
national minimum standards in a number of areas, such as health,
education and sanitation. Wherease the western provinces may be
able to achieve these standards independently, special government
initiatives and targeted programs will almost certainly be required for
these poorer provinces.
Secondly, obvious as it may seem, it is important to remove or
ameliorate any measures which discriminate against these provinces.
While the deregulation measures since the mid 1980s have been
effective, obvious problems remain, such as the controversial
regulations relating to cloves (discussed above), rattan, coconuts, and
other crops important in the eastern economies. Thirdly, there is great
scope for building on latent comparative advantage in the region, by
coordinating private commercial interest and the provision of public
infrastructure. There are a number of sectors with good potential in
these provinces, ranging from cocoa and other cash crops, to fishing,
livestock and tourism, where such an approach will be necessary to
overcome these major bottlenecks.
Finally, the diversity of the region needs to be recognized. As
underlined in Table 8, there are distinctive features of virtually all the
provinces : the poverty and poor agricultural resource base of East
Nusa Tenggara, the special challenges in East Timor associated with
its tragic history and neglect, the enclave nature of developments in
Irian Jaya, the isolation of North Sulawesi, the alarmingly high infant
mortality rates of West Nusa Tenggara, and the under-developed
state of physical infrastructure in much of Sulawesi and Maluku.5 The
challenge for Jakarta will be to fashion a development strategy which
is both sensitive to this extraordinary diversity and yet still entails a
strong central government presence.
For more detailed case studies of the regional economies, see the various
chapters in Hill (ed) (1989). For an illuminating analysis of the economy
of East Nusa Tenggara, see Barlow, Bellis and Andrews (eds) (1991).
4An Ageing President, An Ageing Regime
Harold Crouch*
When President Soeharto completes his present term in March 1993
he will have served as President of Indonesia for a quarter of a
century. If re-elected, he will be 76 years old when his sixth five-
year term comes to an end in 1998. So far he has not made his
intentions clear, claiming — rather disingenuously — that it is not
his choice but that of the people's representatives in the People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR) .
Although there is little open opposition to Soeharto's seeking a
further term, the feeling is growing in elite circles that a quarter
century is enough and that Soeharto should retire gracefully. It is
feared that the President has reached an age where he will become
less able to perform his duties effectively and there is concern that
he might fall seriously ill or even die without having made proper
plans for the succession. As one Golkar member of the parliament
(DPR) put it, 'It is not just a question of like or dislike. He is, after
all^now over seventy'.1
Disenchantment with Soeharto has also been fuelled by the
burgeoning business empires of his children who seem to have first
.Option on all big government contracts and many small ones as well
(Schwarz-1992). As one observer put it, 'Soeharto minus the family'
still enjoys considerable popularity but there is widespread dismay
* This is an expanded and updated version of two articles which first
appeared in the February 1992 issue of The Independent Monthly
(Sydney). I am grateful to Max Suich, the editor of The Independent
Monthly, for his permission to use material from those articles.
1 This and other unattributed quotations are taken from interviews
conducted in Jakarta in November-December 1991.
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at what a pro-government journalist called the 'unbridled greed' of
the President's children. Concern about 'the family' is not limited to
civilians but extends into the military itself. One retired general
mentioned how this question was regularly brought up whenever he
met young serving officers.
Nevertheless, it is now almost universally accepted in Jakarta
that Soeharto will stand again and be re-elected. As a prominent
Muslim activist asked during a round of similar speculation before
Soeharto's re-election in 1988, 'Whoever heard of a Javanese Sultan
retiring?' It is commonly believed that Soeharto has iu>~cK6icVbuT~\
to stay in the presidency in order to protect his family's business
interests. The extraordinary success of the President's children in~
business is not likely to continue when their father is no longer
President and it is not improbable that investigations would be
launched to find out how they acquired their enormous wealth.
Not all Indonesians, however, are disturbed by the expanding
wealth of the President's children and, on a smaller scale, those of
other senior members of the government. In a country where the
small Chinese minority still owns many of the nation's largest
corporations and resentment against Chinese is strong, some point out
that the children of Soeharto and other senior officials are at least
indigenous Indonesians. It is better, so they say, that some of the big
projects go to the children of indigenous officials than to the
Chinese. Soeharto, whose personal wealth is derived in part from
his long association with a Chinese businessman, Liem Sioe Liong,
has tried to divert anti-Chinese sentiment by proposing in early
1990 that Chinese businessmen invest some of their funds in
indigenous co-operatives. /'
Soeharto has always been the undisputed presidential
candidate of the armed forces (ABRI) in the past and it is hard to
imagine that the military would stand in his way if he decides to
remain in office after 1993. There are, nevertheless, senior officers,
led by the Minister for Defence and Security, General Benny
Murdani, who believe that Soeharto should step down. But the
extent of support for this view in the armed forces as a whole is still
far from clear. While many officers feel that it is time for Bapak to
go, they do not want to take action that might split the armed forces
and there is no discernible talk of a coup to force him out.
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The Vice-Presidency
With Soeharto's re-election more or less taken for granted, the focus
of attention has turned to the vice-presidency. In the past Soeharto
was never willing to groom a successor. On the contrary, he always
prevented the emergence of a 'Crown Prince' by balancing off rival
generals against each other. Many supporters of the regiroe,
howeverrare~concerned that in the absence of broadly acceptable\ ^
arrangements for the succession, political instability could reappear
in the event of Soeharto either dying in office or becoming
incapacitated.
Urrtil-t988, Soeharto had always selected vice presidents who
lacked credibility as potential successors. In 1988, however, he
proposed a serious contender for the succession, Lt. Gen. Sudharmono,
a military officer who had long been involved in government
administration. But Sudharmono, who had never been a troop
commander, was not well regarded within the military and had \
/been involved in a hard-fought power struggle with General
( Mnrrianj, I" amazinjr and unprecedented move, Murdani
persuaded the ABRI representatives in the MPR to oppose the
President's choice and later an extraordinary military-inspired
propaganda campaign was launched to show that Sudharmono was
really a communist. (Although Sudharmono was finally elected
/ 'unanimously* as vice-president, the unprecedented indications of
military dissatisfaction made it clear that the armed forces would
not accept him as Soeharto's successor.
" The experience of 1988 showed that Soeharto could no longer
count on ABRI to accept automatically his nominee for the vice-
presidency and that they would most probably put forward their
own nomination in 1993. At present, however, there seems to be a
lack of consensus on who should be their candidate. Murdani
himself, as a Christian in a predominantly Muslim country, is not
regarded as a credible successor although it is widely believed that
he aspires to be the kingmaker.
By 1991 it had become clear that Murdani favoured the present
Commander of ABRI, General Try Sutrisno, as Soeharto's successor
and therefore as the military's candidate for the vice-presidency.
Try, who served as the President's adjutant during the 1970s, had
been a Soeharto favourite whose rapid rise to the command of ABRI
was seen by many as due more to his personal closeness to the
President than outstanding ability. Try, however, shared the
general sense of dismay in the armed forces over the Sudharmono
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appointment and fell increasingly under Murdani's influence. While
Try is usually described as a very pleasant and amiable man, he is
not regarded as especially capable. His tough line in defence of the
military's role in the Dili snooting in November 1991 won him
support in some military circles but his credibility suffered a blow
when his explanation was in effect rejected by the National
Investigation Commission set up to enquire into the incident.
The other leading military candidate for the vice-presidency is
the Minister for Home Affairs, retired General Rudini. Rudini was
replaced as army chief of staff in 1986, reportedly after differences
with Murdani. He has acquired something of a reformist and even
populist reputation in his present position with outspoken criticism
of corruption, officials who are close to Chinese businessmen, tax
evaders, and civil servants who are unresponsive to the needs of
ordinary people. He has also said that civil servants are not obliged
to vote for Golkar. While civilian critics of the government often
Ttote a gap between Rudini's rhetoric and practice, he has some
civilian support. As one human rights activist said, 'We don't really
like any of them, but Rudini is the least bad'.
In the wake of the Dili incident, rivalry between Try and Rudini
came into the open. Following Try's hardline defence of the
military, Rudini made a public call to abandon what he called 'the
security approach which places stability over everything else'
(Kompas, 10 December 1991), a call that was widely interpreted as
an attempt to undermine Try. This was followed the next day by a
response from Try who stated that the question of the security-
approach should not be made a subject of public discussion. 'Don't
distort, don't comment, don't set people against each other', Try
appealed (.Kompas, 11 December 1991), implying that Rudini was
doing just that.
But it is quite possible that Soeharto will reject the candidate
nominated by the armed forces. While some observers believe that
military opposition to his vice-presidential candidate in 1988 was a
warning to Soeharto to heed the wishes of ABRI in the future,
others think that the lesson he has drawn is that he got away with
it then and can get away with it again in the future. According to
Jakarta speculation, possible Soeharto nominees include the
Minister for Tourism, Posts and Telecommunications, Lt. Gen. Soesilo
Sudarman, the State Secretary, Maj. Gen. Moerdiono, and the
civilian Minister for Research and Technology, Dr. B. J. Habibie.
But none of these ministers has a sufficiently strong base in the
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armed forces to be considered as a credible successor to the
presidency. It is also not impossible that Sudharmono could be re
nominated.
The danger is, according to some, that Soeharto will disregard
the armed forces and appoint what one observer called a TJan
Quayle vice-president' who would not be a viable successor. If the
ageing President were then to die or become incapacitated in
midstream, the vice-president might be rejected by the military
who themselves could well be divided over their own candidate. In
the nightmare scenario, as seen from the Jakarta perspective, the
result might be-confusion and uncertojnfojnjakarta accompanied by
revived ethnic nationalism in the regions outside Jaya. The recent
experiencenoHhe Soviet -Uaion-and Yugoslavia hovers in the minds
of at least some members of the Jakarta elite. But what might be a
nightmare in Jakarta would no doubt be seen as a beacon of hope in
Irian Jaya and Aceh as well as some provinces inbetween.
Why should Soeharto risk the wrath of the military by
appointing a Dan Quayle'? It is argued that Soeharto is aware of
the hostility within sections of the armed forces to the favoured
treatment received by his children in business and is worried about
their fate once he is no longer there to protect them. If he accepts
ABRI's nominee for the vice-presidency, the new vice-president will
almost certainly be his successor who as president would quickly
come under intense pressureJo. do something_about^the business /
empires of Soeharto's sons and his daughter. Saeharto^ so the
argument runs, has decided to stay on in the presidency in order to
ly time for another member of the family, Maj. Gen. Wismoyo
Arismunandar, to consolidate his position in the armed forces.
Wismoyo, who is aged fifty-one and married to Mrs Tien
Soeharto's sister, was appointed as deputy chief of staff of the army
in August 1992. He had already served as army commander in
Central Java before leaping over the heads of more senior officers in
August 1990 to the command of the army's strategic reserve force,
[Xostrad. His recent appointment as deputy chief of staff was
facilitated by the dismissal of one of his main rivals and Murdani
vprotege, Maj. Gen. Sintong Panjaitan, who was held formally
responsible for the Dili shooting which took place within his area
of command. Many Indonesians have noted that Soeharto himself
moved from Central Java to Kostrad before taking over the command
of the army and then the presidency. It is now widely expected that
Wismoyo will eventually replace the army chief of staff, General
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Edi Sudradjat, possibly after the MPR session in March 1993. After
three years as army chief of staff, Wismoyo would then be in a
position to move to the command of ABRI in the middle of
Soeharto's next term and then to the presidency in 1998 (see Tempo, 1
August 1992). This progression would, of course, be upset if the
military succeeded in having Try Sutrisno or Rudini rather than a
'Dan Quayle' appointed as vice-president in 1993. It also assumes
that Soeharto will still be around to manage the succession (see
Liddle 1992a).
The Soeharto-ABRI Relationship and the Dili Shooting
The struggle over the vice-presidency illustrates the gap that has
developed during the last decade between Soeharto and the top
leadership of the armed forces. When General Soeharto established
his New Order in the mid-1960s there was no question that the
military was in control. Soeharto, many of his ministers and senior
bureaucrats, and the senior military commanders were all drawn
from the 'revolutionary' generation of officers who had fought for
independence against the Dutch. Although Soeharto was recognised
as the leader, he had to deal with colleagues who often regarded
themselves as his equal and were prepared to discuss issues with
him. In making appointments and determining policies, Soeharto
always had to make sure that he had the support of his fellow
officers.
But since the early 1980s the leadership of the armed forces has
been taken over by a new generation of academy-trained
professionals who had no experience of the revolution against the
Dutch and were only captains or lieutenants when General Soeharto
took command of the army in 1965. Now aged in their early fifties,
the present military leaders are inhibited by traditional Javanese
respect for elders from engaging in frank discussion with the Bapak.
Until the early 1980s Soeharto continued to listen to the views of his
brother officers but now several observers have commented that the
relationship between Soeharto and his generals is not even like that
of a father with his sons but rather a grandfather with his
grandchildren. The grandchildren have their own opinions but do
not dare to contradict the grandfather to his face.
It is widely believed, for example, that the current military
leaders have been unable to bring themselves to raise the topic of
the business activities of Soeharto's children with the President,
despite the disaffection this has caused in the officer corps as a
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whole. The only senior officer who dares to speak frankly to the
President, General Benny Murdani, has been ostracised for his pains
and,is now treated with deep suspicion by Soeharto.
f The tension between Soeharto and the army was exacerbated by~ "\
Hhemassacre at Dili on 12 November 1991. In that incident soldiers—
fired origan unarmed crowcTof mourners at a cemetery where a pro-
Independence youth, killed in a clash with pro-Indonesian youths a
fortnight earlier, had been buried. Although the military claimed
that only 19 people were killed and another 91 wounded, a
presidential National Investigation Commission reported seven
weeks later that it had 'strong reason to believe that the number of
victims who died was around 50 and the injured were more than 91
people'. It also noted that some witnesses believed that up to 100
had been killed and around 90 people were still missing.
The armed forces initially tried to explain the shooting as
justifiable self-defence. In a report to the DPR on 27 November,
General Try Sutrisno, blamed the 'Peace Disturbance Movement' —
the military's code-name for the Fretilin resistance movement.
According to General Try, troops fired on Fre/f/z'n-supporting
demonstrators who were trying to grab weapons from the soldiers.
He claimed that shots had been fired and a grenade (which
fortunately did not explode) thrown at the troops by the
demonstrators.
General Try dismissed the claim that his troops had fired on
peaceful mourners. 'Peaceful demonstration. Bullshit', he said,
breaking into English. Earlier, he said, the demonstrators, who were
becoming increasing 'wild' and 'brutal', had stabbed the deputy
commander of Battalion 700, Major Gerhan Lantara, and another
soldier, as Gerhan tried to calm them in front of the district
military headquarters, about two kilometres from the cemetery. Try
also hinted that 'it is not impossible' that the five foreigners —
'fake journalists', as he called them — at the cemetery 'might have
been involved in engineering the incident' (Kompas, 28 November
1991).
^--^Try^s account differed drastically from eye-witness accounts, ,
i both foreign and Timorese. The eye-witnesses claimed that the
demonstrators had been peaceful and made no attempt to attack the
troops who were armed with M-16 rifles. According to the eye-
v^witnesses, the troops simply appeared and began firing on the 2000
or so people assembled in the cemetery (The New Yorker, 9
December 1991, Jakarta, Jakarta, 4-10 January 1992, Schwarz 1991).
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The video recording made by one of the foreign witnesses, while not
conclusive because it did not record the start of the shooting, seemed
much more consistent with the eye-witnesses' version than with
General Try's.
While the National Investigation Commission followed
General Try in blaming the 'provocative ferocity of the masses'
organised by Fretilin, it refrained from endorsing his explanation of
how the shooting started. Although it noted the claim that the
demonstrators had attempted to grab weapons from the soldiers, it
also accepted the testimony of witnesses who said that the shooting
had been carried out by 'highly emotional, uncontrolled troops in
irregular formation and not in uniform'. The Commission also found
that 'the measures taken by some members of the security forces
exceeded proper limits and resulted in casualties — whether killed
or wounded by shooting, stabbing or beating' (Laporan 1991).
The Commission's report gave credence to an alternative version
of the shooting which put the main blame on troops of Battalion 700
who were not assigned to duty at the cemetery. According to this
version, it is true that the mourners at the cemetery were peaceful,
as attested by the eye-witnesses, but a separate group of about 1,500
angry youths had marched through the town, as described by-
General Try. It was during this march that Major Gerhan had been
stabbed in front of the local military headquarters, about 30-5O
minutes before the shooting at the cemetery. It seems that news of
the stabbing quickly spread among the troops, some of whom had
been guarding the marchers while others were apparently not on
duty and were not in full uniform at the time of the shooting. These
enraged soldiers were taken in trucks to the cemetery where the
shooting began immediately after their arrival. In an interview
published in early December in the weekly magazine, Editor, an
unnamed local government official said he had heard soldiers
shouting 'Just shoot. Don't let any get away', as they moved from the
military headquarters towards the cemetery after the stabbing of
Gerhan {Editor, 7 December 1991).
This eye-witness also described the circumstances in which
Major Gerhan was stabbed. He said that Gerhan had pushed and
punched his way into the crowd in order to pull a Fretilin flag from
a female demonstrator. The eye-witness said, In my opinion, if that
man had not started to punch and pull down their flag, I don't think
he would have been stabbed'. The local government official's
account of the stabbing was supported — also in an interview in
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Editor — by an unnamed policeman whose account, in other respects,
followed that of Try Sutrisno (Editor, 7 December 1991).
A curious aspect of General Try's statement to parliament was
his failure to mention Battalion 700 — a battalion from South
Sulawesi which was serving in East Timor. Instead, Try announced
the withdrawal from East Timor of Battalion 303 — a Siliwangi
battalion from West Java assigned to Kostrad — to which most of
the soldiers on duty at the cemetery belonged. The overall
commander for the military region covering East Timor, Maj. Gen.
Sintong Panjaitan, also explicity stated that 'The battalion
involved in the incident was Battalion 303' although he praised the
battalion and its commanding officer. 'Good work does not always
produce good results', he added (Editor, 7 December 1991).
Why were Try and Sintong so concerned to identify Battalion 303
f as the battalion responsible for the shooting when other evidence
pointed to the involvement of Battalion 700 as well? The
Comifussibn^" report, on the other hand, explicitly mentioned but
did not identify 'highly emotional, uncontrolled troops in irregular
formation and not in uniform'. Further, in the trial in June 1992 of
members of Battalion 303, the lieutentant who commanded them
claimed that he had heard shots from behind the demonstrators
which he thought may have come from 'wild troops' (pasukan liar).
In its report which was headed, The Mystery of the Shooting by
"Wild Troop"', Tempo concluded by asking 'Who in fact fired the
first shots?' (Tempo, 13 June 1992).
The obvious failure of both the army and the Commission to
explain the role of members of Battalion 700 has led to a third
version of the shooting. According to this version, the whole
incident may have been planned by military intelligence officers as
a way of eliminating Fretilin supporters who had become
increasingly bold and assertive in the weeks before the cancellation
of a planned visit of a Portuguese parliamentary delegation.
Intelligence officers had been informed that Fretilin activists would
try to turn the commemoration service into a demonstration against
Jakarta and had already identified those they considered to be
'ring-leaders' who were to be shot at the cemetery. It is also
suggested that these officers were opposed to the relatively soft
'hearts-and-minds' approach of the East Timor commander, Brig.
Gen. Warouw. Some, apparently including President Soeharto's son-
in-law, Lt. Col. Prabowo Djojohadikusumo, had been sponsoring pro-
integration Timorese youths — in what was called the Eagle Unit
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but sometimes dubbed the 'Ninjas' — who had been involved in
clashes with FrefiZin-sympathising youths in Dili.2
Whatever the full story behind the massacre, it greatly
embarrassed the Indonesian government which suddenly found itself
confronted with the possibility that donor countries would cut their
aid. In the aftermath of the massacre, the Netherlands, which was
also chairman of the international aid-co-ordinating consortium,
IGGI, and two smaller donor countries, Canada and Denmark,
announced the suspension of aid, 200 members of the Japanese diet
called on the Japanese government to stop its aid, while other
countries expressed their outrage.3
The sense of outrage and dismay, however, was not limited to
the international community but was felt no less strongly, at least in
some circles, in Indonesia. The opposition Petition of 50 group stated
that 'the government and its security apparatus seem to use firearms
too easily and give insufficient consideration to humane means'
(Kelompok Kerja Petisi 50, 1991) while the Legal Aid Institute
published the results of its own investigation which included
eyewitness accounts which differed significantly from the
military's explanation (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum
Indonesia, 1991). Some sections of the press also published reports
which cast doubt on the official interpretation and there were
indications that the sentiments of the regime's opponents were
shared privately by some regime supporters.4
2 In an interview with Reuters in January, the East Timor governor, Mario
Carrascalao, blamed Timorese associated with Apodeti (a small party
sponsored by Indonesian military intelligence officers before the
invasion in 1975) for creating conditions that led to the clash in
November. They created the situation and of course they were working
together with some individuals in the army', he said. According to the
report, he noted 'widespread speculation that a middle-ranking officer
with powerful political connections was involved.' Canberra Times, 31
January 1992. The Eagle Unit is discussed in Tempo, 7 March 1992.
3 Later, in June 1992, the United States Congress cut a symbolic $2.3
million from the training programme in its military aid budget.Tempo,
4 July 1992.
4 Such sentiments were expressed many times to the author in interviews
conducted in Jakarta in November-December 1991. Don't imagine
that I feel proud when my country's soldiers fire on unarmed citizens',
said one regime insider. 'Why was a crowd of youths treated as if they
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/^In a~step unprecedented under the New Order, President
Soeharto responded by setting up the National Investigation
Commission, headed by a judge of the Supreme Court. Although
three of the Commission's seven members, including its chairman,
retired Maj.Gen.Djaelani, had military backgrounds, its
preliminary report, as we have seen, was strongly critical of the
troops involved in the shooting. In response to the report, the
President immediately ordered the replacement of Maj. Gen. Sintong
Panjaitan, the Udayana regional commander within whose region
East Timor is situated, and Brig. Gen Warouw, the East Timor
commander while General Try Sutrisno himself was ordered to
ascertain the fate of those described in the report as 'missing'.
Soeharto also established a Military Honour Council, headed by
/MajXJen. Feisal Tanjung, which, in addition to action against the
/ two generals, recommended the dismissal of three middle-ranking
V officers in East Timor from the armed forces and a fourth from his
military post. Later ten soldiers, including four junior officers, were
tried and found guilty of such offences as failing to control troops,
firing without orders and, in one case, torturing a prisoner. They
received sentences ranging from eight to eighteen months.5
The disciplinary action taken by Soeharto against military
officers increased the tension between the President and the
military. Many officers seemed to believe that the troops in Dili
were only doing their duty in difficult circumstances.6 They believed
were an invading army?', asked a retired general. 'Why are so many of
our young officers trigger-happy?', he asked again. Regime supporters
asked why the army was not equipped with tear gas, rubber bullets and
other riot-control equipment. 'Surely the military intelligence knew that
there was a possibility of trouble following the cancellation of the
Portuguese delegation's visit but why weren't they prepared?' they
asked.
5 In contrast to these sentences, five participants in the Dili
demonstration on 12 November received sentences ranging from 5 1/2
years to life. Five East Timorese protestors in Jakarta received
sentences ranging from six months to ten years.
6 For example, Major General Mantiri, who replaced Major-General
Sintong Panjaitan as the Udayana regional commander, said in an
interview with Editor, after the dismissals of officers and the courts
martial of other soldiers, 'We don't regret anything. What happened
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that the real cause of the problem had been the government's policy
of opening East Timor in 1989 when it lifted the ban on travel to
Dili. Not only had foreigners been permitted to establish contacts
with anti-integration groups but the visits of prominent foreign
dignitaries such as the Pope in 1989 and the American Ambassador
in 1990 had been allowed to become occasions for demonstrations.
From the perspective of many officers, Sintong, Warouw and the
other dismissed officers had been made scapegoats for the failure of
the government's own policies.
The gap between Soeharto and his generals now means that one
can hardly speak of Indonesia as being ruled by a military regime.
/ The government is no longer dominated by the military as an
/ institution although the armed forces of course continue to wield
substantial influence and remain the regime's principal backer. But
the government and the military are now distinct entities in a way
that they were not a decade ago. While retired military officers are
still prominent in the government, they serve less as representatives
of ABRI than as appointees of Soeharto.
Soeharto has not of course abandoned the military as his
political base and has ensured that key commands are entrusted to
officers with whom he has close ties. Thus, his former adjutant, Maj.
Gen. Kentot Harseno, was appointed to the politically crucial
Jakarta command7 and his relative, Maj. Gen. Wismoyo, has
occupied key positions. Another former adjutant was appointed as
head of the national police. But, given the apparent unreliability of
part of the military, Soeharto has embarked on a strategy to shore
up support in the population at large, in particular by strengthening
his appeal among Muslims.
was quite proper.... As military, this is so. They were opposing us,
demonstrating, even yelling things against the government. To me that
is identical with rebellion, so that is why we took firm action'. AAP report
in Canberra Times, 7 July 1992, citing Editor 4 July 1992. I am indebted
to Ulf Sundhaussen for this reference.
7 The President's proteges no doubt feel a sense of hutang budi (debt of
gratitude) to him. For example, he rewarded Harseno for his loyal
service as an adjutant by presenting him with a house in Bogor (Tempo,
15 August 1992.)
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Wooing the Muslim Community
Since 1988 when the military members of the MPR showed their
dissatisaction with Soeharto's choice for the vice-presidency, the
President has been trying to cultivate a new base of support in the
Islamic community. Although followers of Islam make up about 85
per cent of the Indonesian people, most adopt a fairly relaxed and
tolerant attitude to religious questions. Some, constituting a
substantial minority, are however affiliated with Muslim political
organizations which want the implementation of Islamic political
programs. During the 1970s the military regarded Muslim
'fanaticism' as a major threat and, following a riot at Jakarta's port,
Tanjung Priok, and a series of bomb and arson attacks in 1984-85,
hundreds of Muslim activists were arrested, some being sentenced to
long terms in jail. Since the clampdown of the mid-1980s, however,
the government has attempted to reconcile itself with the
'moderate' element in the Islamic community.
A series of 'pro-Muslim' moves has been made in recent years. In
1989 the government adopted a new National Education Act which
made it compulsory for all schools — including those run by
Christians — to hold classes in Islam for Muslim students. It also
adopted the Religious Courts Act which increased the status and
authorityjb£ Muslim courts. The government men removed a ban on
Muslim girls wearing head coverings (considered obligatory by some
buFnot ali Muslim scholars) at school. In August 1991 a Soeharto
family foundation provided part of the capital needed to establish
Indonesia's first Islamic bank and later in the year the government
held a month-long Islamic festival at the huge Istiqlal Mosque. And
in December Soeharto for the first time attended the heads-of-
government meeting of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.
^-Soeharto also encouraged the formation of a new Islamic
Organization — the League of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals
JJC^D^^jmdejLthe leadership of his protege, the Minister of
Research and Technology, Dr Habibie. Muslim graduates in the
civil service and universities .have been under pressure to
participate in ICMI but it has also attracted the support of some
who had been suspicious, and indeed strongly critical, of the
government in the past. Some seem to have joined ICMI less because
of their support for Soeharto than their fear of the Christian
Murdani whom they perceive as Soeharto's most powerful rival.
That ICMI is not simply an organization for Muslim intellectuals but
has a political purpose is suggested by Habibie's goal to recruit 15
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million members and his definition of an intellectual as 'anyone who
is moved to improve the environment and people of Indonesia'
(Tempo, 14 December 1991). Critics of the well-funded ICMI refer to
the acronym as standing for Ikatan Calon Menteri Islam (League of
Potential Islamic Ministers) rather than Ikatan Cendekiawan
Muslim Indonesia.
Capping it all, Soeharto, his wife, members of his family and
several senior officials made the pilgrimage to Mecca in June 1991.
Although a Muslim, Soeharto himself had always been identified
with ancient Javanese religious tradition which has often been at
odds with strict Islam while rumours had spread in the Muslim
community that his wife was a secret Catholic "By going on the haj
pilgrimage, Soeharto seemed to be symbolically demonstrating that
he too was a genuine member of the Muslim community.
As one senior Muslim leader said, There is no need to doubt
Soeharto's sincerity in making the pilgrimage but at the same time
he was aware of its political benefits'. On his return from the Holy
Land, the President was welcomed with a flurry of declarations of
support from Muslim leaders. 'Praise be to God' declared the
chairman of the semi-official Islamic Council of South Sumatra,
'now the doubts held by Indonesian Muslims about the Islamic
convictions of President Soeharto's family have been wiped ouf
(Tempo, 6 July 1991). Other Muslim clerics called on Soeharto to
continue as President and the Muslim-based United Development
Party proclaimed that it would be nominating Soeharto for re
election in 1993.
Some observers, however, doubt that the Muslims have really
transferred their loyalties to Soeharto. According to the non-ICMCI
Muslim intellectual, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, the religious leaders
realise that their votes won't affect the result of the election but
support for Soeharto and the Golkar party can mean more funds for
mosques and religious schools. As one religious leader quoted by
Jalaluddin put it, 'Whenever assistance from Allah comes, a milling
crowd of religious teachers turns to Golkar' (Tempo, 21 September
1991). Certainly the government has built many mosques during the
last few years.
Soeharto's strategy to win Muslim support has been questioned
by some. Perhaps the purpose was to win Muslim votes for Golkar in
the event that the military's proclaimed policy of neutrality in
elections tended to undermine Golkar's support. On the other hand,
it has been suggested that Soeharto is miscalculating if he expects
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Muslim support in the event of a showdown with the military
leadership. According to this view, the Muslims support him as long
as he provides them with funds for their mosques and schools but
they will not stick with him in a serious contest with the military.
One non-Muslim regime insider described Soeharto's embrace of the
Muslims as 'almost a desperate move'.
/ 1 A more speculative explanation of Soeharto's alliance with
Islam sees the main threat to the regime as coming from mass
opposition mobilised by Muslims in Jakarta and other cities. In the
past it has often been dissident Muslims who have taken the lead in
tmttigOvernment_protests and periodic outbursts of violence against
the Chinese business community which is seen as aligned with the
generals. While Muslim demonstrations and rioting could not lead to
a Muslim takeover of the government, they could create
circumstances that would allow the military to intervene in order to
'restore stability and order'. By approaching the Muslim
community, it is suggested, Soeharto hopes to forestall outbreaks of
Muslim opposition that could be used by the military as an excuse to
move against him.
One of the risks of the move towards Islam for Soeharto is that
it may have alienated some of the military leaders who have
aTwayslieenWharthey call 'fanatical' Islam — as opposed to the
'moderatesTof whom they approve — as a major source of trouble. In
late 1991, for example, Muslim students took to the streets in major
cities throughout Java and in some of the outer islands to protest
against a long-established government lottery to raise funds for
social welfare purposes. But, according to some sources, the Muslim
students' demonstrations were in fact encouraged by some of the
regional military commanders in order to put a spoke in the wheels
of Soeharto's Islamic policy. This is what happens when you give
too much leeway to the Muslims', seems to be the message they may
have been conveying to the President.
The Keterbukaan Trend
Rivalries between military leaders at the top, especially after the
rift between Soeharto and the military leadership over the
Sudharmono appointment in 1988, created circumstances favourable
to a general loosening of the political system (see Lane 1991 and
Arief Budiman in this volume). Reflecting the new mood in 1989, a
number of prominent figures, including retired General Sumitro, the
former chief of the security organisation, Kopkamtib, called for
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more keterbukaan (openness), echoing the Russian glasnost.
Appearing before a committee of the DPR, Sumitro proposed — in
contrast to established practice — that more than one candidate
should stand in presidential elections, that candidates should
publicly present their programs before the election and that the
President be elected by voting rather than the present method of
consensus.
Others have also called for democratic reforms. The Petition of
50 group, established in 1980 and headed by a former Governor of
Jakarta, retired Lt. Gen. Ali Sadikin, called for the withdrawal of
all 'extra-constitutional' emergency powers which allow the
government to detain critics, ban publications and restrict public
discussion. The group also proposed that the reservation of non-
elected seats for the military in the legislatures be abolished and
that President Soeharto should not stand again in 1993. In March
1991 a new Democracy Forum was formed on the initiative of the
Muslim leader, Abdurachman Wahid, to promote a 'democratic
culture'. In addition, bodies like the Legal Aid Institute and various
human rights institutes have regularly protested against violations
of human rights and other abuses.
But these bodies have been prevented from developing mass
bases of support. In his column in the Go/fcar-oriented newspaper,
Suara Karya, Soedjati Djiwandono quoted Frederick the Great as
having said, 'I have an agreement with my people. They can say
whatever they like and I can do whatever I like' (Suara Karya, 1 1
October 1991). There are definite limits on freedom of expression in
Indonesia, of course, but dissident groups at present enjoy
considerable leeway in expressing their views provided they are not
involved in mobilising mass opposition.
Over the last few years, under the leadership of retired Lt. Gen.
Kharis Suhud, the DPR has played a more active role, often calling
ministers before its committees to explain their policies. Members
representing Golkar and the military were especially prominent in
raising issues critical of the government. But it seems that in July
1991 the parliament went too far for Soeharto when it held a
hearing with members of the Petition of 50 group. For years the press
had not been permitted to report the group's activities so it was seen
as a major breakthrough when its members appeared at the DPR and
their names once again appeared in the press.
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But the new liberalism suffered an early setback. Not only did
the Petition of 50 disappear from the pages of the newspapers** but
Soeharto ensured that several of the more independent-minded
members of the DPR would not retain their parliamentary seats.
Those from the ABRI fraction would not be reappointed while the
so-called 'vocal' Golkar members were either removed from, or
placed in unwinnable positions on, Golkar's list of candidates.
Among the names effectively removed were those of the speaker, Lt.
H^en. Kharis Suhud^Maj^Gen. Saiful Sulun who had been one of the
deputy speakers, Col. Roekmini Koesoemo of the police, Marzuki
Darusman, an outspoken young Golkar representative from West
Java (see his chapter in this volume), and Anang Adenansi, a former
newspaper editor from Kalimantan. It looked as if the government
hoped that the DPR would return to its old role described by cynics
as the Four Ds — datang (come), duduk (sit), dengar (listen) and duit
(money).
The General Election
Indonesia's fifth general election under the New Order was held on
9 June 1992 for 400 of the 500 seats in the DPR — the other 100 seats
being filled by members appointed by the President to represent the
military. Elections for regional and local assemblies were held on
the same day. The President and Vice-President, however, will be
elected by the 1000 members of the MPR when it is called into
session at the end of Soeharto's current term in March 1993. The MPR
consists of the 500 members of the DPR plus 100 members appointed
by the President, 149 elected by provincial assemblies and the
remaining 251 distributed between the armed forces and the
political parties in proportion to their representation in the DPR.
Only three parties are permitted by law to contest elections in
Indonesia. The government-backed and military-affiliated Golkar
faced the Muslim-based United Development Party (PPP) and the
nationalist Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI). Neither the PPP nor
the PDI, however, could be described in an unqualified way as
opposition parties. In fact the PPP had already stolen a march on
8 They have since re-appeared. See, for example, the laudatory article
about the former police chief, Hoegeng Imam Santoso, in Tempo, 15
August 1992 and the review of a book about Ali Sadikin in Tempo, 29
August 1992.
60 Harold Crouch
the other parties by announcing that it would be nominating
Soeharto for the presidency once again. During its campaign, the
PDI, on the other hand, raised critical issues involving monopolies
and nepotism, human rights and social justice while it proposed that
the next President should be limited to two terms in office and that
there should be more than one presidential candidate.
In the past the military had directly interfered in the electoral
process to ensure overwhelming victories for Golkar but in 1987— at
a time when the then Armed Forces Commander, General Benny
Murdani, was locked in conflict with the then General Chairman of
Golkar, Lt. Gen. Sudharmono — the military had adopted a neutral
stance. In 1992, it seems that the military reaffirmed its electoral
neutrality and once again refrained from direct support for Golkar.
However, the military security apparatus played an important role
in ensuring that unsuitable candidates were not nominated. All
candidates had to undergo a special investigation (litsus —
penelitian khusus) conducted by the military-controlled
Bakorstanas.9 Reportedly, those who failed the litsus were mostly
PDI candidates at the regional and local levels (Tempo, 14
September 1991). Under the election rules, campaign processions in
motor vehicles were banned (although the ban was not always
observed) and parties were not permitted to display posters of
political leaders — a measure directed against the PDI which had
used pictures of former President Sukarno in earlier campaigns.
The election itself was uneventful although Golkar's share of-
the votes declined from 73 per cent in 1987 to 68 per cent in 1992,
perhaps indicating that more voters than in 1987 believed the
military's promise that it would stay neutral. Another
interpretation saw the voting as an indication of the resurgence of
the aliran loyalties of the past with the PPP exploiting its
identification with Islam while the PDI -tried to present itself as
Sukarno's heir (see Abdurrahman Wahid's chapter in this volume).
The PPP's share rose slightly from 16 per cent to 17 per cent while
the PDI vote increased from 11 per cent to 15 per cent, the rise being
achieved largely in East and Central Java (Jakarta Post, 30 June
1992). Golkar won a majority in all provinces, including Jakarta
9 Bakorstanas (Co-ordinating Agency for Preserving National Stability)
was formed in 1988 to replace the old security organisation, Kopkamtib.
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where a massive rally held by the PDI had led many observers to
expect that Golkar would lose ground.
The relationship between Golkar and the military has become
more ambiguous in recent years. Soeharto himself heads its Supreme
^"ComrdT while its Central Executive Board has always been headed
by a general. Of its 299 members in the DPR elected in 1987, 106 were
described as members of the 'ABRI family' — 67 being retired
military officers while another 39 were wives, children or close
relatives of military officers (Tempo, 25 May 1991). But, under the
leadership in the 1980s of Lt Gen Sudharmono before his elevation
to the vice-presidency, Golkar had attempted to develop its own
identity separate from the military. More civilians were appointed
to importamlj>osiiions, including that of secretary-general^ and a
jnetworR. of local organi2aflons~was~estaBlished. However, its seems
X that that These moves were resented by part of the military and
"Became enmeshed with the- rivalry between Sudharmono and the
v then Commander of ABRI, General Murdani. When the relatively
'civiliahised' Sudharmono was" elected as vice-president, he was
forced to relinquish his Golkar post to another retired officer, Lt.
Gen. Wahono, while military officers — both retired and active —
were elected as chairmen of about two-thirds of Golkar's district
branches.
The continuing influence of the military was seen in the selection
of Golkar candidates for the election. The final list was prepared
not by the party alone but by the leaders of what are called the
Three Lines' — General Try Sutrisno as Commander of ABRI,
General Rudini as Minister for Home Affairs representing the
bureaucracy, and Lt. Gen. Wahono, the General Chairman of Golkar
itself. Their proposals, however, were not all accepted by Soeharto,
who insisted on several changes including the dropping of the so-
called 'vocal' members.* But military control of Golkar is by no means
complete as was shown after the election by the rivalries that
/ emerged between ABRI and Golkar candidates for the the
chairmanship of several regional assemblies and for provincial
governorships (Tempo, 5 & 26 September 1992, Editor, 19 September
'Politics-in-waiting'
In his political survey in this series two years ago, Robert Cribb
described the atmosphere of Jakarta politics as 'increasingly
politics-in-waiting in which most players are attempting a double
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game; seeking to ensure their positions in the present order but at the
same time attempting to position themselves for a possibly new and
different order in the future' (Cribb 1990, p.24). Cribb's description
still applied in 1992. If there is any change it is because this double
game is getting increasingly harder to play as the unpredictable but
inevitable date of the succession draws closer. For many of the
players in this elite game, it would be a lot easier if the President
were to manage an orderly succession himself during his lifetime
rather than leave it 'up for grabs' after he goes, but it seems that
this strategy does not appeal to him.
5East Timor: The Opening up, the Crackdown and
the Possibility of a Durable Settlement
Herb Feith
The shooting of mourner-demonstrators at Dili's Santa Cruz
cemetery on the morning of 12 November 1991 was a central event in
the history of East Timor. It is too early to say that it catalysed
changes which will lead to a durable settlement of the East Timor
conflict. But the new visibility of East Timor has manifestly raised
the cost to Indonesia of maintaining the status quo there. It has also
highlighted how difficult it is to stabilize that status quo by minor
reforms.
The Decision to Open up East Timor
What happened in East Timor in 1991 needs to be understood in
relation to memories as much as to current happenings. Perhaps as
many as one-third of East Timor's population of 1975 lost their lives
in the warfare and famine of the early years of Indonesian
occupation, so the life of almost every family is shadowed by
memories of frightening violence. The relevant comparisons are not
with West Timor but with traumatized communities in Aboriginal
Australia and among Jews and Gypsies in Europe. Perhaps also with
the abangans of the South Blitar area of Java, where a Communist
remnant survived for three years after 1965.1
But this article takes 1988 as its point of departure, arguing that
there is an important sense in which the Dili massacre had its
origins in a controversial decision taken in that year to open up East
1 On the invasion and the early years of occupation see Jolliffe (1978),
Dunn (1983), Budiardjo and Liem (1984), Ramos-Horta (1987), Taylor
(1991), and the key novel by Mo (1991).
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Timor at the beginning of 1989. One argument for that measure was
that of economists like Hadi Soesastro of the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies, who believed that
the maintenance of East Timor as a special and 'closed'
province results...in a variety of abuses by the authorities
and excessive rents enjoyed by particular companies
(Soesastro, 1989:212).
A probably more important argument for the decision was that
Indonesia needed to show itself responsive to overseas opinion on
East Timor if it was to play larger roles in world affairs. It had a
particular reason to improve its international image at that time:
the aspiration to become chair of the Non-Aligned Movement. The
Soeharto government sought that position vigorously in 1988 and
1989 and eventually obtained it in 1991 and 1992.
East Timor's then governor, Mario Carrascalao, initially
opposed the opening up proposal. He did so, according to Hadi
Soesastro,
not on security grounds but primarily as a means of
protecting the indigenous people (putra daerah) from more
entrepreneurial outsiders (pendatang) in commercial
opportunities created by economic development.
On one report Carrascalao was also worried about the possibility
that opening up would mean access for Muslim and Protestant
missionaries into the predominantly Catholic territory. But the
governor changed his position at some point in 1988, apparently in
the belief that opening up would enable him to strengthen his
position vis-a-vis the army. Defence Minister Benny Moerdani had
said ominously in June 1988 that if the proposal to open up the
territory went ahead the armed forces would not be responsible for
its consequences.^
What Opening up Entailed
The opening up of East Timor made it easier for journalists, both
Indonesian and foreign, to visit the province. It made it possible for
2 Other factors relevant to the decision to open up East Timor are
discussed in Feith 1992(b). I would be happy to send copies to people
interested.
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a few Indonesian universities and non-government organizations to
extend their activities into it. It also made it easier for East
Timorese living outside the territory — in Bali, Java, Australia, and
so on — to visit their home area for short periods.
Furthermore it led to a major influx of Indonesians from other
provinces looking for work which required no schooling. As Governor
Carrascalao had feared, large numbers of people from Java,
Sulawesi and other parts of Indonesia came in search of work as
petty traders and laborers. Their arrival made Dili into a very
different looking town. It replicated a pattern of market-driven
migration which had changed the demographic character of Irian
Jaya in the decades after 1963. In East Timor, as in Irian Jaya, there
were government transmigration schemes; but the numbers involved
in those programs were smaller than the number of unsubsidized
'spontaneous' migrants. By late 1991 the total number of pendatang
or non-indigenous people in East Timor, over and above civil servants
and armed forces members, was an estimated 70,000.3
Another major dimension of the opening up of East Timor was a
series of changes in military policy. In early December 1989 the
widely feared Brigadier-General Mulyadi was replaced in the East
Timor command by Brigadier-General R.S.Warouw, a Menadonese
Protestant who had previously served in Irian Jaya.
Coming in as a 'new broom' commander, Warouw quickly
introduced important changes. The number of checkpoints on roads in
the province was sharply reduced. Sizeable numbers of political
prisoners were released. Torture became less frequent and less severe.
And punishment was dealt out on a much larger scale than before to
soldiers tried for violations of military discipline, with 300
servicemen 'disciplined' during his two years in the post (Current
Data 1992, p. 98). Governor Carrascalao later described Warouw
as the best of the commanders he had dealt with in his ten years in
office.
The New Urban Strength of the Independence Movement
Even before the appointment of Warouw there were indications that
opening up was a dubious method of consolidating the integration of
3 The 1991 population of the province was given by the Djaelani
commission of inquiry as 755,950 and 100,000 of these were estimated to
be non-indigenous.
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East Timor. The first major sign came when Pope John Paul had a
six-hour visit to East Timor in October 1989.
The Pope's decision to visit East Timor was controversial, both
in the Timorese church and in international Catholic circles, because
many saw it as likely to set a seal on the territory's incorporation
into Indonesia. But the plan went awry. When the Pope conducted an
open air mass in Dili a small group of young Timorese demonstrated
against the integration, unfurling banners and throwing chairs.
Their dramatic gesture and the sympathy with which it was
greeted by the crowd were television news in many parts of the
world. So the visit was eventually seen to have done more to
undermine Indonesian authority in the province than to entrench it.
In the following year there were two other major occasions when
the young partisans of East Timorese independence defied dire
threats to get their message through to the overseas media at the
time of a foreign dignitary's presence. In January 1990 the US
Ambassador in Jakarta arrived in Dili to be greeted by an anti—
integrationist demonstration in front of his hotel, and in September
an open air mass conducted by the Papal Nuncio in Jakarta was
interrupted by a similar demonstration.
The number of people participating in these youthful
demonstrations was small. But foreign journalists like those from the
BBC, the New York Times and Australian Associated Press had the
impression that they had wide support from urban young people as a
whole. It seemed to these journalists that young Timorese who had -
had no Portuguese schooling were as hostile to Indonesian authority
as their elders, and that the Indonesian educational program had
failed in its integrationist purpose. These journalists conduded that
large parts of the Timorese Catholic clergy sympathized with the
anti-integrationists. Some of them inferred that there was easy
cooperation between the young activists in Dili, the more
politically minded of the priests and the long-time guerrillas in the
mountains (Hyland 1991).
Further evidence of a coherent and disciplined independence
movement emerged on 25 October 1989, when the Melbourne Age
carried a long interview with the long-time Fretilin guerrilla
leader Xanana Gusmao. Robert Domm, a Sydney lawyer-journalist
with previous Timor experience, had succeeded in visiting Xanana in
his mountain headquarters. The meeting between these two was a
double blow to Indonesian authority. Not only was it clear that
Indonesian military intelligence had been outwitted by a
East Timor 67
sophisticated underground network, but the 43-year-old Xanana
emerged as a leader of great stature.
Xanana had unified and re-energized what was a scattered and
demoralized querrilla movement in 1980-81 and had been the key
figure in talks with Indonesian government representatives in March
1983. But few in the outside world knew much about him until the
Domm visit. The interview text and what Domm said about the man
created a picture of a disciplinarian with strong authority within
his own movement, and an intellectual with a broad understanding
of world affairs and a flexible approach to the tasks his movement
faced.
The Prospect of a Portuguese Parliamentary Mission
A key aspect of the immediate background to what happened in
Dili on 12 November 1991 is that a Portuguese parliamentary
mission had been expected to visit East Timor in that month. The
plans for that visit had their origins in a UN General Assembly
resolution of 1982, in which the Secretary-General was instructed to
facilitate talks between Indonesia and Portugal to 'achieve a
comprehensive settlement of the East Timor issue'. Indonesian-
Portuguese negotiations had gone on for many years in consequence of
that resolution and one of their fruits was a plan for a Portuguese
parliamentary group to make an ascertainment visit to the disputed
territory, with an accompanying group of journalists.
That prospective visit had been postponed several times —
because of repeated hitches in talks on its terms — so some people in
and outside East Timor had come to doubt whether it would ever
take place. But in July-August 1991 large numbers of politically
active Timorese came to believe that the mission would indeed
arrive. They inferred that from a big new build-up of Indonesian
troops and an increasing number of threatening statements by
military and civilian officials at many levels of administration.
Accordingly, they too began to make preparations for the visit, to be
able to make their point to the Portuguese visitors in defiance of the
threats.
But on October 28 a Portuguese official announced that the
parliamentary group would not be going to East Timor. Portugal was
not prepared, he said, to accept an Indonesian veto on a particular
Australian journalist who had been chosen as part of the press
contingent to accompany the mission, the Lisbon-domiciled and
Portuguese-speaking Australian Timor specialist Jill Jolliffe.
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For independence supporters in East Timor that cancellation was
a stunning blow. They felt they now had to do something to draw the
world's attention to their cause. There was desperation as well as a
sense of vestigial opportunity.
What happened on 12 November
That cast of mind helps to explain the defiance of the 2500 or so
people, aged mainly between 14 and 25 years, who marched from an
early morning mass at Dili's Motael church to the Santa Cruz
cemetery on the edge of the town on November 12. Some of them
carried banners which said 'We love independence'. Some carried
Fretilin flags and flags of Falintil, the guerrilla army. At least one
mourner-demonstrator carried a picture of Xanana Gusmao.
Those were declarations of unprecedented boldness. The defiance
reflected knowledge that there was a sizeable group of sympathetic
foreigners in town. One of these was Peter Kooijmans, a Dutch
professor of law working as a torture specialist for the UN
Commission on Human Rights.
Soon after the mourner-demonstrators reached the cemetery,
truckloads of soldiers arrived there and started machine-gunning
them and bayoneting targeted individuals. There is continuing
disagreement on where the decision to shoot and bayonet these
people was taken. But it is clear that it was a deliberate decision,
rather than merely an angry response to the demonstrators'
defiance.4
Some of the officers involved in the massacre were key figures in
the hardline group in the military command. This is the group
which had opposed the policy of opening up East Timor. They had
been active in the previous year in organizing Timorese civilians
into goon squads or vigilante groups — usually called ninjas or bufos
4 The best short account of what happened on 12 November and the
following days is Schwarz 1991. English language translations of key
sections of the interim report of the Djaelani commission are in the
'reg. indonesia conference of the world-wide APC computer network'
(which includes Pegasus, Greennet, Peacenet and IGC) of 27
December 1991. See also Asia Watch 1991 and various items in Tapol
Bulletin (London), No 108, December 1991 and Inside Indonesia, No
29, December 1991. The internal army politics of the day are discussed
in Crouch 1992. Interpretations based on trial data are presented in
International Commission of Jurists (Australian Section), 1992.
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— which harrassed and occasionally killed members of the
independence movement. The faction was unified by opposition to
Commander Warouw and Governor Carrascalao. Its freedom of
movement owed much to support from President Soeharto's son-in-
law, Lieut. Col. Prabowo, who had served in East Timor for two
terms and was reportedly seen in palace circles as a Timor specialist.
Most of the eight or nine foreign journalists who were in Dili on
12 November were at or near the Santa Cruz cemetery when the
shooting took place. The group included the Americans Allan Nairn
and Amy Goodman, who gave vivid radio accounts of the massacre
within a day of its occurrence; Max Stahl from Yorkshire Television
whose film of it was seen throughout the world in the following
weeks; and Kamal Bamadhaj, the Malaysian-New Zealand student
who was the one foreigner killed. His foreignness was evidently not
apparent to his attackers.
The International Outcry
So there were powerful reactions from the outside world. They came
in waves over the days and weeks after the crackdown, first in
response to the eye witness accounts and photographs, then in reply
to harsh statements by Indonesian officials, especially Armed
Forces Commander Try Sutrisno, and thirdly after the screening of
Stahl's film.
The outcry was especially vociferous in Australia, New
Zealand, Portugal and Holland. But there were also strong
statements from a foreign ministers' meeting of the European
Community and from members of the Japanese Diet and the US
Congress. The governments of Denmark, the Netherlands and
Canada announced that they would be suspending new aid
commitments to Indonesia. And the massacre was featured in the
media of several of the Latin American and African countries which
President Soeharto visited in late November and early December.
In Indonesia itself the media response was more to the outcry
than to the crackdown itself. But it was a response which evoked a
lot of new interest in East Timor. Indonesian readers of newspapers
and magazines were told more about East Timor than ever before,
and had new incentives to follow overseas radio and television
reporting on the territory. 'If you don't allow us to report all this
reasonably honestly', various journalists said to the censors, 'the
overseas media will be the only ones with any credibility on the
issue'. And some of the censors seem to have accepted the force of the
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argument.
Indonesian Government Responses: The Damage Control
Phase
Thrown off balance by the power of the international
condemnations, the Indonesian government took time to work out
how to respond. But by late December a coherent policy was
emerging. The interim report of a Commission of Inquiry headed by
Supreme Court Judge Djaelani was remarkably frank on much of
what had been happening in East Timor, especially the
anti-integration demonstrations of 1989-91. It concluded that 'about
5<Y people had been killed on 12 November, with over 91 wounded
and 'about 9W missing.
Soon after the report's release President Soeharto announced
steps which mollified many of the foreign critics. He sacked the two
principal commanders in charge of Timor policy, Brigadier-General
Warouw and his Bali-based superior, Major-General Sintong
Pandjaitan. He expressed condolences to the families of those who
had died on 12 November. He humiliated Armed Forces Commander
Try Sutrisno by instructing him to find the 90 or so missing people.
And he established a Military Honor Council to devise ways of
punishing armed forces members who had been involved in the
massacre.
Representatives of the US, Japanese, Australian and other,
previously critical governments described these as credible
responses, and the three countries which had suspended aid
disbursements resumed them.
Several weeks later the Military Honor Council made
important personnel changes in the Dili command. Lieut.Col.
Prabowo's relative and ally, Lieut.Col. J. E. Sepang, and four other
middle-ranking officers who had been at odds with General
Warouw were removed. In factional (palace versus army
headquarters) terms, it was a tit for tat for the purging of Warouw
and Pandjaitan.
Timor Policy in 1992 : The Hardline Dimension
Jakarta's East Timor policy in 1992 has been an uncertain and
occasionally contradictory combination of repression and sealing off
on the one hand, and sensitivity to international opinion on the
other.
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The influence of hardline thinking has been manifest in four
important areas. The new local commander sworn in in January,
Brigadier-General Theo Syafei, declared that he would be tougher
than Warouw and he has acted accordingly. It is true that his
policies have had some reform aspects, for instance efforts to put an
end to ninja vigilante activity. But Syafei's overall posture has been
harsh, as reflected in the large size of the troop presence, in
intensified efforts to capture the guerrilla leadership and in poor
relations with Bishop Belo and the other Timorese leaders of the
Catholic church. Asked by a visiting delegation of foreign
Protestant church leaders how he would handle any further
demonstrations, Syafei replied 'there will be no further
demonstrations'.S
Secondly, President Soeharto has punished Holland for the way
its foreign aid minister Jan Pronk had 'interfered in our domestic
affairs'. Repudiating Pronk's argument for a linkage between aid
and human rights, Soeharto announced in March that Indonesia
would accept no further Dutch aid and demanded that the Dutch-
chaired aid consortium IGGI (Inter Governmental Group on
Indonesia) be replaced by a new World Bank-chaired Consultative
Group on Indonesia.
In the following month the Minister of the Interior said
Indonesian NGOs would not be permitted to receive aid from their
Dutch counterparts. He also threatened to bar them from
participating in activities of the Dutch-headquartered
International Non-Governmental Forum on Indonesia, INGI (Mares
1992).
A third hardline dimension of the government's approach was
the way the courts processed the Dili massacre. Ten low ranking
armed forces members were courtmartialled and given sentences of
between eight and twenty months for violating military disclipline.
As for the eight Timorese who were tried for organizing the Dili
demonstration of 12 November, and the further five who were tried
for organizing a Jakarta demonstration a week later, five of them
were given sentences of between nine and fifteen years and one was
Personal information. See also 'Not by Bread Alone'. Report on a Visit
to East Timor by an Ecumenical Delegation Representing the Christian
Conference of Asia and the World Council of Churches, 16-19 April,
1992.
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sentenced to life imprisonment.
Finally, Jakarta showed the repressive side of its Timor policy
in the appointment of a governor to succeed Mario Carrascalao in
September. The post went to Abilio Osorio Soares, who had
previously been Bupati of Manututu. This 45-year-old former
Apodeti leader is known as implacably anti-Fretilin — his brother
was reportedly killed by Fretilin in late 1975. He has long had close
personal relations with the President's son-in-law, the widely
feared Col. Prabowo. Abilio's early policy statements, calling for a
stepping up of transmigration programs, suggest a strong emphasis on
the 'security approach', and no inclination to experiment with new
ideas.
With Warouw and Carrascalao replaced by Syafei and Abilio,
the power situation in Dili has moved sharply to the right, leaving
Bishop Belo a lonely survivor of the forces of reform and
reconciliation.
Timor Policy in 1992 : Complexities and Ambiguities
Jakarta's policy on entry to the province has combined
restrictiveness with an element of relaxation. Foreign journalists
have been forbidden entry to the area since February and prominent
groups of American and Australian parliamentarians have been
denied entry. But other categories of outsiders have found it
relatively easy to enter the territory. Several Japanese, American
and Australian church leaders known to be critical of Indonesian
control have been allowed to visit, as have a good number of East
Timorese domiciled in Australia. Some 475 people of foreign
citizenship visited East Timor in the first half of 1992. The figure
for all of 1991 was 1,935 (Gunn 1992).
Contradictory pulls are also apparent in what the Indonesian
media have been saying about East Timor in 1992. The dominant
emphasis of media coverage has been as conformist as before
November 1991, stressing that the East Timorese have progressed
rapidly under Indonesian rule, that the worst legacies of 400 years of
Portuguese neglect have now been overcome, that opposition to
Indonesian rule is foreign-fanned, that Portuguese interest in the
territory is mischievous and suspiciously oil-connected, and that the
great majority of foreign governments accept Indonesian authority as
irreversible.
One new element is that there is now much more news of East
Timor. And some 1992 reports have implied radically heterodox
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interpretations. For instance the 9 May issue of the large-circulation
weekly Editor reported on the peace proposals presented to the
European Parliament by Jose Ramos Horta on behalf of East Timor's
National Council of Maubere Resistance. 'Ramos is willing to come
to Jakarta too', its cover page banner said. Similarly the August
issues of the Jakarta magazines Matra and Tiara carried long and
frank interviews with Bishop Belo and retiring Governor
Carrascalao.
Finally, there have been occasional hints that top leaders of
the government may be preparing the ground for a major change of
policy. On 15 February President Soeharto spoke of the difference
between East Timor and Irian Jaya. Irian Jaya, he said, was an
integral part of the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed in 1945,
whereas East Timor had asked at a later point for Indonesia to
accept it as a province. Moreover the exercise of authority there had
been costly. Foreign Minister Alatas has occasionally made
statements implying that East Timor is a burden he would like to
shed.
Continuing Foreign Pressure on Jakarta
The damage control measures the Soeharto government introduced in
December and January enabled governments in the US, Japan,
Australia and other countries to go back to 'business as usual' in
relation to most aspects of their relations with Indonesia.
The 17 July decision of the new Consultative Group on Indonesia
to commit $4.94 billion to Indonesia in 1992-93 (compared with $4.75
billion in 1991-92) suggested that the massacre had had no
significant negative effect on the donor states' support for Indonesia.
(If there was a negative effect, it was presumably countervailed by
the effects on business groups of the way Soeharto punished the
Netherlands for its government's human rights activism. That
punishment apparently strengthened various business groups in
other donor states in their determination to combat the advocates of
human rights linkage in aid policy.)
But the governments of aid donor states continue to be under
pressure to urge Jakarta to negotiate with the East Timorese. The
Timor cause has long had vigorous advocates in the US Congress, the
Japanese Diet, the European Parliament and the Australian
Parliament, and it gained influential new adherents from among
academics and church leaders in several of those countries after the
Dili massacre. That some of these advocates' new influence survived
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the disappearance of East Timor from the daily press has been clear
from the salience of East Timor issues in EC-ASEAN ministerial
forums. And it became even clearer in early October when the US
Congress voted to cut off aid to Indonesia under a program for
military education and training.
Outside the group of aid donor states there is persistent pressure
for a negotiated settlement in East Timor from Portugal, a country
where East Timorese self-determination is supported by all parties.
There is also some pressure from other Portuguese-speaking states,
including Brazil, Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau.
Moreover there seems to be a measure of gentle pressure from
United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. The UN has
entered a vigorous new phase of peace making and peace keeping,
chalking up successes in Namibia, Nicaragua and El Salvador, and
part-successes in Cambodia, Afghanistan and Angola. There are now
many in the Secretariat who want the organization to play larger
roles in relation to East Timor.
Jose Ramos-Horta's New Proposals
One reason why the international pressure for Jakarta to negotiate
with the Timorese has been sustained, at a time when East Timor is
no longer front-page news anywhere, except in small media in
Australia and Portugal, is that Jose Ramos-Horta presented a set of
remarkably conciliatory proposals for a negotiated settlement when
he spoke to the European Parliament in April.*"
Speaking on behalf of the trans-party National Resistance of
the Maubere People, Horta proposed a cease fire and the release of
all political prisoners, to be followed by a three-phase process that
would lead after seven or twelve years to a referendum on
independence. In the first phase, of two years, Indonesia would
reduce its troops to 1,000 and allow various UN agencies to operate
in the territory. In the second phase, of five years, government
would be by an elected provincial assembly, with Indonesia
retaining sovereignty and control over foreign policy. This could be
followed by a second five-year phase on a similar basis.
Surprisingly, the policy met little opposition from within the
A full version of the proposals is presented in The Missing Peace
(Newsletter of the East Timor Talks Campaign), No 2, May 1992 (124
Napier St., Fitzroy 3065, Australia).
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independence movement. This reflected the fact that Horta had
said it had guerrilla leader Xanana's support, and that this claim
went unchallenged. It also reflected the success of the Convergencia,
a new vehicle of cooperation between the Fretilin segment of the
East Timorese community and that of its long-time rival and
adversary the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT). The
Convergencia, operating mainly in the Australia-Portugal diaspora,
goes back to an agreement in 1986.
In recent years both Xanana and Horta have given up their
Fretilin membership to be better able to lead umbrella organizations
linking Fretilin and UDT. Those actions have not only strengthened
the unity of the resistance movement but drawn attention to the
moderateness of its guerrillas. The approach of Xanana's movement
to violence seems to be predominantly instrumental, in contrast to
some other contemporary guerrilla movements whose approach has
strong expressive and consummatory aspects as well - for instance
Cambodia's Khmer Rouge, Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers, Turkey's PKK
(Kurdish Workers Party) and Peru's Shining Path.
The Indonesian-Portuguese Talks of September
On 2 September Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then in Jakarta for the
summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, called on President
Soeharto. After the meeting the President was quoted as saying that
Indonesia was ready to meet with Portugal at any time to settle the
East Timor issue. Boutros-Ghali suggested that the two should meet
in New York during the General Assembly.
That meeting took place on 26 September in the office of the
Secretary-General. Its agenda seems to have been heavily
procedural — 'talks about talks' in the words of the Portuguese
minister, Joao deDeus Pinheiro. It was agreed that the two foreign
ministers would proceed to a series of meetings 'to search for a just,
comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution' to the
problem of East Timor. The first of these would be in December,
under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary-General or his
personal representative. Describing the Indonesian and Portuguese
positions as '180 degrees aparf, Pinheiro said he expected 'a long,
delicate process'.
Boutros-Ghali's commitment to the process was underlined by
his decision to entrust East Timor work to Alvaro de Soto, a Peruvian
who had played central roles in the peace process in El Salvador. It
was also clear from the provision that the Secretary-General's
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representative would chair Indonesian-Portuguese meetings at the
level of permanent missions to the UN.
Jose Ramos-Horta greeted the meeting as a positive
development. Referring to the Indonesian-Portuguese deadlock on
whether East Timorese should take part in these talks, he said he
expected that they would enter directly into the negotiations at a
later stage. He also spoke of 'a proposal on the table at the UN' for
a Vatican delegation including Timorese Catholic representatives to
attend as observers.
The Prospects for a Durable Settlement
Since November 1991 Indonesianists have argued with each other
with increased vigor about whether a durable settlement in East
Timor is in prospect. The sceptics in this argument maintain that the
reinitiation of Indonesian-Portuguese talks has made no significant
change. They see Indonesia as remaining unwilling to negotiate
about the claims of the Timorese to self-determination, or about
anything like the Horta proposals. They hold that the Indonesian
leadership is too strong — especially due to the success of its
economic policies and also because of its new authority as Chair of
the Non-Aligned Movement— to need to give such major concessions.
Some of these sceptics argue that the blow to the prestige of the
armed forces would be too great, others that the ground has not been
prepared with public opinion, others again that there are
military-technical grounds to suppose that Xanana Gusmao will
soon be captured or killed.7
For the Indonesianists who see more hope of a settlement these
arguments are outweighed by others. Some of them stress that the
incorporation of East Timor has never been a popular cause in
Indonesia, unlike the incorporation (liberation') of West Irian.
Some of them argue that Indonesia needs to turn over a new leaf on
East Timor if it is to be successful as chair of the Non-Aligned
Movement, for instance playing innovative roles on such issues as
UN reform. And some Indonesianists see daerah istimewa (special
region) status as a formula that could have relevance to East Timor.
The province of Aceh was granted daerah istimewa status in 1962, to
end a rebellion, and that initially involved a high level of
On military-technical aspects of the guerrilla contest see Stahl, 1992(a)
and 1992 (b).
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autonomy, though this was later whittled down drastically.8
The Problem of Flow-on Effects
The sceptics in this argument maintain that the Soeharto
government's reluctance to make concessions to the East Timorese has
much to do with its fears of flow-on effects. There could only be a
durable settlement of the Timor conflict, they say, if Indonesia
conceded a great deal to the movement it has sought to crush. There
would have to be not only a large measure of self-government,
demilitarization and the symbolics of freedom, but also the right of
men like Xanana and Horta to play political roles. But that, the
sceptics say — and their opponents agree — would embolden the
challengers of Indonesian authority in the other two major 'trouble
spots' on the Indonesian periphery, Irian Jaya and Aceh. Concessions
of that kind, it is widely agreed, would generate demands for
similar negotiations with rebel groups there. But the sceptics go
further. They say concessions such as these would risk a maior
unravelling of Indonesia's territorial integrity, as in the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia.
That further extension of the argument seems weak. After all
the overall politico-economic situation of Indonesia has few
similarities with that of the USSR and Yugoslavia in 1991. But the
fears are real. And the underlying concern, that the enterprise of
Indonesia, rooted in over eight decades of common endeavour and
struggle, should not be allowed to founder, is an eminently
reasonable one, which even sympathisers of the East Timorese, the
West Papuans and the Acehnese should respect.
These fears and their underlying concern are probably the most
important barrier to the achievement of an Indonesian-Timorese
settlement which could be expected to last. But it is not an
insuperable barrier in the present world context. Moreover it is a
barrier the UN has strong incentives to remove.
8 I have discussed this debate in Feith, 1992. For a penetrating analysis of
the way the East Timor issue relates to Indonesia's succession politics
and its politics of democratization see Liddle 1992(a).
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Towards UN Reforms which would Facilitate a Settlement
The self-determination of peoples is a central principle of the UN
Charter. And the UN operationalized that principle creatively in
the 1950s and 1960s in relation to the colonies of the Western
European powers.
What is needed now is similar creativity in relation to a new
generation of self-determination claims, claims by ethnonationalist
movements which are challenging state authority, and catalyzing
warfare, in a variety of contexts from Yugoslavia to East Timor.
Some of these movements have flourished in response to regime
breakdown, as in the USSR, Yugoslavia and more ambiguously Iraq.
Others have grown in importance slowly, in such situations of
'hurting stalemate' as Tibet, Kashmir and the Tamil regions of Sri
Lanka.
The Serb-Croat-Muslim warfare of 1992 has generated new
interest in the case for a principled approach to UN roles in
situations of boundary challenge. The confused and vicious contests
in Croatia and Bosnia, with their persistent element of 'ethnic
cleansing', and the repeated failure of outside mediators and Peace
Keeping Forces to put an end to the warring, have indicated to many
that fire-fighting approaches to ethnic antagonism are not enough,
that new principles and guidelines will be needed if the UN is to
deal adequately with situations where self-determination claims
are a key dimension of conflict.
What then is to be done? Scholars have devised a number of
proposals for a principled but practical approach to the settlement
of conflicts in areas where long-established borders are under new
challenge (Suzuki 1976, Chen 1976, Smith 1991, Smith 1992, Feith
and Smith 1992). Most of these proposals involve reaffirming the
principle of the self-determination of peoples but breaking the nexus
between self-determination and secession. They add to the range of
possible outcomes such semi-sovereign or quasi-state forms as free
association, confederation, demilitarized zones and special territory
status. Greenland's relationship to Denmark, Liechtenstein's to
Switzerland, Bhutan's to India and that of the Cook Islands to New
Zealand are among their models. Several of them see regional
associations of states as creating new conflict-resolving possibilities.
And some of them stress that the emergence of a new UN process is
likely to expand the range of outcomes.
Nor is it just scholars who are pushing for this widening of
options. Both the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization
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(UNPO) headquartered in The Hague and the state or quasi-state of
Liechtenstein have recently been attempting to play path-breaking
roles in relation to self-determination and the 'rights of
communities'.
So it may not be too optimistic to hope for growing attention to
proposals for new UN guidelines and machinery by which self-
determination claims against existing states are evaluated and the
associated conflicts resolved. Interest in such proposals is likely to
grow rapidly as a result of developments in South Africa,
Israel/Palestine and China/Hongkong/Taiwan, if semi-sovereign or
quasi-state formulas prove to be attractive to the designers of
settlements in those areas of hitherto intractable conflict.
But getting agreement on proposals of this kind is likely to be
difficult. For any of them to gain acceptance by the UN or regional
associations of states, various components of the world community
will need to agree on criteria whereby self-determination claims
will be evaluated. The work of scholars on such criteria may
provide useful starting points for such discussions. But the central
task will be to fashion a political bargain, one which reflects the
interests of different groups of states.
What seems needed is a compromise between two particular
groups of states, the members of today's dominant Western coalition
(built around the Group of Seven) and the Urge multi-ethnic states
of the Third World such as China, India, Indonesia and Nigeria.
The dominant Western states have an interest in preventing ethnic
wars, especially nearby ones that generate threatening refugee
flows. The multi-ethnic Third World states have an interest in
'getting off the hook' in relation to their Tibets, Kashmirs and East
Timors. But only if they can secure firm guarantees that concessions
to ethno-nationalist movements in those periphery regions will not
catalyze an uncontrollable process of territorial unravelling.
New Approaches to Self-Determination as an Emerging
Area of Australian-Indonesian Cooperation?
Australia has a strong interest in the fashioning of a new UN process
of this kind. One aspect of that is the need to close the gap between
foreign policy makers and the interested public. That gap became
conspicuous in the immediate aftermath of the Dili massacre.
But it is more than a crisis phenomenon. In fact it has a long
history. It has surfaced whenever the human rights costs of the
repressive status quo in East Timor, Irian Jaya/West Papua or
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Bougainville have attracted the attention of the Australian public.
And it has surfaced whenever questions have been asked about
Australian culpability for violent conflict on the Irian Jaya/Papua
New Guinea border or the border between Bougainville and the
Solomons (see King 1992).
But would Australia not pay a heavy diplomatic price for
actively exploring the relevance of self-determination principles to
its regional environment? Would that not lead us into direct conflict
with both Indonesia and Papua New Guinea? Those are indeed
serious arguments for caution. But the problems they point to are ones
which could be overcome by sensitive diplomacy. The issue would
presumably need to be approached in a way which assures the
government leaders of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea that the
interests here are shared ones, that the suspicion that Australia
sees an interest in their breakup, while historically understandable,
is unwarranted.
The leaders of those states are well aware that Australia is
frightened of refugee flows. Australia's position is clearly similar in
that respect to those of Germany, Austria, Italy and Greece in
relation to Eastern Europe, and that of the US in relation to Central
and South America. Indonesian and PNG leaders readily perceive
that that gives Australia an interest in regional stability.
It should therefore be possible for Australian officials and
diplomats to overcome the initial suspicion which is likely to be
generated by Australian actions in support of a new UN process of
self-determination. Such actions could be presented persuasively as
flowing from an interest in heightening regional stability by
creating new forms of conflict resolution.
But what is required is not so much an Australian initiative for
the fashioning of a new UN process for self-determination, as an
Australian-Indonesian initiative of that kind. So why not an
Evans-Alatas design? The cordiality between these two foreign
ministers, and the justified pride each has in their success in
fashioning innovative forms of North-South cooperation —
especially on Cambodia, chemical disarmament and the Asia
Pacific Economic Co-operation process — suggest that the two should
work cooperatively on this task. They would win, if not the Nobel
Prize, the respect of those who value far-sighted approaches to the
transformation of conflict.
Part II:
Political Perspectives
on the 1990s

6The Role of the Armed Forces in Indonesia's
Future Political Development
A. Hasnan Habib, Lt.General (Ret)
'Whereas military regimes "have an average life span of
approximately five years", the military government of Indonesia
has ruled since 1966, an undeniable success story in terms of political
longevity', thus wrote Marvin L. Rogers (Rogers, 1988, p.247). He
ascribed this remarkable longevity to the successful
depoliticization of the existing political parties, which has
contributed to an impressive stability unprecedented in the history
of the young republic. Stability, in turn, has enabled the regime to
pursue economic policies that have markedly improved the
socio-economic condition of the people. Political stability and
economic growth have largely been the basis for the regime's
legitimacy among the elite and many middle-class Indonesians
(pp.263-268). But, he argued, since the military is determined to rule
indefinitely, it must 'eventually develop a viable mass political
apparatus' outside its organizational structure, that can attract
genuine popular support (p.268).
Since the abortive communist coup attempt of 1965, the
military's involvement in Indonesian politics has attracted much
attention and interest among foreign as well as domestic political
experts. Much has been written about it, and it has been widely
debated and discussed at seminars and conferences. While at the
beginning it drew severe criticism, even outright condemnation,
particularly from sympathizers of the banned Communist Party of
Indonesia and fanatic believers in the principle of 'civilian
supremacy over the military', gradually it came to be regarded as
having benefited rather than harmed Indonesia.
Indeed, the 'post-Gestapu' regime, generally referred to as a
military or military-dominated regime, in marked contrast to the
84 A. Hasnan Habib
period before 1966, has successfully maintained political stability
and also achieved sustained economic growth. Indonesia belongs to a
relatively small group of developing countries which has registered
economic growth well above the third world average.
The Indonesian military is not 'the first and only' to involve
itself in politics. All armed forces participate in politics in various
fashions, not excepting the military in the Western democratic
states. Any military has an impact on the political system, with its
political role being 'a question not of whether, but of how much and
of what kind' (Welch and Smith, 1974, p. 6). Even the United
States, which holds the principle of civilian control over the
military sacrosanct, is not immune from it, although the military's
involvement in politics does not take the form of direct and open
intervention in the civilian political process.
However, within these outer boundaries, much latitude exists
for less direct and less threatening types of political involvement.
Nonetheless they can be very upsetting, even damaging to the
national interest. Take, for example, the intensive lobbying by the
military in alliance with local and private groups for mutually
beneficial spending programs or projects which ended in fiascos, or
the lobbying for strategic and foreign policy doctrines, and so on
(Skelton, 1979, p.23). Huntington (1957, pp.163-192) attributed this
to the constitutional separation of powers which actually
encourages such behaviour, as it blurs the civilian chain of command
and permits officers to play one branch of the government against
others.
This chapter attempts to examine briefly the military's
political role in Indonesia, which impresses many as dominant
today, and to prognosticate on its future role, in particular in
Indonesia's future political development.
The origin of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI)
The Indonesian Armed Forces, or ABRI, consist of two main
components, i.e. the military component, or Tentara Nasional
Indonesia (TNI) comprising the Army (TNI-AD), the Navy
(TNI-AL) and the Air Force (TNI-AU); and the police component, or
Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia (Polri). The military, or
TNI, is assigned responsibility for safeguarding territorial integrity
against both external and internal threats, while the police, or
Polri, is charged with enforcing law and order.
The Role of the Armed Forces
Both responsibilities fall within the 'total people's defence and
security system', developed on the basis of Indonesia's own
experiences in facing external aggression and some internal
disturbances during the 1945-50 revolutionary war for independence,
and countless insurgencies, separatist movements and coups
thereafter. In this system, ABRI constitutes the core which functions
as an integrated instrument of the State. But, in addition to the
defence and security function, ABRI, again based on the nation's own
experiences, has a second function, that is, the socio-political
function, which it performs together with other socio-political
forces. These two functions constitute what is known as the Dual
Function', or Dwifungsi, of ABRI.
Indonesia's independence was not presented on a platter. It was
won through a revolutionary war of independence, the culmination
of the process of national unification and awakening which had
begun four decades earlier, preceded by 300 years of continual local
and regional resistance against Dutch colonialism. The momentous
decision to declare independence immediately after the Japanese
surrender to the Allied forces in August 1945 was a manifestation of
patriotism which had continued to live on in the hearts of the
people despite the continual defeats inflicted upon them by the
Dutch colonial army.
The Japanese military occupation was a watershed in the
development of militant nationalism and patriotism among the
youth, in preparation for Indonesia's independence promised by the
Japanese towards the end of the Pacific War. Political institutions
were established that would provide the basis for an independent
republican government; a constitution was drafted providing for a
centralized presidential system, an Indonesian People's Congress
which would be the highest institution embodying the people's
power, and most importantly, a philosophical foundation of the
Republic-to-be, Pancasila.
The Japanese established the first genuine Indonesian armed
forces, led by Indonesian officers, called 'Defenders of the
Fatherland', or Pembela Tanah Air (Peta). Before this, only a few
Indonesians had served as officers in the Dutch colonial army, the
Royal Netherlands-Indies Army, or KNIL. The Japanese also
created Auxiliary Forces (Heiho) as parts of the Japanese army and
navy. Various youth movements and organizations were set up,
including a semi-military Youth Corps (Seinendan) for youths aged
between 14 and 22 with branches down to the larger villages; a
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Vigilante Corps (Keibodan) as an auxiliary police, fire-and
air-raid organization; a Vanguard Column (Barisan Pelopor); the
Barisan Hizbullah (God's Forces) which was the military wing of
the Masyumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims); and
others. All of these organizations received basic military training;
in all of them there was intensive infusion of seisin (fighting
spirit/patriotism) and strict discipline. The seeds of revolution had
already been planted deeply, especially in Java and Sumatra.
It was out of these militant youth organizations that ABRI
emerged, after going through several stages of development. Forged
in a revolutionary war of independence, it was not created by the
government nor by any political party. It created, organized and
armed itself, solved its own logistical problems, devised its own
strategy and fought for its self-assigned military objectives. It even
elected its own Supreme Commander (Panglima Besar) and Chief of
the General Staff. Former officers and N'Os of the Peta, Heiho and
KNIL formed 'struggle organizations' out of the various militant
youth organizations and military units established by the Japanese.
Arms were obtained or seized from Japanese storehouses. It was only
on October 5, 1945 that the central government decided to form the
Teople's Security Army', or Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat (TKR),
after fighting had started to occur between the republican forces and
Allied troops, mostly British with some Dutch units. October 5 has
since been celebrated every year as Armed Forces Day.
Needless to say, the revolution had a powerful influence on the
formation of ABRI's perception of itself. The uncompromising
confrontation with the Dutch, denying its attempts to impose a
military solution, provided strong back-up for diplomacy to
ultimately secure the eventual transfer of sovereignty.
The origin of the socio-political role of ABRI
When did ABRI first begin to get involved in politics? It is
generally believed that ABRI's involvement started during the
revolutionary struggle for independence. The struggle itself was both
a national revolution and a war of independence.
It was a revolution because the change from a colonial,
traditional and feudal Indonesia to one which was independent and
self-confident was sudden, rapid, fundamental, and violent. The
1945 revolution was the ultimate expression of the self-confidence,
self-reliance, resoluteness, decisiveness, and courage of the 1945
generation, who believed that it was within the power of the
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Indonesian people to control and to change their social, political and
economic fate, and that they had not only the ability but the right
to do so. This was reflected crystal clear in the preamble to the
Indonesian Constitution of 1945. By its very nature, a revolution is
political, unleashed and led by revolutionary leaders.
The 1945 struggle was also a war of independence. Unlike the
American war of independence which was a war of European
emigrants and settlers against the home country, Indonesia's was a
war of native Indonesians against foreign colonial aggressors.
Lacking professional training, experience, and modern armaments
(sometimes fighters were armed only with spears), the war of
independence could not but take the form of guerilla warfare in
which the active support of the people was crucial. By its very
nature, guerilla warfare is both political and military. Guerilla
leaders are required not only to be able to inspire their followers and
lead them in combat, but they must also have the ability to
mobilize people's support and to arouse their spirit to resist the
enemy. Guerilla leaders must be, simultaneously, political and
military leaders. In the case of Indonesia, revolutionary political
and military leaders.
Thus, while it is indeed correct to say that ABRI's perception of
itself as a political force arose from the revolutionary war for
independence, this statement by itself is insufficient. It is a matter
of historical fact that its first political involvement even preceded
the proclamation of independence.
When the news of the capitulation of Japan to the Allied Forces
leaked out in Jakarta, the political leaders from the older
generation, under the leadership of Sukarno and Hatta, were
uncertain what to do and feared provoking conflict with the
Japanese who were still in control. Whereas these older leaders
wished to continue to cooperate with the Japanese with regard to
the transfer of power, in order to avoid confrontation and bloodshed,
the younger people, militant and revolutionary, were determined to
immediately proclaim independence and cut all ties with the
Japanese.
This difference of opinion was resolved only after several youth
leaders on the night of August 15, two days before the Proclamation,
'took' Sukarno and Hatta to the Peta garrison at Rengasdengklok in
West Java on the pretext of protecting them when a rebellion of Peta
and Heiho broke out. On the morning of 17 August 1945 Sukarno read
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out the Declaration of Independence, drafted by himself, and signed
both by himself and Hatta.1
Thus, the militant and revolutionary youth, the origin of ABRI
and the source of its value system, was the driving force behind the
Proclamation of Independence. The course of history could well have
changed if not for the bold initiative of the militant and
revolutionary youth leaders in which the Peta and Heiho were
directly involved. Therefore, it was very proper that the military
saw its role primarily as defender, protector, and upholder of the
newly proclaimed Unitary Republic of Indonesia, the 1945
Constitution, and the Pancasila, rather than just an instrument of
successive governments. This implies that the military will support
only a government which adheres to these three tenets. Its role in
leading both the people's war of independence and the revolution in
the absence of the political leadership, due to its surrender on the
first day of the second Dutch military offensive, provided the
military with the experience of having direct control and
responsibility over political, economic and social matters. This has
implanted in the military a greater self-confidence and a stronger
sense of mission in State- and Nation-building in the broadest sense
of the concept.
The core principles of the 'Dual Function' doctrine
Based on what has been explained above we can now draw the
following principles about ABRI's ' Dual Function':
Firstly, ABRI is both a defence and security force and a
sociopolitical force. As a defence and security force, it is a state
apparatus and forms the nucleus of the 'total people's defence and
security system'; as such it is an instrument of the government.
As a socio-political force, it is one among the legitimate
sociopolitical forces of Indonesia's plural society. It interacts, works,
even competes (fairly) with them in giving substance to Indonesia's
freedom, the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila; in other words,
national development. As such, it is not an instrument of the
government; it is not 'government-oriented', but 'people-oriented',
meaning that it strives for the welfare and wellbeing of the people.
It supports wholeheartedly any government which shares the same
See Notosusanto (1975, p.12), Ensiklopedi Nasional Indonesia (1990,
pp.345-347), and Ricklefs (1981, p.198).
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commitments and which adheres to the principles of upholding the
Unitary Republic, the 1945 Constitution, and Pancasila.
Secondly, it is not a doctrine or a theory of 'civil-military'
relations as understood by Western (or Western-educated) political
scientists who are biased towards the civilian part of the equation.
It does not deny, however, that there are still 'pure civilian' and
'pure military' areas, although these areas are shrinking and the
boundaries setting them apart are becoming more blurred, due to the
rapid advances in science and technology. The contemporary
military has become a 'microcosm' of society, in the sense that
almost all functions of the civilian sector are duplicated in the
military.
The 'Dual Function' does not recognize a civilian-military
relationship in which one is dominant. Indeed, based on the
'extended or big family' (kekeluargaan) concept in the context of all
national endeavors, every military and civilian function or
occupation is open to every qualified person in accordance with the
needs of the moment.
Thirdly, it aims at the continuous improvement of National
Resilience,2 which can be attained only through the willing and
conscious participation of the people in national development. In
order to secure this participation, A6RI must develop in its own
ranks, especially in those who are occupying socio-political
positions, a democratic and persuasive type of leadership which
differs markedly from the command or autocratic type of leadership
peculiar to the military. This social leadership is the following
'trilogy': (1) Ing Ngarso Sung Tuloio (Those in front must set the
right example); (2) Ing Madya Mangun Karsa (Those in the middle
must arouse the spirit to create); and (3) Tut Wuri Handayani
(Those in the rear must prod gently or stimulate).3
For a concise explanation of 'National Resilience', see Habib (1989).
There are 11 principles of leadership of the Indonesian Armed Forces
contained in the Armed Forces Doctrine Catur Darma Eka Karma, the
result of the First National Defence and Security Seminar, held in
Jakarta, 12-21 November 1966. Three of the 11 principles, popularly
called Tut Wuri Handayani, are particularly suited to the Indonesian
society. In this chapter they are referred to as the 'trilogy of social
leadership'.
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Fourthly, ABRI members are both professional soldiers
(prajurit) and fighters (pejuang). By 'professional' is meant soldiers
and fighters who (a) possess a high degree of specialized
theoretical knowledge, plus certain methods and devices for the
application of this knowledge in their daily practices; (b) are
expected to carry out their tasks with attention to certain ethical
rules; and (3) are held together with a high degree of corporateness
stemming from their common training and collective attachment to
certain doctrines and methods (see Abrahamsson, 1972, p.21). The
quintessence of the concept of prajurit ABRI is that he is
simultaneously a prajurit rakyat (a people's soldier), prajurit
pejuang (revolutionary soldier, or fighter), and prajurit nasional
(national soldier/national unifier/guarantor of national unity and
integration).4
Fifthly, in its implementation every prajurit is expected to
adhere to ABRI 's ethical code, the Sapta Marga (Sevenfold Way).
The first three relate to his status as citizen, and the remaining four
as members of ABRI. The seven pledges (or Sevenfold Way) laid
down in the early 1950s are as follows:
1 . We (are) citizens of the unitary Republic of Indonesia based on
Pancasila.
2. We Indonesian patriots, bearers and protectors of the state
ideology, are responsible and know of no surrender.
3. We Indonesian knights are devoted to the One God, and defend
honesty, truth and justice.
4. We soldiers of ABRI (are) guardians of the Indonesian state
and nation.
5. We soldiers of ABRI, uphold discipline, are obedient and
observant to our leadership, and uphold the soldier's attitude
and honor.
6. We soldiers of ABRI give primacy to courage in the
performance of our task, and are ever ready to devote ourselves
to state and nation.
7. We soldiers of ABRI are loyal and keep our word and the
soldier's oath.
4 See Hakekat Kekaryaan ABRI/TN1-AD Bukan Militerisme
(Departemen Angkatan Darat, 22 Juli 1967), pp.34-35.
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The 'core principles' and the increasing dominance of
ABRI's socio-political position
Ever since the very first beginning, even preceding the proclamation
of independence, the revolutionary armed forces have generally
conducted themselves according to the core principles outlined
above, in their self-assigned dual mission to actively promote the
cause of the revolution and to fight the war for independence against
a foreign enemy. This is not to say that they had done so knowingly
and consciously; rather, it was by intuition or instinct, if you will. In
spite of the many conflicts among themselves, which were caused by
differences of perception, interest, point of view, inclination, or
otherwise, a distinct thread can be seen running through the whole
fabric of the struggle of the armed forces from the beginning until the
present, depicting the core principles.
It was only in late 1958 that General A.H. Nasution, Chief of
Staff of the Army, propounded the first concept concerning the
Army's status, place and role in the nation's political system, called
the 'Middle Way', which was the conceptual origin of the
Dwifungsi doctrine. The 'Middle Way', introduced in his speech
delivered on November 12, 1958, at the Magelang National
Military Academy, was meant as an attempt to provide a rationale,
for, and at the same time lay down the limitations of, the Army's
greatly expanded role after martial law was declared in 1957, due to
the rapidly deteriorating situation since the early 1950s. He
described the military as
... not just the 'civilian tool' like in the Western countries,
nor a 'military regime' which dominates the state, but as
'one of many forces in the society' the force for the peoples'
struggle, which works 'together with other forces of the
people/5
Except during the first six years after the transfer of sovereignty
at the end of 1949, when civilian politicians ran and mismanaged
the country, the political role of the Armed Forces, in particular
that of the Army, has been increasing. While a rapid expansion
occurred during the period of martial law and guided democracy, it
was not until the ascendancy of the New Order immediately
See Simatupang (1987, p. 52). See also Said (1987, pp. 22-23) and Crouch
(1978, pp. 24,39,344-345).
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following the abortive communist coup attempt that its role has
really become dominant. At the same time ABRI has also been most
creative in terms of producing concepts and most effective in
implementing those concepts. In relatively rapid succession it
produced: the Orde Baru (New Order) concept; Dwifungsi (Duel
Function); Ketahanan Nasional (National Resilience); Wawasan
Nusantara (Archipelagic Concept); Integrasi Nasional (National
Integration); simplification of the political infrastructure which
has resulted in two political parties and one functional group; and
the 'floating mass' concept. These concepts have become the 'terms of
reference' of the political agenda of Indonesia's body politic.
Despite the dominant political role and the presence of the
military in almost all aspects of the country's national life,
Indonesia is not ruled by the military, at least, not by the military
alone. The whole economic sector and other important sectors such as
education, science and technology, social welfare, health and
family planning, are run by professional civilians or technocrats.
The military assists the technocrats, in the exercise of their tasks
and responsibilities, by maintaining political stability throughout
the country, and by dynamizing the people, especially in the rural
areas, to participate in the development of the local infrastructure,
health and family planning. To this end ABRI has regularly
employed military units in the ABRI Masuk Desa Program, which is
a different version of the 'civic action' program of the Army in the
early 1960s.
Now that the most serious source of threat to domestic security
and stability has disappeared, namely communism, and Pancasila
has been accepted in its entirety by all political parties, mass
organizations and NGOs, ABRI has been relaxing its political grip.
The Kopkamtib (Operations Command to Restore Order and
Security) has been abolished; the democratization process is
becoming more solid; political openness is increasing; and more
strings have been loosened with some widening of the range of issues
open for public dicussion and criticism. All this points to ABRI's
success in its political role as stabilizer and dynamizer. It also
shows that Dwifungsi is not to provide the 'ideological
underpinning for perpetual military rule', or statements to that
effect, as some foreign 'ABRI watchers' have maintained (for
example, Rogers, 1988, p.254).
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Conclusion: ABRI's role in Indonesia's future political
development
As we have seen, ABRI's role both as a defence and security force and
a socio-political force to restore, maintain and enhance stability
after the revolutionary fervour, volatility, and upheavals which
culminated in the bloody October 1965 tragedy, has been successful.
Twenty-five years of uninterrupted national development has
brought about extraordinary political, economic, and social changes
which have completely changed Indonesia from the one that
proclaimed and achieved independence in 1945.
Dwifungsi has worked, and has proved to be beneficial to the
state and nation. ABRI's role in the process of transforming a
traditional-agrarian society into a 'pre-modern-pre-industrial' one
has been recognized and accepted. In all the years when Dwifungsi
was in operation, many people held their breath and asked
themselves where this would lead. The spectre of a 'praetorian'
society was haunting them, including some among the top military
leaders themselves. The warnings and admonitions from the top
national leader and other military leaders, given repeatedly on
many occasions, proved this point. The 'Middle Way' introduced in
1958 was the first one.
ABRI itself held a special seminar in March 1972 to formulate a
plan for the transfer of the 1945 values from the older 1945 generation
to the younger generation, with participation by members of both
generations. One purpose of this seminar was to make the younger
generation aware of the fact that, despite the rather frequent
differences of view and opinion, at times fundamental, between the
military and the political leadership, the Army never tried to seize
power, and never coerced the national leadership. Intuitively or
instinctively, it was abiding by the core principles of Dwifungsi as
mentioned earlier. Whenever, during martial law and especially
under the New Order regime, ABRI became very dominant in the
political life of the nation, it did not happen because of ABRI's own
choosing. It happened because of the civilian political leaders'
mismanagement.
Recently, questions have been raised as to how long Dwi Fungsi
will last, now that ABRI has succeeded in enhancing national
stability and in setting the course of national development on a firm
footing. In other words, ABRI has proved its mettle as stabilizer and
(partly) as dynamizer. Is it not the time now for ABRI to open the
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door wider to civilian politicians, now that a middle class has been
growing?
As to the first and fundamental question, the anwer is a definite
'never'. Dwifungsi is here to stay. What will definitely change is
the implementation of Dwifungsi. That is to say, in Indonesia's future
political development, ABRI will gradually shift its role from
emphasizing the 'security cum stability approach' to the
'prosperity-cum-slability' approach. In this approach the Tut Wuri
Handayani type of leadership is the most appropriate.
With regard to the second question, the answer is 'that is what
ABRI has been doing' since the second half of the last decade. Two
general elections (1987, 1992) have been clearly shown to be 'clean' in
terms of ABRI's interference. The increasingly open political climate
is another indication. The reason for this gradual 'retrenchment' is,
as said earlier, that the main source of threat to security has been
eliminated, and that Pancasila has become the sole basis of the
country. This does not imply that Pancasila has permeated all
aspects of national life. Nothing is further from the truth.
But, at least as far as the political system is concerned, the basic
structure (that is infrastructure) has been already established, while
the suprastructure has long been in existence as stipulated in the 1945
Constitution. What remains to be done is to give 'meaf to both
structures in order to make them a solid foundation on which to build
and exercise the 'Pancasila democratic system'. This is not directly
the task of ABRI.
Pancasila is not supposed to be 'from, by, and for' the Armed
Forces; nor is it 'from and by ABRI for' the nation. It must be 'from, by,
and for' the people. Let the people themselves do it. The country has
a growing number of civilian intellectuals who are interested in
politics. ABRI could and should participate in this endeavor, but not
dictate. The best thing it can do is to create a political climate
conducive to the various interactions among all socio-political forces,
or their respresentatives, to arrive at common views, or consensus, on
how to make the Pancasila system work. ABRI should see to it that
this process takes place in an orderly manner, unhindered and
unimpeded by outside influences.
But this will also depend on the civilian forces themselves in
terms of their political orientation and capabilities, political
integrity, degree of commitment to national unity and integration,
and so on. Be that as it may, in any case, closer cooperation and more
open dialogues between the military and civilians are called for.
7Political Development and National Stability
Jusuf Wanandi
The outcome of the general election in June 1992 shows that the
political system is becoming more open. The Armed Forces (ABRI)
has adopted a neutral stance towards the three political parties,
both during the campaigns and on the election day itself. In most
parts of Indonesia people felt more relaxed and relatively free to
choose among the three contesting political parties.
This suggests that political development will become more
important in Indonesia's national development, for at least two
reasons. Firstly, as a result of economic development, there is a
growing middle class that can articulate its aspirations and
interests, and demands greater participation in the political
process. The second factor is the much improved access to education,
information and telecommunications for the population at large.
The problem for the future is how to promote political
participation in accordance with people's expectations without
endangering the unity of the nation and the stability of the country.
This problem arises because the country is still vulnerable to various
forms of social and political instabilities, be they caused by ethnic,
religious or even regional animosities.
Some of these traditional sources of instability are gradually
being overcome, but new ones may have arisen as a result of economic
development. In particular, one needs to recognize that the strategy
of economic development based on the free-market system has
resulted in a more unequal distribution of income, but hopefully this
is only a temporary consequence.
In this chapter, attention will be given first to a discussion of
the 1992 general election and then to two factors which will
influence the process of political development in the years to come,
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namely the presidential succession and the development of civilian-
military relations.
The General Election
The 1992 general election was an important development for
Indonesia's political future. It was the fifth general election held
during the Soeharto government, and people are now more aware of
their political rights. Before, they only saw the event as a mere
obligation. However, there was more freedom of choice in this
election, especially in the more developed parts of Indonesia such as
Java.
In general, the trend for Golkar, the government party, was
downward although they have still a very comfortable majority —
from 73 per cent of the votes and 299 seats in parliament down to 68
per cent of the votes and 282 seats out of 400 seats contested. The
reasons for the current results are to a large extent influenced by
considerations at the provincial and county levels, but there are also
overall conclusions that could apply nationally.
First, Golkar's victory with 73 per cent in 1987 was just too high
compared to the support it got in the three elections of 1971, 1977 and
1982, which hovered between 62-64 per cent of the votes. Second,
there is more freedom for the people to choose. They have become
more accustomed to such choice after having had four elections, and
the attitude of the security and armed forces was quite neutral
towards the three parties contesting the election. Third, there was a
certain sense of drift in Golkar's efforts during the campaign. The
electorate was also tired of the same party winning for the fourth
time, and above all Golkar could not really defend itself against
criticism of the deficiences of the government and bureaucracy,
which are generally associated with Golkar. (In reality, however,
Golkar does not really control the government or the bureaucracy).
Fourth, despite the overall results, in many places, especially
outside Java, the deferential attitude of the electorate is still
prevalent and the organization of Golkar supported indirectly by
the bureaucracy is still overwhelming. Moreover, the development
achieved in the last 25 years, with which Golkar has been
associated, could not be denied easily by the PDI or PPP.
The PDI or Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (the Democratic Party
of Indonesia, an amalgation of nationalist and Christian parties),
did very well, as expected, and increased its vote by 4 per cent and
its seats by 16 (from 11 per cent up to 15 per cent of the votes, and
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from 40 to 56 seats in parliament). The main reasons are that it was
able to show itself as an opposition party, criticizing the excesses of
the government and bureaucracy, coming up with new ideas and
reaping the protest votes and those of the first-time voters (17-22
year old).
However, PDI has had its limitations in organizational
capabilities, and in the limited issues they can raise (sometimes in a
rather incoherent fashion). Moreover, in some places, such as
Jakarta and West Java, they have had some setbacks because of the
stridency of the tone of their campaigns, as well as the excesses
during their rallies which affected the common people in the form
of traffic jams and minor abuses. y" - ~~
The ~PPPTthe United Development Party, which is an
amalgamation of four Muslim parties), has maintained their
support of about 17 per cent among the electorate and increased their
seats in parliament by one seat, from 61 to 62. The bickerings and
split in the party's central board brought about a decline in seats in
the 1987 generafeTection, from 90 to 61, and on this occasion they
still hav<fnbT managed to recapture the lost seats. The loss of seats
and votes, surprisingly, occurred in Sumatra, which has been their
natural base because of religious affiliations. This loss in Sumatra,
however, was compensated by gains in Central Java, Yogyakarta
and East Java. The main theme of their campaign was still religious
oriented, but their lack of organization has also been felt. The
seemingly sustained support the party enjoyed proved again that
Islam-based issues are still valid for their supporters.
The Presidential Succession
In the short and medium term, the main problem will be the
succession of the president, since this post is so overwhelmingly
important and powerful in the Indonesian Constitution. One factor
will alleviate the crisis surrounding President Soeharto's succession,
and that is the fact that he has been in power for over 25 years,
while most of the earlier generation of leaders of the Armed Forces
and the bureaucracy have already been replaced by a new
generation. In fact, he has been the most stabilizing factor while
these changes have been taking place. The question of the
presidential succession can be practically set aside until 1998. By
then the two most important centres of power will have already
been taken over by a younger generation for some years. These centres
of power will therefore not become sources of instability, since the
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rules of the game that have been laid down and implemented for
some time will prevent internal political rivalries and divisions to
cause disturbances.
Two factors are important for the smooth transition of
leadership. Firstly, President Soeharto has to prepare a candidate
for the next presidency beginning in 1998 by appointing a vice-
president from the younger generation, who is considered as the best
candidate for that important post. The idea that a president cannot
be prepared beforehand, because he should arise from a natural
process of competition among the next generation of leaders, has
some merit. However, the post now and in the future will demand
many aspects of leadership and statesmanship, so that the
candidate needs to have a lot of experience and be prepared to the
maximum extent possible before he can do the job. Because the
activities of the nation and the society have developed and
expanded into so many fields and sectors, the job will no more be as
simple as 25 years ago when President Soeharto took over.
Furthermore, the tempo of change has quickened so dramatically,
requiring the candidate to be a consensus-builder, and a moderate,
pragmatic and flexible leader. At the same time he has to be a
person who understands the new challenges of a more open, diverse,
developed, and international-oriented society and nation.
These capabilities have to be acquired by experience and
practice, although character and leadership are also important
prerequisites for the next leader. As such, President Soeharto has to
give the vice-president real experience and responsibilities in the
various fields of governance. He should be selected from among the
younger generation, so that he will be able to represent the coming
generation and their aspirations, and to anticipate more ably the
.dramatic changes that are expected.
Secondly, President Soeharto should also delegate more of the
coordinating functions in the various fields to his coordinating
ministers. To be able to do so, he should really look for persons with
leadership qualities, experience and capabilities to do the job
accordingly. Thus far, not all of the coordinating jobs have been
performed adequately, due to various constraints and limitations. A
greater delegation of the coordinating function could alleviate the
tasks of the presidency, and enable the president to concentrate on
the main job of statesmanship and to watch over the change of the
guard. With this kind of coordination and delegation, the succession
can be prepared by President Soeharto in a statesman-like and
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effective way, and will proceed in a smooth, responsible, peaceful
and well-accepted manner.
Military-Civilian Relations
In the longer term, perhaps the most important factor for political
change will be the role of the Armed Forces and the relationship
between the civilian elite and the military leadership. Continuing
into the forseeable future the Armed Forces will play an important
political role due to its dual role or function, which it acquired from
its historical experience, especially the struggle for independence
and the process of nation-building.
The relationship can become a problem if the two parties,
civilian and military, cannot adjust amicably and lack
farsightedness as well as statesmanship in their respective roles in
the society. The doctrine of the dual role has been accepted by the
society at large due to historical political developments. With the
success of modernization, and achievements of national
development, and with a new generation of more professional
leadership in the Armed Forces, the question of adjusting this role to
a more open society with a larger middle class has come forward and
needs to be addressed.
The Armed Forces is of the opinion that the dual role is a matter
of principle because of its historical and political origin. They
believe that the purpose of having this role is to maintain the unity
of the nation, based on Pancasila, and to save the nation from future
crises. They also believe that the doctrine enables them to
participate positively in politics and thus will also prevent them
from resorting to the use of inconstitutional means, such as coups or
threats. How far they will continue to participate actively in
politics in the future will depend on the political maturity of the
nation. In this context, the last few years has already seen many
Armed Forces appointees among diplomats, directors-general,
governors or district leaders being replaced by civilian bureaucrats
and professionals. Even the number of appointees from the Armed
Forces in the legislative councils has become an issue for public
debate. Their appointees in the Parliament (DPR) and the
Consultative Assembly (MPR) are seen as the guarantee to
maintaining^jPancasilfl asji basic principlei_in[ Indonesian political
Ufe^sduch.inJ^jr^guarantees the unity of the nation. The President
has announced recently that the numbers will be adjusted according
to the state of political stability of the nation.
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As has been said, in the last general election ABRI adopted a
neutral stance towards the competing political parties and Golkar.
ABRI also has stated that it will make adjustments in the
implementation of its dual role in accordance with the needs of the
nation and the maturity of its political life in the future. However,
they continue to stress their right to intervene in order to save the
nation as the main argument for their dual role.
What the new generation of leadership in ABRI really thinks
about their role in the future still needs to be examined very closely.
Thus far, it appears that they are just following the thinking of the
1945 generation, namely the founding fathers of the TNI and of the
nation. How they will manage their relationship with civilian
leaders in the future is also an open question. They are better
educated and they should better understand the problems and the
needs of a more open society, the wishes of a larger middle class, and
the international development of a global society, including the
challenges of interdependence in the fields of the economy,
technology, science and telecommunication. But at the same time
they seem also to be overly worried about the unity of the nation,
the continuity of development and the continued stability of
political life.
Therefore, it is important that the civilian and military
leaders are continuously engaged in dialogues and exchanges. They
should help formulate a new national consensus on political
development and their respective roles in political development.
Furthermore, they should help each other in adjusting their
respective roles. In this respect, stability still is considered as an
important factor in the equation. The new national consensus ideally
should be embodied in the next long-term development plan which
will be discussed, deliberated and agreed upon by the MPR in March
1993. Its implementation will be realised in legislation through the
DPR. The debate should also involve the society at large,
especially among the various thinkers, institutions and non
governmental organizations who feel that they have an important
stake in the future political development of the country. This can
provide important feedback, and their participation will also be
important for the support of the dual role. Since political
development is a very important topic for the future of Indonesia, it
is hoped that the debate will be held in a free and responsible
manner.
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Through regular consultations and adjustments both outside and
inside the Parliament, flexibility in the implementation of the
consensus can be guaranteed. The role of Golkar will be extremely
/Central in maintaining a balanced relationship between military
Vand civilian leaders. For that purpose the Golkar leadership in the
future should~£OTtst5T oFTeaders who are visionary, bold and
statesman-like in outlook, while maintaining a pragmatic, flexible
and moderate attitude. Above all they should be accepted by
military and civilian leaders, including the civilian bureaucracy.
It is also important that political parties and Golkar have a
certain autonomy Tn order to be able to play their role in the
polincaT^rocessrFor Golkar to be able to maintain its leadership in
the future, it has to be more independent from the bureaucracy and
has to be able to organize more purposeful compaigns for the people
in general. Based on this, suprastructural institutions like the MPR
and DPR and other legislative councils can then execute their
respective roles of controlling the Executive Branch.
This is the main challenge for the military and civilian
leaders: on the one hand, it is relatively easy for the military to
understand the importance of political development for stability in
the longer future of the nation, and pay lip-service to that effect in
their statements and deliberations; on the other hand this
challenge also requires readiness on their part to implement
decisions and ideas that will reduce their political power in
relative terms. This readiness will be greatly reduced if this process
appears to cause instability and uncertainty in political life, which
in essence is part of the process of democracy itself.
For civilian leaders, it will not be easy to organize themselves
and to restrain popular support and public opinion. Some policies
and actions of government and political leaders could be quite
unpopular but these decisions might be important for the
maintenance of stability in the political process and for maintaining
unity. It is also possible that the steps taken in achieving a certain
stage of political development will be gradual, and this might also
be unpopular with an impatient populace.
Above all, the challenge to the civilian leaders is whether
they can keep the country together, despite the differences that
exist in the society, by reaching a consensus on how to develop the
country in the various fields.
The other political parties and NGOs can induce and put
pressure on Golkar, as the main civilian counterpart of ABRI, to
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formulate the relationship between the two. However, this should
not limit their own participation in the process of political
development since they can play an important role as catalysts and
as pressure groups.
In all these efforts, generational change will have its influence.
On the one hand, the 1945 generation of ABRI could be more open-
minded on political development due to their civilian background.
But they also have endured a lot of political challenges,
instabilities and civil wars due to the mistaken leadership of
civilians, as happened during the Sukarno years. Therefore, they
are very concerned and even rather obsessed with political stability
and national unity, which make them very reluctant to try out new
ideas for political development. To a certain extent, they are quite
nationalistic in their outlook on international relations and
Indonesia's foreign policy.
On the other hand the new generation of ABRI, the so-called,
generation of the 1960s, is better educated, more international
minded, and also very professional. Although they have some
experience in carrying out a political role in the so-called territorial
activities, only a very few at the top have had national or
international experience in the political field. Their understanding
of the need for political development is quite adequate, but they
have to face the challenge of adjusting to a new future political role
which will be more limited than what they have known so far. This
transition will not be easy. It also needs a great deal of openness,
dialogue and cooperation between them and civilian leaders. Both
should adopt a pragmatic, flexible and moderate attitude towards
political development.
Looking to the Future
What are the chances that these developments will succeed? What
are the factors that will determine whether developments will be
favorable or unfavorable? First, President Soeharto in the next five
years will still be the most decisive factor, not only in appointing
and preparing for his successor, but also in the ways and pace at
which political development will be implemented.
In the last few years the President has increased his personal
intervention in the Armed Forces, and it is expected that he will
continue to do so. He is also the head of the civilian bureaucracy,
which in itself is a powerful group. Essentially, the President has
enormous powers to intervene in political life, although he is more
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sensitive to pressures and public opinion than it might appear. He
also follows political trends and developments in other countries,
especially neighbouring countries, quite closely. At the same time,
he is also the exponent of the 1945 generation par excellence, and
basically has a conservative and cautious outlook towards political
development.
Therefore, it can be expected that he is not going to take bold
steps to keep political development ahead of social and political
changes. He could even slow the trend somewhat, except if he
decides to delegate more of his authority to others as has been
suggested above.
Second, of course, is the leadership in ABRI, which would like
to keep its political influence and power, but also recognizes the
need to become more professional. It has to promote political
development but at the same time remain concerned with political
stability and the unity of the nation.
There are some personalities coming up in ABRI who, when
given power, can manage to balance those two contradicting
tendencies in political life. But in general ABRI tends to be more on
the conservative side, despite their pronouncements, essentially
because of their concerns with stability and unity. This is also due to
the fact that developments always bring about new and unforeseen
changes, a process which in general ABRI abhores. Therefore, it is
still uncertain how they are going to react to future developments. In
part this will depend on how much attention they give to their
political role (which is not always steady), and on the personalities
who will be in charge of political affairs.
The third factor is the new leadership of Golkar, which should
be trusted by the President and ABRI, but also endowed with the
authority for change and development. This will be crucial, because
in theory only Golkar has both formal and informal relations with
the President, the Army and the bureaucracy. Political development
will depend greatly on the vision, leadership and activism of the
new Central Board of Golkar. However, in view of the limited
authority and autonomy of the Central Board, especially in the last
general election, it will be very difficult to imagine how Golkar
could change dramatically. Perhaps this will proceed in an
incremental way, and this will very much depend on the right
personalities.
Fourth, there is the role of other political parties, the NGOs,
public opinion makers (press, academia and personalities) and so
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forth. Their role is equally important for the success of political
development in the future. This is because a lot of political pressures
are needed to promote political development. The main political
actors, on balance, see the need for greater political openness, but are
hesitant and essentially conservative in their ideas, and on their
own they will not be strong enough to push for this development.
They need support, pressures and even criticism. But paramount in
these efforts will be a consensus not to destabilize the nation or to
divide the country. In this process of change, there are some
developments and trends that give hopeful signs for future political
developments. There is some self-constraint on the part of the
political elite due to the dramatic change of government in 1965-67,
which was so traumatic and is still being felt.
Pancasila, the principle of unity, has become a stronger factor in
political life as the common denominator and integrating factor. In
practice further evidence is still needed to show whether indeed
this is true. In particular, Muslim organizations, which are no longer
propagating an Islamic state or the Jakarta Charter, have to
demonstrate greater tolerance towards, and a willingness to accept,
minorities by not pressing for more legislation of some aspects of
Fikih law. Such respect and tolerance for minorities is the
centrepiece of democracy, where the majority rules, but where
minorities are also protected in their rights and obligations. And in
the effort to create a more democratic society in the future, based on
Pancasila, the rule of law has to be supreme.
Political development in the last five years has, despite its ups
and downs, been more vigorous than ever. The general election has
shown that a greater degree of freedom has been given to the
populace to make their choice. Economic developments since the
middle of the 1980s have led to the emergence of a so-called 'middle
class', consisting of some members of the bureaucracy, Army officers,
professionals and an upcoming entrepreneurial class, which is more
open towards political development and more willing to push for
political participation and openness. This group is expanding very
quickly in line with the growth of the economy.
And last but not least, the new generation of youth that has
come up is not bound by the experience of the political struggle for
independence, the civil strife of the Bung Karno years, or even the
traumatic change of leadership in 1965. They are better educated,
more professional, more international and cosmopolitan. They are
also numerous and at this stage, as everywhere else in the world,
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they are thinking less about politics and more about making money.
They are our 'yuppies'. How they will get more politically involved
in the future is not yet clear, but they certainly are a force for
modernization and will be on the side of democracy if circumstances
push them to take an active part in the political development of the
country.
Conclusion
The political picture that has been drawn is a mixed one. The
Indonesian culture of tolerance and compromise will still be the
dominating factor influencing the direction of Indonesia's political
development.
Another most important and decisive factor is economic
development. So long as the economy continues to expand and grow
and the distribution is reasonably even, the easier it will be for
political development to proceed in an orderly fashion.
But leadership is perhaps the crucial factor. Those in power
should be able to discern the needs of the future and implement the
necessary adjustments and changes. Those who are not in power
should continue to push for change and political development, but
should also know how to restrain themselves and the masses. They
have to be able to balance the need for change and the need for a
certain stability in political life, so that the unity of the nation and
the achievements of national development will not be forfeited
lightly.
8Indonesian Political Developments: Problems
and Prospects
Marzuki Darusman
Observing developments in Indonesia today has acquired a
dimension beyond the traditional economic perception. Measuring
changes based on a range of standardized growth indices has come up
against new political realities. However, the mechanics of
compiling data and the exercise of gauging economic progress have,
by sheer scale and political expediency, caused economics to be
substituted for politics. A major consequence of this situation is that
economic norms have been applied to the evaluation of politics,
making politics a mere extension of economics. This limits analysis
and does not do justice to the complexities of Indonesian realities.
In fact, while economic performance has no doubt been singularly
impressive, Indonesian political developments in the last ten years
have been no less important. A general observation would conclude
that a consistent but extremely graduated process of democratization
is under way. It is taking place in the form of a ceding of power to
'polities'. Furthermore, imperceptible developments in this area
may be quite real and even generally more predictable than
economics. This means that areas of effective power, once
relinquished to democratic political processes, are not easily
retractable without affecting the intricate balance of relationships
that makes up the power complex.
A recent example is the draft proposal on the Broad Outlines of
State Policy (GBHN) normally submitted by the President to the
collective leadership of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)
at its five-yearly session. This document, the bible of Indonesian
politics, is submitted as contributory thoughts to be deliberated upon
and — as in the past — eventually adopted. Departing from former
practices, an unexpected decision was made to allow the political
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parties to draft their own GBHN documents for the MPR General
Assembly sessions. A primary reason cited for this extraordinary
gesture, particularly the timing, was the growing maturity of the
political parties and of the system as a whole, which would
warrant a greater sharing of national responsibilities. A sudden
withdrawal of such political magnanimity, on whatever pretext
(for example, if the five factions in the MPR session cannot agree on
a consensus draft GBHN), would markedly reverse the heightened
democratic expectations created and undoubtedly be disruptive.
Another case where the conceding of power to politics would be
clearly manifested, therefore indicating real political
developments, is the projected repeal of Decree VI/1988 (TAP
VI/MPR/88). This was announced early this year and will be
initiated by the Golkar (Golongan Karya) faction at the 1993 MPR
General Assembly. The decree and its predecessors, in essence, have
given General Soeharto for more than 25 years the mandate to
invoke, if necessary, extraordinary powers to secure, through
whatever means, the implementation of national development
efforts. The lifting of this decree, based on the Super Semar letter of
1966, when it finally does happen, will assuredly go quite a long
way towards shaping a substantive and open politics in Indonesia,
leading to what the House Speaker, Lt. Gen. Kharis Suhud termed
as 'a deregulation of politics.'
Existing circumstances have for some time ceased to correspond
with those under which the decree was initially issued. In fact, the
decree had never really been specifically enforced except in
connection with the former Operational Command for the
Restoration of Peace and Order (KOPKAMTIB), now transformed
into the Coordinating Agency for Preserving National Stability
(BAKORSTANAS). The rescinding of the decree and its intended
objectives would nevertheless still be a significant political and
psychological initiative, allowing henceforth for a more effective
implementation of the 1945 Constitution. A practical consequence
would be a greater tolerance of differences of opinion, as these would
no longer be immediately seen as threats to the government or
subversive of the system. This would then also promote a more
assertive parliamentary role, including a more balanced and
supervisory relationship with the executive as provided in the
constitution. Further political development in the future would
eventually result in corresponding adjustments to the laws on the
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press, General Elections, the political parties, subversive activities,
and other fields.
Looking at the democratization question in this light would
then lead to a more productive analysis. This in turn would be the
first step towards normalized politics in Indonesia, based on a
normal way of looking at it.
Under such normalized conditions the recognition of such ideas
as politics, democracy, constitutionalism and human rights will be
more easily and correctly perceived in their proper context. These
will be seen more as areas of legitimate activities requiring skilled
individuals in articulating issues that supersede ideological debate.
As to the greater predictability of Indonesian politics as
compared to economics, the fact that five consecutive elections were
won by Golkar attests to an emerging natural political stability
anchoring the system firmly within the body politic. This stands out
all the more when we observe the somewhat erratic pattern of
deregulation and re-regulation of certain markets recently (cloves,
oranges, TV subscription fees) despite the overall thrust towards
ever greater economic decontrol, especially with the launching of
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).
In any case, to the extent that concentrated power is now
gradually relenting to democratic processes, however feeble they
may still be at this stage, the absence of effective institutional and
political control on the president, and the executive in general, is
now being slowly reformed.
An interesting statement by the President in his 16 August 1992
speech referred to a possible reduction in the number of ABRI (armed
forces) faction members in parliament which presently number 100.
This could be seen as a similar process of power being ceded to
politics. However, the statement contradicts the previous one of
about three weeks earlier when the President received all the
military district commanders at his private ranch in Tapos. There
the President defended the ABRI's dual function, including its
present role in parliament, which had recently come under criticism
by prominent scholars such as Professor Miriam Budiardjo.
Therefore, was the President's statement a case of political
manoeuvering in response to such pressures?
What, then, would distinguish previous 'politics' from
'normalized polities'? Or, between 'New Order Polities', as
Indonesian politics has invariably been described, and simply 'plain
Indonesian polities'?
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The term New Order refers to a historic political regime or
arrangement, based on organizing principles that centre on the way
the state and society are made to relate to one another. This is
structured within a stable system that is operationally geared to
achieve developmental goals. The New Order has been described as
a corrective order, a constitutional order, a legal order and a
developmental order as the case may be. It has also been
characterized as an order with self-renewal capacities. Pancasila
order is again another name that has been given to the New Order.
However it may be interesting to note that, as far as all these
designations go, the New Order was never popularly labelled as
specifically a democratic order.
The use of the term New Order entails a recognition of certain
features (ideological, regime-defined, pre-political) that
characterize the system's political-historical identity. However,
what activates the system is the technocratic developmental
principle, where decision-making is based on a set of criteria and
techniques that forecloses real public participation and thereby
manifests inherent authoritarian tendencies.
It is clear that under such a developmental scheme, political
and democratic dimensions are not readily accommodated. The
striving for technical developmental goals is by nature averse to
aspirational politics and democracy. Therefore, technocratic New
Order politics cannot easily explain the causes of the actual
emergence of democratic tendencies. The question is, how are these
phenomena explained within a theoretical framework that denies
them any legitimate significance?
Therefore, simply put, plain Indonesian politics would then be
New Order politics plus greater democracy, with democratic
tendencies integrated into technocratic perspectives.
At the same time, it must be pointed out that these democratic
trends have not been entirely state-led in their origins. Another
area of development has been the phenomenal growth in the last
five years of a significant number of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) throughout the country. These have focussed on a variety of
single-cause objectives in their activities that relate to national
developmental goals. The eventual acceptance of the existence of
these new organizations, on a greater scale than in the past, had to
go through a bumpy adjustment period with the government. In
retrospect, it can be hypothesized that, ironically, pluralistic
democracy in Indonesia could never have in fact been realizable
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with the prevailing nature of pluralism. This pluralism was
primordial-inclined (ethnic-, religious-, racial-, historical-
oriented), rather than public-interest orientated. That condition is
presently being gradually reformed through the transformative
potential of the NGOs, among others.
A major intellectual challenge today then is to form a
theoretical framework that would encompass seemingly disparate
political developments within an integrated and logical analytical
structure. As it stands, democratizing tendencies in Indonesia are
clearly identifiable and can be related to concrete events and
policies. They are, however, less clearly explainable as part of a
logical process and system of political change. The problem, then, is
how to determine the underlying cause behind specific political
events that are seemingly politically unnecessary. Are these
political events random or will they form a pattern? How far do
they constitute a part of a coherent process of political change? Are
they trend-setters? How does one explain the relatively greater
assertiveness of parliament during these past years, although the
technocratic script did not provide for such an unforeseen
eventuality?
It is possible to explain these phenomena in terms of
motivational theories of social change. However, one would
presumably end up with complex justifications of why things
happened or why others failed to happen. A question of this nature
would be, for example, why General Soeharto has not opted to step
down, as a matter of personal choice, after so many years of personal
sacrifice to the nation? Such a decision would be of momentous
consequence but would, nevertheless, be well taken by a nation that
is eternally grateful for such an extraordinary contribution.
It may be difficult, understandably, to imagine an Indonesia
without Soeharto, and there are a number of compelling reasons why
he should stay on. However, there is only one reason, probably
equally convincing, for actually stepping down and this would be
specifically to allow a new generation of leaders to take the helm
while he would still be there to offer guidance. While the
probability should not be foreclosed, this has, of course, not
happened. How, therefore, would one explain things that have not
happened, in contrast to things that have? How are the causes of
political events in Indonesia that have inherent democratic
potential to be explained?
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A possible solution to this complex question is to determine
whether or not these tendencies in any way relate to the national
thrust of economic deregulation. For in the wake of deregulatory
measures and privatization, a general course towards selective state
decontrol has been initiated. It would, however, be difficult to
specifically correlate economic deregulation with political
democratization at this point. Nevertheless, it is inevitable that
further deregulation will eventually require democratization. As
the range of economic choices expands, political options will have to
diversify commensurately. Otherwise, those measures will only
generate and aggravate inequities, for only limited groups will be
able to benefit from those policies. Decontrol of politics is intended
also to achieve equity objectives. Therefore, as a matter of principle,
it will in turn affect how economic deregulation is implemented in
the name of efficiency.
The reverse is, of course, equally true. Ultimately, it is the
emergence of a political-economic dynamic that is being sought. In
the meantime, state-decontrol processes will presumably be mainly
economic-generated. The historic phase that this process is going
through presently is extremely important. A more balanced
interdependent relationship between politics and economics must
gradually be institutionalized. This has far-reaching democratic
implications for political development. This is all the more true
with regard to the results of the 1992 General Election, which saw
the government-supporting social-political force, Golkar losing an
unprecedented 18 seats in parliament. Those elections imparted a
dual political message of continuity with change.
Continuity would refer to present economic policies, while
change would mean future political choices. The social-economic
uplift felt after two decades of national development efforts has
been clearly attributed to sound economic policies that could be
designated as social-market oriented. To maintain that momentum,
however, it would seem that changes are in order. First-order
changes would presumably lead to matters of political leadership.
This matter has been highlighted in its more important aspects
throughout this paper. The nature of political leadership changes
in Indonesia sets them apart from second-order changes relating to
matters of policy implementation. The latter have to do with
mechanisms for effecting normal policy adjustments through
political means. A primary focus would be to allow corrective
policies, politically and institutionally applied, to balance out the
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more severe economic inequities ranging from steep differentials of
social-economic status and unwarranted discriminatory practices to
monopolistic policies.
The dimensions of this leveling-off problem make it into a
transitional process on its own. Furthermore, it involves a major
adjustment on the part of those who have availed themselves of the
economic opportunities of the past 25 years. This is not being
contested here. By its nature and scale, however, this is a political-
economic problem which constitutes the critical core of the
transitional process.
To bring about this state of affairs, a concerted effort is required
of all the political and economic actors. This, in turn, calls for
transparency and consensus of the highest level and quality. The
moment the idea of change becomes widely accepted and
appreciated, through a set of agreed-on confidence-building
measures, corresponding democratic political processes will follow.
This would then allow for reforms to be negotiated within a clearly
defined national political agenda. The transfer of power will be
perceived as a constitutional concept that is firmly embedded
within the dynamic process of institutionalized political and
economic change, rather than merely as moments of power crises.
In terms of time-frames, adhering to the cycle of the national
constitutional agenda would ensure the highest degree of political
stability required to guarantee a least disruptive transitional
process. The 1993 MPR General Assembly could form that
constitutional point of reference. However, realistically and if only
to allow the full import of the process to be appreciated by the
public, the 1998 MPP General Assembly would be a more feasible and
responsible time-frame.
To share among all actors the perspective of a sequence of phases
that must be passed to achieve political change would require the
highest political skills. The initial consensus to outline a common
platform would already serve as a focal point for discourse.
In this connection, it could be asked whether the so-called
succession problem is the single most important issue today. An
affirmative answer would immediately sideline a set of other
equally important matters. They also relate to the objective
challenges facing the nation. It also relates to those conducive
conditions enabling a viable political system to operate
independently of indispensable actors. The call by Home Minister
General Rudini for greater autonomy for the districts (kabupaten
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and municipalities), for example, is a reformating initiative that, if
implemented, could decisively shape the future of democratic
politics in Indonesia by distributing power more proportionately
throughout the system. This would then contribute to more
autonomous politics. While this may be a long-term process, the
present system is, in fact, already capable of shouldering expanded
democratic responsibilities.
In conclusion, the general and oft-asked question of whether the
Indonesian situation is amenable to normal social science
methodologies in terms of 'forecastability' is probably casting the
problem too simply. The uniqueness of the Indonesian setting is that
while problems are intractable, the prospects are bright. To be
optimistic is not to be biased, but to be open-minded.
9The Future of Human Rights in Indonesia
T. Mulya Lubis
Human rights is no longer a simple subject matter. In the last 50
years human rights as a subject has become very wide and complex.
Practically every aspect of life is governed by various human rights
instruments such as human rights declarations, conventions,
covenants or resolutions. The UN Declaration of Human Rights,
widely regarded as the post-world war II Magna Carta of Human
Rights, has branched out into more than 50 international human
rights instruments, covering a wide range of subjects from civil and
political rights to economic, social and cultural rights. Lately,
another branch of rights has come into being. These are solidarity
rights, which encompass the right to peace, the right to a healthy
environment and the right to development.
At regional level, notably in Europe and America, various
human rights declarations have been adopted and come into force.
The African continent in 1981 also produced a human rights charter
known as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Banjul
Declaration). However, in Asia and Australia we have yet to
produce such a document. It is indeed interesting to ask why Asia
and Australia have been very much left behind, in spite of the
Asian independence movements which started in the 1940s.
Historically, the newly independent states in Asia voiced a strong
demand for freedom, equality and liberty. And yet Asia is now
forced to realize that those basic values have been put aside in the
name of security and economic well-being.
Indonesia, especially under Sukarno in his early years, was
known as an advocate for independence, self-determination,
economic justice, and change in the international order. The
Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung (1955) underlined the position of
Indonesia. In human rights terms, what was voiced by Sukarno's
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government can be regarded as disseminating basic values in line
with freedom, equality and liberty. But as our history shows, his
government gradually put itself in a problematic situation in which
Sukarno was obsessed with his own ambition to stay in power
forever at the expense of freedom, equality and liberty. Sukarno
detained a lot of politicians and intellectuals, outlawed opposition,
banned critical media and led the country into economic bankruptcy.
As we all know, Sukarno precipitated his own downfall, and the
new regime came to power.
When the present government —the New Order — came to
power, many people believed that its early years could be
considered as a human rights revival, in which such rights were not
merely rhetoric but very much alive in the society. It was a time
when people talked freely about international human rights
instruments, and even proposed that a kind of human rights charter
be drafted. Likewise, the leaders of the country responded
positively, and expressed their commitment to human rights, while
blaming the ousted government for authoritarianism that included
human rights violations. The government requested the MPRS
(Provisional Peoples' Consultative Assembly) in 1967 to establish a
human rights guideline in accordance with Pancasila and the 1945
constitution. The MPRS set up an ad-hoc committee that prepared
such a guideline to be incorporated into a Human Rights Charter
widely known as Piagam Hak-hak Asasi Manusia dan Hak-hak
Serta Kewajiban Warga Negara (Charter of Human Rights,
Citizens' Rights and Duties). But as history shows, the Charter was
not submitted to the MPRS for adoption, allegedly because of
opposition from various inner circles within the government. The
prevailing view of the government at that time was to concentrate
on economic recovery, and for that reason a trade-off policy was
adopted in which human rights were put aside in the name of
economic recovery.
To be fair to history, it can be argued that, although economic
recovery was the main obsession of the government, human rights
were fairly observed and debated until the early 1970s. The decline
in human rights started in 1974 in the aftermath of the Malari
incident in which almost 100 activists, intellectuals and lawyers
were detained, and 11 newspapers were banned. It is not an
overstatement to conclude that since 1974 various policies and laws
that regularized and controlled political organizations have been
adopted. It started with the policy to reduce the number of political
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parties from nine to three, and the cooptation of the press, labour,
farmers, and youth organizations; it extended to banning
demonstrations, and later controlling the activities of
non-governmental organizations such as LBH, Peradin, YLKI, LP3ES
and others. Interestingly, all these policies were finally legalized
in 1985, when the government enacted a package of bills called
'political development bills '. These are the Law on Political Parties
and the Functional Group, the Law on General Elections, the Law on
the Structure of the MPR, DPR and DPRD, the Law on Referenda,
and the Law on Societal Organizations (NGOs). At the same time,
we have to consider also the Law on the Press, the Law on the
Judiciary, and the Law on the Supreme Court. This cluster of laws
made everything legal and lawful despite the fact that negation of
political rights in a wider sense had become very apparent.
In view of the above it is understandable if there is pessimism
within the society; but on the other hand there are also people who
keep their hopes alive. Globalization of human rights after the
collapse of Eastern European countries seems inevitable. Moreover,
maintaining the pace of economic development will require, among
other things, certainty of law and human rights guarantees.
Sustainability of economic development will depend not only on our
commitment to environmental protection but also the fulfillment of
basic human rights. Therefore, environmental protection and
fulfillment of human rights must be treated as two sides of one coin;
they go hand-in-hand. And above all, economic development will
have to interact one way or another with globalization, and in this
case gradual human rights fulfillment will become part of the game.
There is no point of continuing to promote economic growth if it is at
the expense of social alienation and dissatisfaction. Economic
development should not become a time bomb because it would mean a
serious set-back.
International Pressures
Many government officials have on various occasions reiterated that
Indonesia is not a rights-based society. What is important, they
say, is duty. They seem to recognize certain human rights but these
are subject to certain limitations, while at the same time they stress
the importance of duties. Implicit in this attitude is the repeated
allegation that human rights, as perceived and advocated by many
international organizations, are a western construct. That is, human
rights, as spelled out in various international human rights
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instruments, are seen as Western values based on a natural rights
philosophy. Therefore, they are not rooted in many Asian societies.
According to this view, Asia should have its own human rights
notion distinct from the UN Declaration of Human Rights. In other
words, there should be an 'indigenous' concept of human rights. This
explains why there has been an outright rejection of various
international human rights instruments despite the fact that all
Asian countries joined the United Nations. Being a member of the
United Nations, every country is ethically and organizationally
bound by the UN Declaration of Human Rights because it is
regarded as a common standard of achievement.
Among international lawyers, international human rights
instruments have been regarded as customary international law,
meaning that ratification is no longer conditio sine qua non. Above
all, our international community has become a borderless society in
which no state boundaries are recognized, especially by economic
actors. Internationalization of our economy seems to be inevitable
even for states like Cuba and Myanmar. There is no one single
country on earth which can survive without engaging in
international trade. But internationalization of the economy has
carried with it international values, mostly originating from, and
found in, the Western societies, such as the rule of law, democracy,
the market economy and human rights. Gradually, those values
penetrate the non-Western societies and some are adopted by them.
In Latin American countries, South Korea and Taiwan, for instance,
one can witness more respect toward rule of law, democracy and
human rights. It seems that the success of economic development has
forced these countries to be bound by the rule of law, democracy and
human rights. This is so even though one should recognise that there
are countries which continue to violate human rights, despite
economic development.
However, the dissemination of these values is a continuous
process, and one should compliment the tireless efforts of
international organizations, especially those of international
human rights organizations, both inside and outside the United
Nations. Their agenda consists of three main activities, namely,
international standard setting, enforcement and information.
Remarkably, they have achieved a great deal in the way that they
forced every state on earth to recognize and gradually embrace
human rights values in their national life. Nowadays, almost every
national constitution incorporates human rights principles. And
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many judgments rendered by national courts have cited international
human rights instruments. This is not to say that we have no
problems with enforcement, but the fact that international standard
setting has been substantially achieved is in itself a remarkable
phenomenon. Eventually, it will lead to a situation where most of
the complaints about the imposition of Western values on
non-Western societies are dismissed.
Another factor that must be taken into consideration in this
great achievement of international standard setting is the collapse
of Eastern European countries, which practically ended the so-
called cold war and containment policy. The failure of communist
systems has brought an inevitable victory of values that have been
advocated persistently by the capitalist countries — such as a
market economy, democracy, rule of law and human rights. This
victory of capitalist countries has changed their agenda from
countering and containing communist ideology into spreading their
values. In this case, human rights become very instrumental. If, in
the past, human rights violations were ignored and silently
accepted in the name of containing communist ideology, that very
reason does not exist anymore. If, in the past, most international
human rights campaigns and pressures came from international
human rights organizations, this is not the case any more. For the
first time in our history, there is a concerted effort by states and
international human rights organizations to strengthen human
rights principles.
In Search of Human Rights Policy
Economic development has been regarded as the core of the New
Order government since it came to power in 1965-66. In the name of
economic development, it is argued, human rights must be deferred
until economic development has been completed. Theorists of
economic development hold that it must succeed whatever the cost
and sacrifice shouldered by the people because, in the end, economic
development will bring with it benefits in other realms of human
rights. The prevailing notion among economic planners has been that
this form of trickle-down would ultimately take place and when the
economic conditions of the people were sufficiently improved, at
this point the people could begin to enjoy full human rights.
It has been argued that economic development has produced a
new class or group consisting of managers, young entrepreneurs,
professionals, and to some extent, intellectuals. Their position is not
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always similar, but most of them aspire to a strikingly similar goal :
the guarantee of rule of law as opposed to the rule of the ruler,
favouritism, or primordialism. A new consciousness has arisen
resulting from the constant fear that if the tradition of rule of law is
not strengthened, then the future of society, and with it the future of
human rights, would be in jeopardy and dependent solely on the
discretionary power of the ruler.
In a parallel development, an impressive new group of NGOs is
also emerging as viable and vocal advocates of reform. In the last
two decades, growing numbers of concerned intellectuals, student
activists, and informal leaders have become involved in NGOs. The
NGOs that label themselves partners or critical partners of the
government aim for the most part at awakening and facilitating
people's true participation in determining their future. These NGOs
may not yet be strong enough to form a political alliance, but they
could help influence public opinion and push the government to
greater responsiveness. Needless to say, more human rights
guarantees are an indication of a greater responsiveness on the part
of the government.
At this point, it is appropriate to underline the role of the press,
despite its weaknesses. Of course, it is a mistake to regard the
Indonesian press as free, but within its own limitations the press has
been instrumental in disseminating and strengthening human rights
values. It is through the media that all those human rights values
have been introduced to the society at large, and to some extent a
limited 'human rights discourse' can also be found in the media.
Certainly, the press can do more in its effort to strengthen human
rights, but the fact that the press is being closely watched and
controlled by the government through its control over the licence to
publish (SIUPP) must also be taken into consideration. One has to be
realistic and recognize the limitations faced by the press; and yet
there have always been ways to bring up the issues of human rights.
The need to strengthen human rights has been articulated on
many occasions, particularly during the campaign prior to the June
1992 general election. Every party, including the ruling Golkar
party, has promised that the time has come for more respect for
human rights, and for this very reason the notion of a state based on
law (rechtstaats) must also be strengthened. Human rights can only
survive under the umbrella of the rechtstaats and, therefore, the
government's initiative in introducing and reforming the
administration of justice, by enacting a new criminal procedures code
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(KUHAP) and establishing an administrative court (PTUN), must
be continued. In this regard, many people have demanded that the
judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, should be independent and
impartial. Moreover, the Supreme Court should be given the right to
review legislative products (judicial review) promulgated by the
parliament (DPR). Without such power it would be very difficult
for human rights to grow, since the government can freely enact
legislation that might negate human rights. Repressive laws such
as that on Anti-Subversion cannot be challenged while, if the
Supreme Court is equipped with the right to judicial review, we can
realistically expect that human rights can significantly be guarded.
Aside from efforts to strengthen the notion of rechtstaats, we
should consider also the internal pressure coming from the
Department of Foreign Affairs, which has called for the adoption of
a human rights policy. Partly this is a response to international
scrutiny and criticisms over alleged human rights violations in Aceh
and East Timor, but it is also because the department serves as a
spokesperson for the international community. Internationalization
of human rights has meant there is little choice except to gradually
comply with human rights principles. It is for this reason that
Indonesia joined the UN Human Rights Commission. Of course, some
people have questioned Indonesia's sincerity in joining the UN
Human Rights Commission, but it is a step in the right direction.
The government's involvement in this international human rights
forum will eventually broaden its understanding of human rights.
Internationalization of human rights has found another avenue
which is even more effective. As we know, the Indonesian
government has been a recipient of foreign economic assistance in the
last 20 years, and as a matter of fact Indonesia is one of the biggest
debtors in Asia. The consortium of donor countries, the Consultative
Group for Indonesia (CGI) (formerly known as IGGI), led by the
World Bank, has suggested that the rime has come to link economic
development to the betterment of human rights. The US, Germany
and Japan, for instance, have adopted human rights policies in their
economic assistance to third world countries. Although the first
meeting of CGI did not explicitly raise human rights issues, it is only
a matter of time before it comes on the agenda. The problem is that
donor countries have to face critical groups and citizens within their
own countries who question the human rights records of the recipient
countries. This explains why the US government is being confronted
by a bill enacted in its House of Representatives aiming at curtailing
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military assistance to the Indonesian government as a protest over
the handling of the East Timor incident. It should be recognised also
that the government of Germany has conditioned its economic
assistance on respect for human rights, democratization,
preservation of the environment, the guarantee of law and a market-
friendly economy. Japan has also adopted similar guidelines. Other
donor countries one way or another will link their economic
assistance to human rights, and this will force the Indonesian
government to pay serious attention to the improvement of human
rights.
Having explained the dynamics and on-going interaction
between the government and those striving for human rights,
nationally and internationally, it is interesting to note that some
attempts have been made by various groups within the country to
come up with what is called the 'Indonesian concept of human
rights'. The Foreign Affairs Department has assigned the Law
School of Diponegoro University the task of undertaking
comprehensive research on this subject. Gajah Mada University has
initiated a project to draft a sort of national human rights charter,
and in Jakarta a similar attempt is being made by the Indonesian
Moslem Intellectual Association (ICMI). This is indeed a good sign,
even though this kind of venture might hamper the international
standard-setting campaign, and possibly might de-emphasize a
number of international human rights norms which are regarded as
alien and not rooted in Indonesian soil. However, while waiting for
the outcome of those human rights projects, a guarded optimism is by
no means unreasonable. The possibility of a peaceful evolution
towards stronger observance of human rights in this era of
globalization is daily growing stronger.
Conclusion
What is the future of human rights in Indonesia? There is no simple
answer to this question. On the one hand there has been a
mobilization of pressures from the international community as well
as from national groupings such as the NGOs, intellectuals and the
press, while on the other hand a kind of ambiguity remains. The
fact that an Indonesian concept of human rights is being prepared
explains the ambiguity. Reservations about the universal character
of human rights are still present. Therefore, the outcome will
depend very much on the intensity of the interaction within the
government.
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This is not to say that international pressures do not play a
significant role but, above all, the attitude of the government, the
business sector, the NGOs, the press and the military are the most
significant factors in shaping human rights policy. If a truly middle
class emerges from all these social-political interactions, it may
bring Indonesia closer to the realization of rechtstaats, democracy
and human rights.
10
The 1992 Election: A Devastating Political
Earthquake?
Abdurrahman Wahid*
The results of the 1992 general election provide an interesting
window on a possible drastic departure in Indonesian politics. In my
view the results of the 1992 election should be interpreted as a
political earthquake — for Golkar of course. For PDI and PPP, on the
other hand, the results were good.
In the election Golkar was able to contain the aspirations of the
PDI and the PPP to the point where it lost only 5 per cent of its
previous votes. But in several regions — the most important regions
in the Indonesian polity — Golkar suffered major setbacks. That is
in East Java, Central Java and the capital region of Jakarta. In East
^ava Golkar lost ten seats in the national parliament, amounting to
f 25 per cent of its previous gains. In Central Java the loss was not so
I large. Perhaps I could continue the analogy by saying that if there
was an earthquake in East Java, there were severe tremors in
Central"Java. Maybe it was around seven-and-a-half on the Richter
scale, enough to do a lot of damage. In Jakarta Golkar failed to
""achieve the target of 60 per cent of the votes which had been
instructed by the President to his supervisor for the Jakarta region,
Minister Azwar Anas. Jakarta is especially important because it is a
showcase. According to this line of thinking, Golkar's performance
in Jakarta is an indicator of its popularity throughout Indonesia. In
an open, relatively honest and free election as in Jakarta, Golkar's
ability to garner votes should be an example for the rest of
* (This chapter is based on an edited tape of Abdurrahman Wahid's talk
and answers to questions at the Indonesia Update seminar)
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Indonesia. Instead, in this year's election Golkar won only 53 per
cent in Jakarta. Its result was far off the target.
This result has great significance for the politics of Indonesia in
the future. First, it showed that Golkar still has to rely very
heavily on the bureaucracy and the military, and that it has failed
to take deep root among the population. The population still
more or less captured by the oldforces -— the Islamic forces
represented by PPP and the populism of Sukarno represented by PDI.
This is very important because the very establishment of Golkar
was intended to break up those single-community political forces.
For the PPP, the election result encouraged those who would like to
preserve the continuation of conventional Islamic politics. For the
PDI, the result indicated the revival of populist politics (paham
kerakyatan) on a vast scale with great promise for the future.
Golkar was established precisely to promote the collective
interests of various small groups and competent individuals. The
term Golongan Karya (meaning functional groups and abbreviated to
/Golkar) denotes Golkar's purpose of modernising Indonesian politics
within a certain time frame. Its goal was to 'colour' politics in such a
way as to draw the population away from the old types of politics.
But now, approaching the end of the first long-term developmentJ
plan, Golkar has failed to achieve that goal. .—-—'
This brings us to the question of whether the policy of trying to
disengage Indonesian politics from the 'big issues' of the past is still
feasible. The blow suffered by Golkar in East Java, Central Java and
the capital necessitates a thorough examination of Golkar's own
foundations since it is evident that, by relying on the bureaucracy
and military, Golkar will only invite more trouble from the
electorate in the future. By its very nature, Golkar is a confederation
of small outfits and minority groups, in contrast to the past political
parties with their Trig constituencies'. Go/fair's loss of support in the
1992 election raises a very important question: is the political
strategy of 'de-ideologising' Indonesian politics still feasible?
If it is not feasible, what should we have as a replacement so
that we can avoid a return to the old politics — the politics of
aliran and contradictory ideological persuasions? One thing is clear
now. It looks as if the effort to de-ideologise politics in Indonesia
will be difficult to sustain any longer without resorting to
undemocratic ways, that is by maintaining what is called the
'security approach' indefinitely. There is a problem here because if
we continue along the lines of the past, by going back to the aliran
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movements, then we will experience all sorts of contradictions in our
society.
/^Despite the emergence of primordial issues and tendencies in
/ Indonesia, I would say that Muslims in Indonesia are basically
^jolerant.Fbrjexample, their acceptance of Pancasila is a product of a
long-tradition of reinterpreting Islamic laws to take account of the
nee^^etrby_ Other groups outside the Muslim community. This is
clear from the study of religious law or fikh in Indonesia. Another
example is the acceptance by the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) in 1935 of
the validity of the concept of the Indonesian nation. It did so by
declaring that the entity called the Dutch East Indies at that time
should be defended by the Muslims because that state gave them
religious liberty, that is the liberty to implement their religious
teaching. This tolerant and flexible tradition grew from the first
contacts of Islam with previous traditions in Indonesia — pre-
Hindu, Hindu, Buddhist and Hindu-Buddhist — and was later
strengthened by the introduction of Christianity in Indonesia.1
Tradition teaches tolerance, but political trends are not dictated
by tradition only. The common people have not yet been able to
develop strong organizational capability. Because of that, those
who are active and better organized are able to take advantage of
the situation, something that has happened within the Islamic
movement.
There is a nucleus of Muslim militants who emerged in the 1970s
as the offspring of the former Muslim militants who dominated the
dialogue between the nationalists and Muslims in the Constituent
Assembly between 1956 and 1959. If we look closely at the
proceedings of the Constitutent Assembly, it was clear that only a
small number of Muslim leaders actually wanted to reject Pancasila
orjvanted to establish an Islamic state. The rest of course were just
inactiveTbut were used by militants like Kiyai Isa Anshary, for
example. Fliave conclusive proof of this, including the late Kiyai
Achmad Sidik's paper delivered to the NU in East Java in 1957,
when he said that the establishment of an Islamic state is not an
obligation for Muslims. That shows that there was debate inside
the Islamic movement. But, since the 'moderates' were defeated or
1 Maybe, in discussing East Timor, many do not realise that the military
commander, Brigadier Theo Syafei, is a Christian with an Islamic name
— a name that belongs to Christian princes in the Sultanate of Buton.
How could you expect to find a family tree like that?
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were outmanoeuvred because they were weakly organized, the result
was a deadlock in the Constituent Assembly. This was only resolved
by the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 marking the return to the
1945 Constitution and the establishment of autocratic government as
well.
In Indonesia today this kind of situation has re-emerged partly
because Indonesia has open contacts with the Middle East. All kinds
of influences are felt among the Muslim movements so that many
different Islamic ideologies come to Indonesia — Shi-ite, both
Iranian and Iraqui, Saudi Arabian Sunni, Indian Sunni, Pakistani
Sunni and so forth — and the better organized will become the
dominant force. Unfortunatly this development happens to coincide
with the setback experienced by Golkar in the recent election, and
the President's search for support from the Islamic community. Thus
people who in the 1970s denounced Pancasila are now becoming 100
per cent 'PancasilaisV and working with the Presidential groups.
As of now we can still see that the call to Islam as made by PPP
is still quite strong. If we cannot put reasonable limits on this kind of
tendency in a democratic way withouF resofTIhg to "extra-
constitutional measures, then T think the whole endeavour will be
discredited because those very issues will then emerge as democratic
issues.That is what happened in Algeria with the rise of the
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). What happened there was that the
FIS used democratic processes — although they were undemocratic
themselves — so that they could beat the government. That could
also happen in Indonesia.
But when I aired this issue, not a single person defended me, and
accusations abounded from my own fellow members of Islamic
movements in Indonesia. So the challenge now is how to shape
Indonesian politics towards the continuation of the efforts to
deconfessionalize politics so that, politics can run in a 'normal' way
but without resorting to unconstitutional instruments. This is a very
grave challenge which became clear in the results of the last
election.
At present this ongoing process of the deconfessionalization of
politics through constitutional means is being complicated by the
/ fact that the Presidential succession will take place in maybe 1995,
but if not in 1995 then in 1998. Even before the recent election, the
i succession issue itself gave rise to unintended side issues. President
Soeharto failed to get a carte blanche from all important sectors in
the society, including the armed forces and various other
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organizations. I don't yet know about Golkar because up to now it
says that it is still observing the situation. Its Chairman, Wahono,
said that they were still observing the candidates to determine who
would be the most appropriate.^
In these circumstances the President was forced to resort to a new
tactic, that is to woo the Islamic groups in an all-out effort to get full
support. TnTsTaises the possibility that really 'out-of-line' Muslims
with one-sided orientations in politics — those, for example with
'anti-this-and-anti-thaf attitudes — will have an opportunity to
emerge in the body politic. We will not know to what extent this
will happen until the membership of the new MPR, the People's
Consultative Assembly, is announced in October 1992 when we will
see whether such 'fire-brands' will be included in its membership. If
they are appointed they will call for a return to the old politics,
although instead of demanding the establishment of an Islamic
state they will now demand the creation of an Islamic society in
Indonesia, which will amount to the same thing. That is, the
Muslims will be given first-class status and the others will become
second-class citizens. But it will not be all the Muslims, only the
Muslims they choose.
So now we can see the problems of the political process in
Indonesia. We need to try to find a balance between political
orientations. Proper professional orientations, concern for the
improvement in the people's living standards, rule of law and so
forth should be promoted, but the process now faces difficult and
very daunting obstacles because of the situation concerning the
Presidential succession. In these circumstances it is necessary in the
democratization process to prevent this kind of primordialism,
sectarianism and exclusivism from developing and gaining support.
But on the other hand we also have to try to enlarge the constituency
for democracy.
In this respect I think I should clarify the position of Forum
Demokrasi (FD). It is not an action-oriented group. It is just a group
of people from different constituencies. So if one particular member
or participant in FD wants to take action, then he or she can, but
cannot force the rest of FD to join in. Why? Because from the very
beginning we made it clear that we seek a common platform. We
would like to discuss and reflect on the parameters of democracy, the
In October 1992 Golkar announced its intention to nominate President
Soeharto for re-election (Editors).
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limits of power, and how we could promote the democratization
process in a satisfying way. But we do not discuss such issues as when
to call a strike, when to defend the farmers facing land
confiscations, and so on because this is already being done by other
groups. We have to make it clear that FD works for full
democratization by trying to provide a framework for peasants,
labourers, small traders, and even government employees to channel
or organize themselves, because weak people have no ability to
organize. Why that is so is an historical question and relates to the
political situation.
I would also like to say something about the question of East
Timor. Today there are many groups demanding all sorts of solutions
to the intractable problem there. The expression of these collective
efforts can be found in the aide memoire of the INGI, the
international NGO forum on Indonesia at its conference a few months
ago, where there was explicit mention of two differing perceptions
about the status of East Timor — the Indonesian government's
perception that the Timorese have already decided to join Indonesia
and many East Timorese' own perception that they haven't yet
determined that. The aide memoire calls for open dialogue among
all parties concerned. I think this is a very important development
in the attitude among the NGOs in Indonesia At great risk those
NGOs participating in the INGI conference adopted a basic position
acknowledging the claim — although not accepting it just like that
— of the resistance movements such as Fretilin.
Concerning the issue itself, I think that we should develop two
approaches towards human rights questions in Indonesia. Firstly,
what happened in East Timor showed clearly that protection of law
is not provided for citizens but that doesn't happen only in East
Timor. I think that the LBH, the Legal Aid Institute of Indonesia,
carried a very heavy burden when the 'mysterious killings' were
carried out against the population several years ago by mysterious
units of the armed forces — as was later acknowledged by President
Soeharto in his book although denied at that time by everybody. I
was the only one who wrote in Kompas about the criminality of
these events. It is a lonely fight to establish the rule of law in
Indonesia and I think we have still a very long way to go. So every
case like the East Timor case is important — a part of the problem of
human rights in Indonesia.
The human rights issue must also be viewed in a wider context,
as there are many many aspects to it. The question of human rights
The 1992 Election 129
concerns so many aspects that I think you can't just talk about human
rights separated from political development or from national
development. That is why I think that acknowledging the problem
of East Timor should be put in a broader context. This is a two-edged
knife. We all have to remember that this is all one part of a broader
context and that the other parts should not be forgotten.
FD has stated its demand that a just process of law with a
presumption of innocence and the full legal process should be
applied to those accused but we still see results that are unfair with
different sentences given to different parts of the same society. And
in my view, if you ask me frankly, I would say that the military
culprits should get more than the civilians. Everywhere in the
world, when military personnel violate the law, they get stiffer
sentences because they are bound by discipline. So now it is all a
farce, it's a joke. I agree that we should feel indignant about this
matter, but without shouting of course.
11
Indonesian Politics in the 1990s
Arief Budiman
A Whisper for Change
The 1992 general election indicated that people want change. This
was demonstrated especially with Golkar's loss of seats in
parliament, as shown in the table below:
Table 1: Parliamentary Elections, 1987 and 1992
Number of Seats
Year PPP Golkar PDI
1987 61 299 40
1992 62 282 56
+1 -17 +16
Source: Kompas, June 16 and 30, 1992
Golkar lost 17 seats, or 4.25 per cent of the total. PDI gained an
additional 16 seats (4 per cent of the total) and PPP got an
additional seat (0.25 per cent). The numbers are quite small, but in a
tightly controlled election they are significant.
PDI, the 'improving' party, appeared the most aggressive in
talking about the need for change. In its campaign, featuring
especially 'rebellious' young people, it talked about having more
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than one candidate for the coming 1993 presidential elec
limiting the president's terms to just two, abolishing business
monopolies, and other critical issues.
PPP also talked about the need for change, but very slightly. It
nominated Mr Soeharto as candidate for his sixth term as president
in the coming presidential election. With this image, PPP resembled
more the Moslem wing of the government, rather than a party that
-offjered^anjMej^tive;! ..
Golkar, of course, talked about the success of the government's
development program. This had to be continued, it argued. It
apologized for mistakes that had been made. It didn't mention yet
who its candidate for president would be, but many of its
campaigners gave a clear indication that it was to be Mr Soeharto
again.2 Golkar, as shown in Table 1, lost 17 of its parliamentary
seats.
Thus, it is not an exaggeration to conclude that the message of
this election is that people want to have change. This message was
spoken softly, like a whisper, because people still did not dare to
say it loudly. However, for the Indonesian public, this whisper is
loud and clear.
Type of Democracy and Social Conflicts
What kind of change do people want? Different people want
different kinds of change. However, there is one thing in common:
people at least want to participate in the decision-making process.
If people were able to participate in this process, they could at least
express their opinions about the widespread practice of nepotistic
monopolism, about government projects that force people to be
resettled with no, or very little, compensation, and about the need
for press freedom. People want to have more democracy.
When one of the most popular PPP campaigners, Mr Sri Bintang
Pamungkas, mentioned that it was possible for PPP to nominate more
than one candidate for the presidency, he was corrected immediately
by the General Secretary of this party.
Mr Suhardiman, for instance, said that Golkar had to vote for the
same pilot who had successfully flown this 'airplane of development'.
Other campaigners mentioned voting for an experienced candidate
who had proved to be successful.
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In this context, it is useful to differentiate between three kinds
of democracy. The first is what I would call loan democracy. This
democracy exists when the state is very strong, so it can afford to be
criticized. A sort of democratic space then emerges in which people
can express their opinion freely. However, when the state thinks
that the criticism has gone too far, it will simply take back the
democracy that it has only lent. The people have no power to resist.
There is, second, limited democracy. This democracy exists when
there is a conflict among the state elites. This conflict also creates
some kind of democratic space. People can criticize one faction of the
'powers that be', and be protected~by~the opposite faction. This kind
of democracy is 'stronger' than the first one, in the sense that the
state cannot simply take it back as in the case of the first type.
However, when the conflict within the elite is over, this democratic
space will probably disappear also.
The third kind is structural democracy. Unlike the other two,
this type of democracy exists because the non-government, socio
political forces (or the civil society*) succeed in organizing
themselves and become balancing counter-forces against the state.
Democracy here is rooted in the structure of the society. Thus, unlike
the other two, the state has no power to simply stop this kind of
democracy.
At present in Indonesia, the most we could have is only the
second type of democracy. The third type is still far away. There
are still many obstacles to overcome before the third type is
achieved.
These obstacles result from the fact that the present civil
society is divided by several conflicts: religious,, racial and class.
Indonesia is divided into the Islamic commuruty„(ihe majority) and
the non-Islamic community _(the_ minority, but quite_powerful,
controlling business and some important state offices). The case of
the weekly TV magazine Monitor in 1990 is one manifestation of this
conflict.4 Moslems are sensitive to anything that is considered as
I am very much aware about the problem of using the bi-polar
concepts of state and civil society. The boundaries between these two
concepts, in reality, are not clear at all. However, for practical
purpose, these concepts are still used here. On the problematic
concept of civil society, see Budiman (1990a) and Taylor (1990).
This weekly magazine ran a public poll to discover which figures were
most popular among youth. The Prophet Mohammad was placed as
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damaging the interests of their religion. This sensitivity is then
used to mobilize the Moslem populace and to oppose all political
manouevres by non-Moslem politicians.
Racial conflict manifests itself in the business community. It is
/"well known that Indonesian (especially big) business is dominated
/ by Sino-Indonesians. At the same time, these Chinese businessmen
^-are-protected byjugh^government officials. They work together as
partners: the former creates economic surplus, the latter provides
political protection. In order that these Chinese are always in need
of state protection, a sort of anti-Chinese sentiment has to be kept
alive.5 This policy, which was practised during the colonial period,
is being implemented again now.
.^""The third obstacle, class contradiction, is the result of the
f capital? st-oriented -development policies, which produce a
widening gap between _the rich and the poor. As mentioned earlier,
even though the living standards of the poor have increased, the
incomes of the rich have risen much faster, especially at the very
top levels. This has created tension among the rich and the poor,
^^wiich-in Indonesia is called kecemburuan sosial, or 'social jealousy'.
~j The worst aspect is the fact that these three contradictions are
/ attached to one identified group: the top businessmen. They are rich,
^mostly Chinese, and mostly^von^Moslem. It is quite logical, then,
that this group becomes the target of this 'social jealousy.' When
this tension runs loose and breaks into social riots, it will damage
the middle class, if not the whole society, who have benefited
substantially from the economic achievements of the New Order
state.
number 11 in the list, even below the chief editor of the magazine,
Arswendo Atmowiloto. This was considered an insult to Moslems.
There were demonstrations in some big cities, and the magazine was
then banned. Mr Atmowiloto was put on trial and was sentenced to
four and a half years in jail. There have been other smaller cases in
which Moslems have reacted to issues considered as insults to their
religion.
This anti-Chinese sentiment is maintained especially among the poor
and the Moslem populace (see Budiman, 1991, pp27-29). The Chinese
are also used by the state bureaucrats as scapegoats for the spread of
bureaucratic corruption and the uneven income distribution.
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Democracy, the Middle and Lower Classes
One of the results of the economic growth produced by the New
Order Government is the growing size of the middle class."
Compared to the 1960s, there is now a substantial middle-class
layer although as a percentage of the total population it is
relatively still very small. It is, however, getting stronger
economically, and eventually politically also. This phenomenon, no
doubt, has become a factor in enhancing the democratization process
of the country.
Despite the fact that the New Order Government has given this
middle class many things, this group also has complaints. There are
several reasons why most factions of this middle class increase their
demand for democratization.
First the 'nepotistic monopolism' in the eomomy hurts many
business people. In spite of the deregulations introduced by . the
government, some regulations creating business monopolies given to
the family of high state officials have been dramatic. The case of
BPPC, the clove trade monopoly, has been the most discussed. This
kind of monopolism does not only hurt big businesses, but it also goes
down to the middle business level. The clove monopoly has hurt
many middle clove traders, as is also the case with the trade
monopoly of citrus fruit in West Kalimantan. With the growing size
of the middle-level business community as a result of the success of
the New Order economic policy, there is an expanding group of more
professional young business people. They want to have a more
liberal economic policy in which they could compete professionally.
They press for more economic deregulation, in order to limit the role
of the state.
Secondly, the professionals alsorhavetheir corhpIairitsT Despite
their increased standard of living, they see that the state,
dominated by the military, is too powerful. This power of the state
The concept of middle class is somewhat problematic. Like a basket,
it contains different kinds of things (see Heryanto, 1990). It is difficult
to have a unified single political view of this group. The business
people may have a different political view from that of the top state
bureaucrats, who also have a different view from the professionals.
However, like the concept of civil society discussed earlier, the middle
class concept is used for practical purpose. The common element is
that this class enjoys relatively high incomes, especially compared to
those at the bottom.
Indonesian Politics in the 1990s 135
has limited their freedom of expression. Journalists are hurt because
their freedom of expression is controlled by the government. The
same applies to academics and intellectuals, whose critical ideas
are suppressed. They need more democratic space.
Thirdly, the state bureaucrats, especially those in high
positions who can use their bureaucratic power to get some economic
gains, are in general quite happy with the present situation.
However, some factions of the military7 are worried about the deep
involvement of the Armed Forces in politics and economics.8 They
are afraid they may get entangled in a complex web of political and
economic corruption, and that their socio-political roles will be the
target of attacks when the winds of change come.
Thus, the middle class seems to agree that a change is needed, in
order that they can extend their roles in enhancing the development
process. However, due to the social conflicts discussed earlier, they
also feel that a strong state is still very much needed. Thus, the
change has to occur within the framework of the existing political
stability. At present, it seems that only the military is able to
provide this. Democracy is still not on the top of the list of demands
from theIndonesian middle class.
Democracy is also the result of the growing strength of the
people at the lower level. Although their standards of living have
increased as the result of economic growth, their lives are not getting
easier. Not only do these people experience difficulties obtaining
employment, but they are also losing their existing jobs. They
become the victims of development projects. Peasants are losing
their land/* people who work in the informal sectors in the big cities
are losing their jobs,10 and industrial workers are being laid off.11
I am not discussing only the retired military people, both members of
the Petisi 50 and those outside this group who are quite vocal. I am
talking also about some military personnel who are still on active
duty.
The core of this critical group was discussed in Jenkins (1984).
For example, in the case of Kedung Ombo, and many others where
the peasants were forced to give up their land — or to sell very
cheaply - to private industrial estates.
For example, due to the local government projects to modernize the
cities to attract tourists, as for instance the abolition of becak in
■ — /
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f These people want to say something about government policies.
However, they are not organized politically. This is due to the
successful control by the government over almost all existing mass
and political organizations in the country. Political parties, student
and youth organizations, and even the NGOs are being subjected to
government control.
The state thus emerges as the strongest institution vis-a-vis the
existing civil society. Of course there is some conflict among factions
of the ruling elite. This conflict creates from time to time some
democratic space. The limited democracy, as was mentioned earlier,
appears and reappears from time to time. However, this democratic
space disappears when the conflict is over. The military, again,
regains control over state power.
Within this context, it seems unrealistic to hope that the
internal political dynamic would produce democracy. The state is
too strong, the civil society is divided, and the state is not only
taking advantage of the social contradictions existing in the civil
society, but also keeps 'disorganizing' civil society to make it weak.
This job, it appears, has been done quite successfully.
The External Factors
If the internal political dynamic gives little chance for the process
of democratization to develop, what of external factors? Consider,
in particular, two recent phenomena.
First, the Dili incident of November 12, 1991, has shaken the
domestic political foundation. For the first time the Indonesian
government appointed an investigation team to go into the matter.
For the first time there was a military tribunal for those who were
involved in the incidents. For the first time some high ranking
generals were removed from their positions. For the first time
President Soeharto, as the BBC television correspondent Peter
Jakarta, or the effort to prohibit the street vendors to operate in
Yogyakarta along Malioboro.
For instance, with the problems faced by the clove cigarette industries
as a result of the government policies to regulate the clove trade.
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Godwin put it, made a speech with a tone 'next to apologizing.'1 ^
Indonesia for the first time realized that it can't afford to play deaf
to international criticism. It can't afford anymore to ignore such
issues as human rights and the environment.1'' Suddenly it realized
that its domestic politics were vulnerable.
Secondly, this vulnerability no doubt has something to do with
the need to get foreign capital. Despite Indonesia's refusal to accept
Dutch aid (which is very small proportionately, so Indonesia can
afford to disregard it), its need for foreign capital can't be concealed.
Thus, after abolishing the IGGI, the CGI14 was created at the
request of the Indonesian Government.
This need to obtain capital from abroad has forced Indonesia to
liberalize its economy. At present, Indonesia is trying harder to
attract foreign investors. A few months ago, the government again
allowed investments which are 100 per cent foreign-owned.1^ There
is no need now to find a domestic partner to operate in Indonesia.
However, even this policy is considered insufficient. Some
prominent Indonesian economists have mentioned that other
countries, such as China and Vietnam, have already adopted more
liberal foreign investment policies. If Indonesia failed to liberalize
its economy, they argue there would be no foreign funds coming into
the country. The fear that foreign investment will dominate the
1^ This was stated in his comment in a television feature, Under the
Volcano, broadcast on June 9, 1992 on BBC television.
1^ In August 1992, in the wake of the Non-Aligned Movement
Conference in Jakarta, the Indonesian parliament 'suddenly'
established committees on Human Rights and on Population and
Environment.
14 IGGI and CGI are international institutions organizing development
aid to Indonesia since 1966. IGGI was chaired by the Dutch, and was
dissolved after the Dili incident. Indonesia accused the Dutch of
intervening in Indonesian domestic politics, by tieing economic aid to
human rights. CGI was established in 1992, excluding the Dutch and
chaired by the World Bank. Both IGGI and CGI have the same
function.
1** However, the minimum amount of capital has to be at least US$50
million. Some economists have criticized this '$50 million minimum'
condition as counter-productive, damaging the main purpose of the
policy itself.
138 Arief Budiman
16 This is what I would call globalization of the civil society. See
Budiman 1990b.
17 This summit meeting was considered very prestigious for President
Soeharto's position in the international forum. Thus, it had to run
smoothly, without any disturbances.
Indonesian economy has to be abandoned, because in many empirical
cases in other countries foreign investment has proven not to kill the
domestic economy, but has stimulated the domestic economy to
grow,' they concluded (Kompas August 20, 1992). These very liberal
attitudes towards foreign aid and investment indicate that
Indonesia is in great need of capital injections.
Thus, both economically and politically, Indonesia has become
more vulnerable. The change from a bi-polar to a uni-polar world
has made it possible for the western countries to intervene in
Indonesian politics and its economy without being afraid of
communists taking advantage of the situation (see Budiman, 1992)^
In relation to the process of democratization, it has become clear
that the domestic struggle to participate in the decision-making
process could be successful if it has some connection with external
factors. The struggle of the Kedung Ombo peasants succeeded after
the INGI (International NGO Forum for Indonesia) organized an
international campaign to pressure the World Bank.1^ The Dili
incident, as discussed earlier, has also proved that external pressurj
is quite effective in influencing Indonesia's domestic politics. Th
recent postponement of the implementation of the infamous Traffii
and T anH Trangportatiniy l-aw ig-alan prnnfifaaf external far-fore are
important in influcing state decisions. The government was afrai
that there would be a national strike by the drivers of public
transportation during the Non-Aligned Movement summit meeting in
Jakarta,1 ' if this law were enforced.
Politics in the 1990s
I would argue that in the 1990s the pressurefdr change wflT
significantly. The majority of the middle class has become more and
more dissatisfied with the practices of state intervention, which
/ have produced nepotistic monopoly in the^ economy. These
' monopolies in turn, have created internal conflicT~anTOhg the
military elites. This conflict then created some sort of democratic
space, which made it possible for some political manouevres to
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happen in society. Strikes among the industrial workers in
Tangerang and other places have occurred more often. These strikes
are spreading to other regions as well, such as those by the public
transportation workers in Yogyakarta in relation to the Traffic and
Land Transportation Law. All these will make it possible for the
people to become more organized politically, in turn enhancing their
power. This eventually will create the structural democracy
mentioned above.
In addition to these factors, the international pressure to
democratize the political system, together with the pressure to
liberalize the economy has come from some powerful states such as
the US.18 This intervention will become more frequent and more
intense in the years to come.
However, in spite of these many pressures, the role of the
military will still be dominant. This is due to the fact that the
middle class, notwithstanding their complaints and grievances, are
still in favour of political stability. To control unexpected eruptions
from below, they need the military. The middle class needs change,
but it has to be done in an orderly way, through the existing
political institutions.
The pressure for change will be channelled especially through
the intellectuals (who don't have any direct contact with the
masses), the press, the NGOs, and other non-mass based
organizations. The lower people, the industrial workers, peasants
and people working in the informal sector, will be kept at bay.
Politics in the 1990s will still be pretty much the same as in the
1980s. However, there will be more pressure for an orderly change.
This means it is unlikely that a mass based 'revolution', such as
occurred in the Philippines a few years ago and Thailand recently,
will take place in present-day Indonesia. If a 'revolution' has to
happen, it will be only a palace 'revolution.'
A few years ago, the then American ambassador in Indonesia, Paul
Wolfowitz, made a farewell speech in which he mentioned the need
to democratize the political system. This comment drew some
negative reactions from certain Indonesian state officials, who
considered it as intervening in Indonesia's domestic politics.
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